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Abstract 
 
This study concerns itself with executive share option plans that have earnings 
per share targets and examines whether the existence of such vesting criteria 
results in opportunistic behaviour by managers or represents efficient 
contracting.  Accounting choices by management are studied to see whether 
earnings per share targets in various executive remuneration components are 
associated with (1) the disclosure of alternative earnings per share, (2) earnings 
management defined as abnormal working capital accruals and (3) earnings 
management defined as meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts. 
To begin with, the current study tests for an association between the disclosure 
of alternative earnings per share figures and earnings per share performance 
criteria in executive share options.  Following Healy (1985) it is argued that 
situations might exist where executives are aware they will not meet the target 
or will overshoot the target giving rise to incentives to manage earnings 
downwards.  There are also situations where executives expect to miss the 
target but have incentives (and scope) to manage earnings upwards.   The 
study then proceeds to measure earnings management using a modified Jones 
(1991) model.  A proxy for target growth in earnings per share is developed.  
The third and final section of the current study considers meeting or beating 
analysts’ forecasts as the earnings management metric.  Prior research 
provides evidence that meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts is rewarded by 
the stock market and as the payout from executive share options is linked to 
share price, executives have incentives to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. 
 
Regression analysis, in the form of either logit or ordinary least squares is 
employed in all three sections of this study.  The results suggest that earnings 
management is associated with earnings per share vesting targets in executive 
share option plans.  Moreover, the findings as a whole suggest that the 
introduction of earnings per share targets as a vesting criterion in executive 
share options resulted in opportunistic behaviour by management. 
 
This thesis adopts an agency theory framework and contributes to the literature 
on corporate governance and executive remuneration by identifying a specific 
contractual setting where management is especially sensitive to reported 
earnings numbers.  This particular setting is novel.  Additionally, the research 
design facilitated the testing of whether or not executive share options with an 
earnings per share growth target result in opportunistic behaviour on the part of 
managers or represent efficient contracting.  
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1.1 Introduction 
 
 
Executives in a company are in an agency relationship with the shareholders.  The 
shareholders are the principals (owners) and the executives are employed as 
agents to manage the company on behalf of the owners.  This separation of 
ownership and control results in the need to monitor the action of the agents in an 
effort to have the agent act in the best interest of the shareholders.  Two 
developments have resulted from this separation of ownership and control.  The 
first is the evolution of regulatory structures such as the legal requirement for an 
annual independent audit, the listing rules of the London Stock Exchange and 
various corporate governance reports and principles.  The second, which is the 
focus of this thesis, is the design of management incentive schemes whose 
objective is the achievement of as much congruence as possible between an 
agent’s own personal objectives and the shareholders’ objective of wealth 
maximisation. 
 
The above developments refer to the UK, but the same would be applicable to US 
firms in that they are subject to their own regulatory structures and legal 
requirements.  Also, similar to the UK, US firms employ executive incentive 
schemes as part of the solution to the agency problem.  An agency problem arises 
from the conflict of interest and information asymmetry between the uninformed 
principal and the informed agent. 
 
Executive compensation is a subject that has received considerable interest from 
the media, academia and the public for several decades and is an area which 
continues to attract attention and controversy.  Lumby and Jones (2003) maintain 
that it is generally recognised that incentive schemes have not been successful, 
except of course for the executives themselves. 
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The key question for this thesis is the issue of whether executive remuneration 
contracts, in particular the structure of those contracts, impact on various company 
accounting choices.  In particular, it addresses the subject of whether executive 
remuneration contracts cause managers to behave in an opportunistic or optimal 
manner with regard to accounting and related disclosure decisions. 
 
 
1.2 Current Remuneration Structure and Issues 
 
Because managers are agents of the principals, the objective facing the designers 
of the components and structure of executive remuneration schemes is to do so in 
such a way as to ensure the agents act to maximise the wealth of the 
shareholders. 
 
Executive compensation has many components: cash, bonus plans, executive 
share option plans (ESOs), long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) and pension 
contributions.  Share options comprise a significant component of executive 
remuneration over the past two decades.   
 
Much early accounting research and policy makers’ deliberations into the issue of 
share options as part of executive remuneration centre on the debate as to how 
these options might be expensed in the accounts and the impact of any decision to 
require their expensing.  As expensing became generally accepted accounting 
practice (GAAP) from 1 January, 2005, focus has moved from this debate.  In 
designing executive remuneration, policy makers would like to know that the 
chosen design has the desired impact in aligning the interests of the agents and 
principles.  One reason performance targets were considered desirable is their 
expected ability to change the focus of management’s decision-horizon from the 
short term to the long term.   
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Recently the failure of firms such as Enron and WorldCom, where the use of ESOs 
was prevalent, brought about new legislation and regulation.  Companies must now 
disclose more information related to executive remuneration, and the expensing of 
share option grants is now mandatory.  
 
To address the agency problem, the vesting of ESOs, while originally contingent 
solely on the passage of time, is now often structured so that their vesting is also 
dependent on the achievement of performance criteria.  In the UK, for ESOs, the 
performance criterion is generally a growth in earnings per share (EPS) over a 
three-year period.   
 
The motivation of this thesis is to consider whether the introduction of a 
performance criterion, as an attempt to address the agency problem caused by the 
perceived long-term focus of shareholders and the short-term focus of 
management, has the desired outcome. 
 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
The substantive objective of this study is to develop and test hypotheses about the 
following accounting choices of firms with EPS targets in their ESOs: 
 
• Disclosure of an alternative EPS figure. 
 
• Earnings management. 
 
• Whether EPS vesting targets are more important to the agent than 
meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts. 
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Ex ante, it is impossible to discern whether the inclusion of a particular 
performance criterion in any component of executive remuneration will lead to 
opportunistic behaviour or efficient contracting.  Thus, a research design is 
employed to test the hypothesis that the addition of an EPS performance criterion 
in executive remuneration components has resulted in management behaving 
either efficiently or opportunistically.  The research design involves classifying 
companies by the distance between actual EPS growth and target EPS growth.  
Testing the hypothesis is mainly achieved through identifying whether the 
performance criterion can be met through earnings management, adopting two 
different indicators of earnings management:   
 
1. abnormal working capital accruals. 
 
2. whether EPS vesting targets are more important to the agent than meeting 
or beating analysts’ forecasts.   
 
The following research questions are addressed in this thesis: 
 
1. What impact does an EPS target in bonus plans, ESOs and LTIPs have on 
the decision to disclose an alternative EPS figure? 
 
2. Is an EPS target in ESOs related to earnings management? 
 
3. How does the difference between actual EPS growth and target EPS growth 
impact on earnings management? 
 
4. Does the direction of the distance between actual EPS growth and target 
EPS growth impact on the direction of earnings management? 
 
5. What is the association between the probability of meeting or beating 
analysts’ forecasts and the existence of an EPS target in ESOs? 
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6. Is the probability of meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts higher in years 
when ESOs with EPS targets are due to vest? 
 
7. Is the probability of meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts dependent on the 
closeness to the target EPS growth required in order for ESOs to vest? 
 
8. What impact do ESOs with EPS targets that are due to vest have on the 
probability of meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts? 
 
9. Are companies close to the target EPS more likely to meet or beat analysts’ 
forecasts? 
 
 
1.4 Research Contribution 
 
The introduction of performance criteria into ESOs provides the motivation for this 
thesis.  This represents a specific contractual structure which provides a unique 
setting in which to study the behaviour of management.  Specifically, this thesis 
considers the impact a performance criterion has on the behaviour of management 
with respect to three accounting choice decisions.  
 
The accounting choice decisions are (1) to disclose an alternative EPS figure, (2) 
to manage earnings relative to the EPS target in the ESOs and (3) meeting or 
beating analysts’ forecasts. 
 
During the period of this research, the majority of ESOs in the UK have three-year 
EPS growth targets which have to be met before any options vest.  Consequently, 
EPS vesting targets are the focus of this thesis.   
 
This research contributes to the literature as follows: 
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• It considers the possibility that contractual considerations may influence 
disclosure choice with respect to earnings performance measures. 
 
• ESOs are identified as the component of executive remuneration most 
associated with the disclosure decision. 
 
• As the definition of the EPS growth target is not disclosed, a proxy EPS 
growth target is devised.  This proxy target is robust in the two studies in 
which it is used: (1) the earnings management study and (2) the analysts’ 
forecast study.  A methodology is developed to determine how close actual 
EPS growth is to the proxy growth target, allowing the firms in the sample to 
be classified by the incentive to manage earnings upwards or downwards.   
 
• The inter-relationship between an EPS target in ESOs and the probability of 
meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts is studied to determine whether 
management has a pecking order in its motivation between these two 
earnings figures. 
 
• The findings in chapter 4 and chapter 5 provide evidence that executives act 
opportunistically when there is an EPS target in their share options. 
 
• This research is important as it helps determine whether the behaviour of 
management as a consequence of a particular performance criterion in 
ESOs can be classified as efficient contracting (the purpose for which a 
performance criterion was introduced) or as opportunistic behaviour. 
 
• Much of the agency research into executive remuneration is set in the US 
environment where EPS targets in ESOs are not common; in the UK 
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performance targets are common and this provides a unique opportunity to 
examine the impact of such targets.   
 
This thesis contributes to the debate between those who argue that the targets 
represent efficient contracting, through better aligning of the principal and agent’s 
incentives, and those who argue that the structure of executive remuneration is a 
result of managerial power, where performance targets are easy or agents have 
influence to manage earnings to these targets.  The development of a proxy for the 
EPS growth target, along with the development of a methodology to classify 
executive behaviour as opportunistic or efficient contracting, is an important 
contribution to the study of the impact of executive compensation contract design. 
 
Despite an effort to link executive remuneration to company performance, Clark 
(2009) states that even after the rapid escalation in Chief Executive Officers’ 
(CEOs) salaries in the US in the boom years of the 1990s: 
 
‘Though there were more stringent efforts to link CEO compensation to 
performance, CEO reward remained at incredibly high levels whether the 
companies they managed did well or not’ (Clark, 2009:6). 
 
Given the above developments, the next section will outline the specific research 
questions addressed in this thesis. 
 
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 2 presents agency theory which provides the underlying theoretical 
framework for this research; it outlines the agency problem facing firms, as a result 
of the separation of ownership and control.  The framework provides an 
understanding of where this study resides in the accounting and finance 
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disciplines.  In addition, it discusses measures which are intended to reduce the 
agency problem. 
 
Having presented the framework for thinking about executive remuneration, 
Chapter 3 provides the motivation for the interest in this topic, and investigates 
whether the existence of an EPS target in executive remuneration components has 
the potential to explain the choice management makes as to whether or not they 
disclose an alternative EPS figure.  This chapter explores whether or not the 
structure of executive compensation contracts helps explain the decision by UK 
firms to disclose an alternative EPS figure.   
 
As Chapter 3 finds that an EPS performance target in ESOs helps explain the 
alternative EPS disclosure decision, this leads this research to focus the remaining 
empirical studies on executive share option plans.  Chapter 4 attempts to consider 
the earnings management decision of firms based on their chance of reaching the 
EPS target which is necessary for their ESOs to vest.  This particular executive 
remuneration structure allows situations to be identified where the incentive is to 
manage earnings downwards.  It also allows the identification of situations which 
might provide executives with incentives to manage earnings upwards. 
 
Having established an association between the existence of an EPS target in 
ESOs with alternative EPS disclosure choice, and the direction of earnings 
management, Chapter 5 considers another accounting choice that management 
make; that is, meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts.  The creation of a proxy for 
target EPS growth, which allows measurement of the distance between target and 
actual growth, opens up opportunities to contribute to the literature on meeting or 
beating analysts’ forecasts.  This chapter considers the pecking order between two 
targets that management are expected to aspire to meet.  It examines whether 
EPS vesting targets are more important to the agent than meeting or beating 
analysts’ forecasts. 
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1.6 Conclusions 
 
This thesis contributes to the literature on corporate governance and executive 
remuneration by identifying a specific contractual setting where management is 
particularly sensitive to reported earnings numbers.  The study of ESOs with an 
EPS growth target enables the identification of the circumstances under which 
management use discretion to achieve a desired reporting objective. 
 
The research design allows sample firm’s executive behaviour to be considered 
under the opposing theories of (1) opportunistic behaviour on the part of 
management and (2) whether or not the inclusion of an EPS target in ESOs results 
in efficient contracting (the purpose for which it is intended).  The research also 
adds to the literature as it considers a particular contractual arrangement, allowing 
the study of management behaviour regarding the direction of earnings 
management, as well as providing an opportunity to determine the preference of 
management among targets. 
 
From the results, it can be concluded that when designing executive remuneration 
contracts, allowance needs to be made for the fact that these contracts may induce 
opportunistic accounting choices that undermine the quality of the information set 
available to investors.  There is a trade-off between providing managers with an 
incentive to produce, on the one hand, value relevant information and, on the 
other, the use of accounting numbers for contracting. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
The key question for this thesis is the issue of whether the structure of 
executive remuneration contracts impacts on various company accounting 
choices.  In particular, it addresses the issue of whether executive remuneration 
contracts cause managers to behave in an opportunistic or optimal manner with 
regard to disclosure and accounting choice decisions. 
 
Positive Accounting Theory (PAT) which is associated with key contributions 
developed by Watts and Zimmerman (1979) is concerned with predicting 
actions such as the choice of accounting policies by firm managers and also in 
predicting how managers will respond to new accounting standards.  Under 
PAT, a firm is viewed as a nexus of contracts, that is, its organisation can be 
largely described by the set of contracts it enters into (Scott, 2003).  Given the 
above, the motivation for the current chapter is to introduce the agency theory 
framework which emanates from a detailed exposition by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976).  Agency theory (a version of game theory) models the process of 
contracting between two parties.  Agency theory provides key concepts and 
insights which need to be understood before one can attempt to pose, let alone 
answer, the above question.  Most research approaches the study of executive 
remuneration from an agency theory perspective. 
 
One of the most important developments in the history of economic progress 
has been the formation of corporations, accompanied by the separation of 
ownership and control.  As a result of this separation of ownership and control 
in the modern firm, economists describe the relationship between shareholders 
(principals) and management (agents) as one where the principals employ 
agents to take actions on their behalf.  A basic assumption of agency theory is 
that individuals are rational, and will seek to maximise their own expected 
utilities; that is, the agent will pursue his or her own objectives rather than those 
of the principal.   
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Financial accounting information has a role in company valuation (determining 
share prices) and in governance (control).  The focus here is on the governance 
role and addresses one such control mechanism, that is, executive 
remuneration compensation contracts.  Agency theory provides a framework for 
modelling the process of contracting between principals and their agents. 
 
Berle and Means (1932) were the first to document the development of the US 
quasi-public company.  They note that the private, closely held company had 
given way to a quasi-public company: 
 
‘a corporation in which a large measure of separation of ownership and 
control has taken place through the multiplication of owners’ (Berle and 
Means, 1932:4). 
 
The image of the modern corporation as being owned by a large number of 
shareholders, each holding a small fraction of the company’s shares, and being 
controlled by professional managers underlines both the agency literature and 
the corporate governance literature (Casson, 2000).   
 
Section 2 provides an overview of the agency theory framework while Section 3 
presents the agency costs that arise from the separation of ownership and 
control.  Section 4, outlines the interplay between corporate governance and 
agency theory; Section 5 discusses how the design of executive remuneration 
contracts can address these costs.  Section 6 presents some alternative 
theories and Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2.2 Theoretical Agency Framework 
 
Agency theory models the process of contracting between two or more persons 
and since each party to a contract attempts to get the best deal, contracting 
under agency theory necessarily involves conflict. 
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Implicit in the complex set of contracts that a firm may be taken to represent are 
various forms of agency relationships.  For example, one such relationship is 
between managers who must make decisions on behalf of the owners, and the 
owners themselves.  Some of these decisions may lead to the managers’ own 
wealth being maximised rather than that of the owners.  Losses resulting from 
such decisions, and expenditures incurred to mitigate them, are referred to as 
agency costs. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) in a detailed theoretical exposition of agency 
theory define the managers of the company as ‘agents’ and the shareholder as 
the ‘principal’.  The principal delegates the day-to-day decision-making in the 
company to the executives who are the shareholder’s agents.  The problem that 
arises as a result of this system of corporate ownership is that the agents do not 
necessarily make decisions in the best interests of the principal.  One of the 
main assumptions of agency theory is that the goals of the principal and agent 
conflict. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that agency costs comprise monitoring 
expenditures, bonding expenditures and a residual loss.  By providing 
appropriate incentives for the agent (and incurring expenditure in monitoring the 
agent’s actions) the principal can better align the interests of the agent with his 
own interests.  Holmström (1979) shows that there are potential gains to 
monitoring, except in the unlikely situation in which the agent's actions cannot 
have negative consequences for the owner.  While perfect monitoring may be 
impossible or too expensive, imperfect monitoring can be used in practice to 
alleviate "moral hazard" through penalizing the agent's dysfunctional behaviour.  
The agent has incentives to make expenditures to guarantee that he will not 
take certain actions to harm the principal’s interest or that he will compensate 
the principal if he does; these are bonding costs.  Watts (1977) explains 
residual loss as follows: 
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‘Finally, even with monitoring and bonding expenditures, the actions 
taken by the agent will differ from the actions the principal would take 
himself… the wealth effect of this divergence in actions [is defined] as 
“residual loss” (Watts, 1977:131). 
 
During the 1960s and early 1970s, economists explored risk-sharing among 
individuals or groups (Arrow, 1971; Wilson, 1968).  This literature describes the 
risk-sharing problem as one that arises when co-operating parties have different 
attitudes towards risk.  Agency theory broadens this risk-sharing debate to 
include the problem that occurs when co-operating parties have different goals 
and there are divisions of labour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). 
 
Risk is considered as playing an important role in agency theory.  Principals are 
assumed to be indifferent to the specific (unsystematic) risk of a single firm, 
because they can diversify this source of earnings variation away by holding a 
diversified portfolio of investments.  However, this will not reduce their exposure 
to the variability in each firm’s returns that is systematically tied to the general 
economic uncertainties.  Given two investment projects of equal systematic risk, 
principals will always prefer the project with the higher expected returns 
(Alchian and Woodward, 1988). 
 
By contrast, agents are risk-averse and forcing managers to bear compensation 
risk is consistent with agency theory (Scott, 2003).  As effort is unobservable 
pay is linked to observable output, but as output is a noisy performance 
measure, the risk-averse agent is exposed to risk in terms of payoff variations 
that are beyond his/her control.  As rational risk-averse individuals, managers 
trade-off risk and return, consequently, the more risk the manager bears the 
higher must be their expected compensation.  To motivate the manager at the 
lowest cost, executive remuneration plans must be designed to achieve the 
most motivation for a given amount of risk imposed. 
 
The central premise of Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency theory model is 
that shareholding causes a de facto delegation of managerial responsibility from 
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a firm’s principals (shareholders) to their upper echelon agents (executives).  
This delegation, in turn, causes a misalignment of incentives due to the 
following: 
 
(1) The goals of the principal and agent conflict due to each party attempting 
to get the best deal for himself. 
 
(2) It is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify the agent’s effort which 
is unobservable.  
 
(3) The principal and agent have different preferences for risk.  
 
The basic model involves a risk-averse agent taking unobservable actions 
which shift the statistical distribution over observable performance measures.  
The resolution is that the principal designs a compensation contract based on 
observable and enforceable performance measures to align the interests of the 
agent with those of the principal.  According to Bushman and Smith (2001) the 
unobservability of the agent’s actions, along with the agent’s risk-aversion, 
results in a “second best” contract in which the principal must trade-off the 
desire to provide incentives against the risk premium that must be paid to the 
agent for bearing risk imposed by the contract. 
 
 
2.3 Agency Costs 
 
Under agency theory a conflict of interest exists between the principal and 
agents as a result of the possibility that agents are maximising their own utility 
to the detriment of the principal’s utility.  These agency problems cannot be 
resolved at no cost due to asymmetric information and the need for risk-sharing 
which means these relationships involve costs to all parties.  As noted above, 
these costs can be defined as the sum of (1) monitoring expenditures by the 
principal, (2) bonding expenditures by the agent, and (3) the residual loss 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).   
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2.3.1 Information Asymmetry 
 
Agency theory studies the design of contracts to motivate a rational agent to act 
on behalf of a principal when the agent’s interests would otherwise conflict with 
those of the principal.  Information asymmetry and agency theory play a central 
role in corporate finance and financial economics.  Information asymmetry is 
said to occur when one group of participants has better or timelier information 
than other groups.  An inevitable consequence of the separation of ownership 
and control is that the agent acquires information about the present and likely 
future performance of the firm that is superior to that acquired by the principal.  
Conflicting interests between agents and principals can lead to suboptimal 
allocation of resources within the firm particularly where at least some relevant 
information is known to some but not all parties.  Moral hazard and adverse 
selection are both due to information asymmetry.   
 
Moral hazard arises when an agent takes advantage of the fact that their 
behaviour is unobservable by the principal, for example when an agent shirks 
their responsibilities (Arrow, 1963).  Other examples include excessive risk 
avoidance by the agent, or choosing projects that entrench them.  In other 
words, the agent’s choice problem is to decide on how much effort to devote to 
running the firm on behalf of the shareholders.  Since effort is unobservable, the 
agent may be tempted to shirk on effort as they are assumed to bear no moral 
burdens.  Agency theory assumes that agents seek to balance the return from, 
and costs of, their efforts.  In addition, agents are perfectly willing, given the 
opportunity, to renege on pledges that they make during contract negotiations 
about the level of effort, skill and knowledge they will provide.  This combined 
with the principal’s inability to monitor completely creates the moral hazard 
problem and results in the need to monitor the agent’s actions.  Holmström 
(1979) suggests that: 
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‘when the [agency relationship] repeats itself over time, the effects of 
uncertainty tend to be reduced and dysfunctional behaviour is more 
accurately revealed, thus alleviating the problem of moral hazard’ 
(Holmström, 1979:90). 
 
Adverse selection alludes to the various ways that managers and other insiders 
can exploit their information advantage at the expense of outsiders, for 
example, by managing the information released to investors.  These actions 
may impact on the investor’s ability to make good investment decisions.  Also, if 
investors are concerned about the possibility of biased information release, they 
will be wary of buying firms’ securities, which will result in both the capital and 
managerial labour markets not functioning optimally. 
 
The principal will attempt to limit both moral hazard and adverse selection costs 
by designing appropriate incentives for agents and by incurring monitoring costs 
designed to limit actions that increase the agent’s welfare at the expense of the 
principal.   
 
 
2.4 Corporate Governance and Agency Theory 
 
The influential book by Berle and Means (1932) sparked off analysis of the 
problem caused by separation of ownership and control.  Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) were among the first to formalise the modern theory of the agency 
problem.  Their work adopts the image of the modern corporation as developed 
by Berle and Means (1932).  Other important contributions to the literature 
include Ross (1973), Mirrlees (1974, 1976), Holmström (1979, 1982), Fama 
(1980), Grossman and Hart (1983), and Holmström and Milgrom (1987). 
 
The corporate governance system is formed by the interaction of a complex set 
of economic factors which help ensure managers act in the best interests of 
shareholders and include the following: 
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• Markets for labour, capital and products. 
 
• The design of incentive contracts. 
 
• Internal governance mechanisms, for example, the separation of 
the role of chairman and chief executive and the appointment of 
non-executive directors to the board. 
 
Lambert (2001) maintains that agency theory is attractive to accounting 
researchers as: 
 
 ‘it allows us to explicitly incorporate conflicts of interest, incentive 
problems, and mechanisms for controlling incentive problems into our 
models’ (Lambert, 2001:4) 
 
Executive remuneration contracts are one corporate governance mechanism 
with which to align the principal and agent’s incentives, that is, mitigate the 
agency problem.  Basic agency models facilitate the study of the trade-off 
between risk-sharing and incentives in the optimal design of executive 
remuneration contracts.  A key consideration in the design of these contracts is 
to balance the amount of risk the remuneration plan places on an agent against 
the strength of the incentive to perform well. 
 
Corporate governance research has focused on determining and understanding 
the mechanisms that mitigate agency problems and thus facilitate this form of 
economic organisation (Bushman, Engel, Milliron and Smith, 2000).  Product 
market competition (Alchian, 1950; Stigler, 1958), the market for corporate 
control (Manne, 1965) and labour market pressures (Fama, 1980) have been 
identified in the literature as pure market forces that discipline managerial 
behaviour.  In other words, this school of thought maintains that these markets 
are, for the most part, efficient in aligning the interests of managers and 
shareholders. 
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2.5 The Role of Executive Remuneration 
 
In addressing the moral hazard and adverse selection forms of information 
asymmetry, the principal has two options.  One option is to discover the agent’s 
behaviour by investing in information systems such as reporting processes and 
a board of directors.  These would reveal the agent’s behaviour to the principal 
and thus address the lack of information issue.  The second option is to contract 
on the outcomes of the agent’s behaviour.  Eisenhardt (1989) argues that while 
the latter option aligns the agent’s preferences with those of the principal, there 
is still a price in so far as risk is transferred to the agent.  This occurs as 
outcomes are not only determined by behaviour; other factors (competitor 
actions, economic climate) may also influence outcomes.  She also maintains: 
 
‘the heart of principal-agent theory is the trade-off between (a) the cost of 
measuring behavior and (b) the cost of measuring outcomes and 
transferring risk to the agent’ (Eisenhardt, 1989:61).  
 
This implies that through the provision of appropriate incentives for the agent 
and by incurring expenditure in monitoring the actions of the agent, the principal 
can better align the agent’s interests with those of his own.  An agent is 
considered to be more likely to act in the interests of the firm’s principal 
(shareholders) if he gets a share of the firm’s profit as part of his remuneration 
contract.  Additionally, it may be effective for agents to incur expenditures in 
bonding themselves to act in ways consistent with the interests of the principal.  
It is generally impossible for the principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure 
that the agent will not take certain actions that will harm the principal.  The 
monitoring and bonding expenditures are only incurred to the extent that they 
are expected to result in an equivalent reduction in the costs to the principals of 
divergences of interests.  Thus, more likely than not, some divergence will 
remain, and the consequent reduction in firm value is called residual loss. 
 
 39  
In a Jensen and Meckling (1976) framework, the firm is viewed as a nexus of 
contracts between all stakeholders.  However, corporate finance concentrates 
on the following two contracts: 
 
(1) Those between the principal as owners and the management as their 
agent. 
 
(2) Those between the firm and its debt holders. 
 
A compensation literature has evolved as a branch of governance research, 
and the role of financial accounting information in managerial incentive 
contracts is a large body of this research.  With respect to executive 
compensation, Bushman and Smith (2001) evaluate the use of externally 
reported financial accounting data in control mechanisms; one such internal 
control mechanism being managerial incentive plans.  Bushman and Smith 
(2001) categorise the empirical compensation research around three distinct 
approaches.  The first approach examines agency theory inspired predictions 
using pay-performance sensitivities and relies primarily on the “informativeness 
principle” of Holmström (1979).  The second takes the contract as exogenous 
and examines earnings management behaviour motivated by the contract 
structure and emanates from PAT.  The third examines firm performance after 
the adoption of specific compensation plan features.   
 
The informativeness principle contends that in the design of remuneration 
contracts, total value is increased by reducing the error with which the 
performance is measured.  Whether executive remuneration plans’ performance 
measurement is based on accounting returns or market returns should reflect a 
trade-off between risk and incentives.  A key consideration in designing a 
management compensation contract is the signal-to-noise measure (Baker, 
1987), that is, the higher the signal-to-noise ratio, the more information about 
managerial effort captured in the performance measure can be distinguished 
from the random noise in the measure.  Lambert and Larcker (1987) consider 
whether an accounting-based measure or a market-based measure is optimal.  
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They contend that market-based measures, while attractive to shareholders, 
may not be the best indicators of managerial effort.  Given that share price and 
accounting income have different signal-to-noise ratios and communicate 
different information, it can often make sense to use both measures in 
combination. 
 
The research in this thesis is based within the second category and concerns 
itself with decisions made by management given a specific contract design 
feature.  This approach flows from the PAT literature whose main objective is to 
develop an empirically testable theory of accounting policy choice based on the 
value of accounting numbers in formal contracting arrangements, for example, 
compensation or debt contracts.  One such study by Healy (1985) considers 
bonus plans with lower thresholds (bogey) and upper limits (cap).  Guidry, 
Leone and Rock (1999) provide a comprehensive comparison of the empirical 
designs adopted in this literature. 
 
Three accounting choices for executive compensation structures are examined 
in this thesis: the disclosure of an alternative EPS figure; accruals management; 
and meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts.  Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001) 
classify the accounting choice literature into three groups based on the market 
imperfection that makes accounting important in a given setting: agency costs, 
information asymmetries, and externalities affecting non-contracting parties.  It 
is important to note that contracts are costly to write and often do not consider 
all possible outcomes or all possible responses by the agent.  Managerial 
opportunism arguably arises when managers act to exploit imperfectly designed 
contracts to their own benefit. 
 
 
2.5.1 The Role of Risk and Relative Performance Evaluation 
 
From an efficient contracting perspective, excessive risk is costly to the firm.  In 
the incentive compensation literature, principals (shareholders) base 
compensation on observable outcomes when they are unable to observe an 
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agent’s efforts.  When executives are risk-averse and shareholders are risk-
neutral, Holmström (1982) demonstrates that compensating executives for the 
part of the outcomes under their control and filtering out the common 
uncertainty not under their control, results in more efficient incentive contracts. 
 
This theory of relative performance evaluation (RPE), a risk-reducing device, 
was developed by Holmström (1982) with the intention of reducing extraneous 
risk, which should be an objective in the design of executive compensation 
contracts.  The RPE concept states that by setting awards relative to the 
average performance of other firms in the industry, systematic risk will be 
filtered out of an incentive plan.  This, Holmström (1982) maintains, is 
particularly true if the number of firms in the industry is large, implying that the 
result would be a closer association between effort and performance.  This 
principle would lead to the conclusion that a manager’s compensation should 
not be linked simply to the firm’s share price or earnings performance but to the 
amount that the firm’s share returns or earnings exceed the return on the 
market in general or other firms in the same industry.  ESOs are an important 
component of executive remuneration in the UK (Main, 2006) and while these 
share options are generally not indexed to industry or market share movements 
they are, in general, indexed to common risk in the form of the Retail Price 
Index (RPI).  As common risk meets the definition of RPE, relative performance 
plays a role in the remuneration contracts of UK firms. 
 
 
2.5.2 Agency Theory and Executive Remuneration 
 
As discussed above, information asymmetry in the forms of moral hazard and 
adverse selection creates the need for governance mechanisms.  Agency 
theory maintains that goal conflict may arise because principals delegate 
authority to agents, and agents are independent actors (Gomez-Mejia and 
Wiseman, 2006).  Costly contracting represents a possible solution to the 
inherent conflicts of interest between agents and principals.  Fama (1980) 
maintains the extent to which it is necessary to rely upon costly contracting is 
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dependent in part on the nature of markets for managerial labour.  A perfectly 
competitive management labour market will result in the present value of 
managers’ future wages being adjusted to reflect excessive perquisite 
consumption.  Such ex post settling up would discipline managers to behave in 
the firm’s best interest.  Likewise, in a perfect capital market, deviations from 
firm value maximisation would be identified and eliminated through takeovers.  
Given that the extent of competition in these markets is a moot point, this study 
is based on the assumption that the inherent conflicts between agents and 
principals are not resolved through these markets. 
 
The original and foremost paradigm, optimal contracting, informs much of the 
research by financial economists on executive compensation.  It is based on the 
incentive alignment hypothesis, which assumes that boards design 
compensation contracts to align managers’ interests with those of shareholders 
thus mitigating agency problems (Hanlon, Rajgopal and Shelvin, 2003).  It is 
believed that efficient compensation contracts should link pay to performance 
thus providing executives with incentives to maximise shareholder value.  This 
research attempts to explain the various features of executive compensation 
and cross-sectional variation in compensation practices among firms.  Surveys 
of this work include Murphy (1999) and Core, Guay and Larcker (2003). 
 
Jensen and Murphy (2004) maintain that observed compensation practice is 
inconsistent with agency models of optimal contracting.  The findings in 
Yermack (1995) are similar in spirit and he concludes that many leading 
principal-agent compensation theories are not supported by empirical findings.  
He tests theories as to why companies award share options to their top 
managers, and suggests that few theories based on the agency or financial 
contracting literature can explain actual awards of share options to CEOs.  One 
theory supported is that firms facing internal liquidity problems shift the mix of 
pay away from cash salaries and bonuses and towards share options.  Yermack 
(1995) maintains that share option incentives are not decreased as financial 
leverage increases, a move which would reflect attempts by firms to reduce 
agency costs of debt.   
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In contrast to the finding of Yermack (1995), and in support of the optimal 
contract approach, Core and Guay (1999) predict and find that firms set optimal 
levels of CEO equity incentives and that firms use new grants of equity 
incentives (share options and restricted shares) to correct deviations from these 
optimal incentive levels. 
 
 
2.6 Alternative Theories 
 
This research, based on the agency model, has lead to more questions than it 
has answered, and has not provided satisfactory guidelines with respect to 
explaining the structuring of executive compensation remuneration.  
Consequently, there has been a search for alternative theories to explain 
executive compensation pay patterns and practices.  Two such theories which 
are relatively new and have yet to provide proven insights, are the managerial 
power and the perceived cost perspectives. 
 
 
2.6.1 The Managerial Power Approach 
 
Under the optimal contracting approach, executive remuneration is set by a 
board of directors who aim to maximise shareholder value.  In contrast, the 
managerial power approach suggests that boards do not operate at arm’s 
length and that management extract excessive pay (rents).  It is important to 
note that the proponents of the managerial power approach – Bebchuck, Fried 
and Walker (2002) – suggest that it be employed in tandem with the optimal 
contracting approach, not as an alternative.  This makes their theory difficult to 
test, as it does not produce falsifiable propositions just ex post rationalisation.  
They argue that combining the optimal contracting approach and the 
managerial power approach is necessary as the optimal contracting fails, on its 
own, to explain executive compensation practices.   
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Bebchuck et al. (2002) argue that the influence of managerial power on 
executive compensation can better explain various features of executive 
compensation arrangements and cross-sectional variation in compensation 
practices among firms.  They further claim that boards deviate from optimal 
contracting and executives can receive excess pay (rents).  Inefficient pay 
structures can result from the need to camouflage or facilitate this extraction of 
rents.  “Excessive” option grants is one of the primary means by which 
excessive pay is extracted.  Other ways include backdating (adjusting grant 
dates to earlier dates when share prices were lower); spring-loading (the 
practice of scheduling an option grant before the release of good news); and 
bullet-dodging (the practice of delaying a grant until after bad news so the 
options are granted at a lower price). 
 
A critical building block of the managerial power approach is that of “outrage” 
costs and constraints.  The fact that executives can exert influence over their 
own pay does not imply that there are no constraints on their ability to do so.  
The more outrage a compensation arrangement is expected to generate, the 
more reluctant directors will be to approve the arrangement, and the more 
hesitant managers will be to propose it in the first instance (Bebchuck et al. 
2002).  Hence managers have an incentive to “camouflage” their extraction of 
rent to reduce outrage costs.  This desire to camouflage might lead to the 
adoption of inefficient compensation structures. 
 
Bebchuck et al. (2002) conclude that managerial power and rent extraction play 
a significant role in executive compensation and this conclusion has important 
implications for the study, regulation and practice of corporate governance. 
 
Some basis for the managerial power hypothesis can be found, for example, in 
research that provides some evidence that members of the board of directors 
serve at the discretion of the CEO (Hermalin and Weisback, 1998; Shivdasani 
and Yermack, 1999). 
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2.6.2 The Perceived Cost Approach 
 
Murphy (2002) refutes the managerial power argument with the following line of 
reasoning: 
 
‘The escalation in executive pay in the 1990s coincided with 
increasingly independent corporate boards; CEOs hired from 
outside with no ties to existing boards enjoy especially attractive 
packages; and trends in option grants continued despite 
increased disclosure, refuting the outrage consequences 
argument’ (Murphy, 2002: 850). 
 
Along with refuting the managerial power approach, Murphy (2002) also 
maintains that optimal contracting cannot explain the profusion of broad-based 
option plans.  Two assumptions underpin his theory; first the Black and Scholes 
(1973) model overvalues options for undiversified, risk-averse employees, and 
second, companies perceive options to be inexpensive because of the 
favourable accounting treatment.  This favourable accounting treatment meant 
that before 1 January 2005, no accounting expense was required to be 
recorded when a company granted share options.  This theory generates 
predictions consistent with a variety of predictions and practices cited by 
Bebchuck et al. (2002) including the absence of relative performance criteria, 
uniform exercise prices, and repricing.  Murphy (2002) maintains the perceived 
cost view also helps explain the growth of broad-based option plans, as the 
granting of share options to all employees is difficult to justify from either an 
optimal contracting or managerial power approach.   
 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter provides the framework in which this thesis resides.  This research 
focuses on a particular structure of executive remuneration, that is, the 
existence of an EPS target in executive remuneration contracts.  The structure 
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of executive remuneration contracts is one corporate governance mechanism 
with which to address the issues caused by the separation of ownership and 
control.  This separation is at the core of agency theory, a perspective which 
maintains the principal and agent’s motives diverge leading to agency costs.  
Corporate governance mechanisms represent ways to reduce these costs and 
principals would aim to structure executive remuneration so as to better align 
the interests of the principal and the agent. 
 
All the initial approaches to the study of share options as a component of 
executive compensation were based on agency theory predictions (the 
incentive alignment perspective) which underpin a substantial body of research 
starting with Jensen and Meckling (1976).  This view suggests that option 
contracts can help align managers’ incentives with those of shareholders.  
Agency theory focuses on the contract between the principal and the agent and 
aims to indicate the most efficient contract alternative in a given situation.  
Being rooted in economics, it is dominated by a single paradigm, and a single 
view of human nature, self-interest (Eisenhardt, 1989).  It has been found 
lacking and it is often recommended that it be used in tandem with other 
theories which will help capture some complexity of organisations that agency 
theory ignores.  As this paradigm failed to explain actual executive 
remuneration practices, this resulted in a search for alternative theories to 
explain the level and/or structure of executive remuneration practice.  Two 
widely cited alternative theories are the managerial power approach and the 
perceived cost approach. 
 
The initial research into share options focused not on their effectiveness but on 
the question of how the accounting expense should be measured.  Overall, 
there still remains a question over whether executive remuneration as 
structured, including the provision of ESOs, is such that it results in the 
achievement of a firm’s objective, that is, maximising long-term shareholder 
value. 
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The company accounting choices observed in this thesis support the optimal 
contracting approach to the extent that the inclusion of a performance target in 
ESOs should result in a better alignment of the principal and agent’s incentives.  
Assuming the performance measure - growth in EPS - conveys information 
about the agent’s effort levels, the informativeness principle supports its use in 
remuneration contracts.  In agreement with Bebchuck et al. (2002), managerial 
power explains the results if the composition of the EPS target is set by 
management, or if they are managing earnings to achieve the performance EPS 
figure, then rent extraction can occur.  As Bebchuck et al. (2002) argue, 
managerial power will not, on its own, explain executive remuneration practice; 
presumably executives would prefer no performance criterion.  
 
A caveat to the conclusions of this thesis is that only share options granted to 
executives are considered; this renders the perceived cost theory less relevant 
as broad-based share option plans are not taken into account.  Residual loss 
under optimal contracting is unlikely to explain such relatively consistent results 
across the disclosure and accounting choice studies in this thesis.  
Furthermore, assuming the goal of the principal is long-term performance, an 
EPS target would conflict with this as it is a short-term performance measure. 
 
The next chapter will consider one accounting choice available to managers, 
that is, whether or not an alternative EPS figure is disclosed.  This choice will be 
examined with reference to three components of executive remuneration, 
namely the bonus plans, ESOs and LTIPs, with a view to testing for any 
association between the decision to disclose and the structure of executive 
remuneration.  In particular, the existence of an EPS performance target in each 
of these executive remuneration components will be studied with a view to 
determining whether any association exists between an EPS target and the 
decision to disclose an alternative EPS figure. 
 
This thesis involves investigating the association between an EPS performance 
target in executive remuneration contracts and accounting decisions.  Each of 
the next three chapters will present and review the literature relevant to the 
 48  
particular research questions addressed.  Chapter 3 will review the accounting 
choice literature, Chapter 4 will review the earnings management literature and 
Chapter 5 will review the analysts’ forecasts literature.  While these three 
chapters present and consider literature specific to the research question they 
address, each is considered as falling within the ambit of the agency theory 
framework presented in this chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
The Earnings per Share Disclosure Decisions of UK Firms: 
The Effect of Executive Compensation Contracts 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter adopts an accounting choice perspective to understand why firms 
disclose an alternative EPS measure.  The accounting choice literature has its 
foundation in PAT.  The accounting choice which is of interest is whether or not 
firms choose to disclose an alternative EPS figure.  Recent research in the UK 
(on which this chapter builds) by Choi, Lin, Walker and Young (2005) 
investigates the motives for disclosing an adjusted EPS figure.  Their findings 
support the disclosure decision as an effort by management to report adjusted 
EPS when this is a better measure of sustainable earnings and also agree with 
the more recent findings in Choi, Lin, Walker and Young (2007).  These findings 
are in line with those of Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen and Larson (2003) 
whose research is based on US firms and Choi, Lin, Walker and Young (2005).  
However, Choi et al. (2005) do not consider the possibility that contractual 
considerations may also influence disclosure choice with respect to earnings 
performance measures. 
 
There are two perspectives for thinking about accounting choice.  The first holds 
that managers are acting opportunistically to influence one or more of the firm’s 
contractual arrangements.  The main contracting arrangements considered are 
executive remuneration contracts and debt contracts.  Under this perspective 
managers seek either to secure their jobs, reputation and compensation or to 
transfer wealth to shareholders from other bondholders.   
 
The alternative perspective, efficient contracting (value maximising), maintains 
that managers make accounting choices that minimise agency costs, and thus 
their incentives are aligned with those of shareholders (Holthausen, 1990).  It is 
often not easy to test which perspective is accurate as indeed it may be the 
case that some firms are opportunistic and others are not.  In addition, it may be 
the case that some firms are only opportunistic under certain circumstances, for 
example, when times are bad or survival is threatened. 
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The objective of this chapter is to explore whether the existence of an EPS 
target in executive remuneration components has the potential to explain an 
accounting choice decision of management as to whether or not they disclose 
an alternative EPS figure.   
 
Following Healy (1985), a number of papers have attempted to demonstrate a 
link between the details of the executive compensation contract and the 
accounting choices of firms.  In his seminal article, Healy (1985) linked income-
smoothing decisions to the structure of US bonus plans under which no bonus 
was paid until a minimum level of performance (bogey) was achieved and the 
bonus was capped beyond a certain specified level of performance. 
 
For many executives, both in the UK and the US, share-based compensation 
(SBC) such as ESOs and LTIPs have become by far the most important form of 
performance-related pay, with the bonus element becoming relatively 
unimportant (Murphy, 2002). 
 
Superficially, one might have expected SBC schemes to have broken the link 
between accounting-based measures of performance and performance-related 
pay.  However, many firms use SBC contracts that make explicit use of 
accounting-based performance measures.  For example, many executive 
compensation contracts require specific accounting-based performance targets 
to be achieved in order for options to vest. 
 
In this chapter, the use of EPS performance vesting criteria in the executive 
compensation contracts of 276 UK-listed firms is documented.  Then the 
relationship between the existence of an EPS performance criterion in various 
components of executive remuneration (bonus plans, ESOs and LTIPs) and the 
EPS disclosure choice of the firms in the sample is explored.  While the results 
suggest that there is a link, the research design does not allow determination of 
whether this result is due to opportunism or efficient contracting.  Chapters 4 
and 5 adopt a research design which allows analysis of the findings in terms of 
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opportunism or efficient contracting and the results of those latter two chapters 
together allow a conclusion to be reached. 
 
The research question of interest is whether or not the presence of an EPS 
target in executive compensation components increases the probability that 
firms will disclose an alternative EPS figure.  The objective is to contribute to the 
literature on the effects of the structure of compensation contracts on 
accounting choices of firms.  EPS is an appropriate focus for this research as 
(concurrent with the findings of this study) Conyon and Mallin (1997), and 
Stathopoulos, Espenlaub and Walker (2004) report that EPS was by far the 
most commonly employed performance criterion for ESOs.   
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a brief 
explanation of ESOs, Section 3 presents the institutional background; Section 4 
provides a brief review of the accounting choice literature; Section 5 looks at 
other studies which address the impact of compensation contracts on 
accounting choice; Section 6 outlines the data and methodology and presents 
the findings; and the last section concludes.   
 
 
3.2 Executive Share Options 
 
Executive share options are options granted to company executives to 
purchase company shares, for a price (exercise price) usually equal to or close 
to the share price on the options’ grant date.  ESOs generally extend for a 
period between three and ten years, and the holder of the options has no voting 
rights and receives no dividend prior to exercising the options.  The grant date 
is the date at which the employer and the executive have a mutual 
understanding of the terms of the share options.  Vesting date is the date on 
which an executive, having satisfied all the conditions necessary, becomes 
unconditionally entitled to the options.  These conditions generally include the 
executive remaining in the company, usually until, at the earliest, the vesting 
date.  In addition, the right to exercise the executive options may be contingent 
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upon the achievement of company performance targets, and not simply lapsed 
time (Conyon, Peck, Read and Sadler, 2000).  These targets could be, for 
example, growth in EPS, growth in share price etc.  In addition, executives 
cannot sell their options, and if they leave the company prior to the end of the 
vesting period, the options are generally forfeited.  If executives leave the 
company after the vesting date, they must immediately exercise their options or 
forfeit them.  Exercise date is the date the option to purchase shares is 
exercised by the executive. 
 
Intrinsic value is the amount by which the market price of the underlying share 
exceeds the exercise price of an option.  The fair value of a share option 
consists of both intrinsic value and time value.  Time value is determined by the 
length of time until an option expires; the longer the time to expiry, the greater 
the time value of an option. 
 
 
3.3 Institutional Background 
 
SBC to executives continues to attract attention as a result of the high payouts 
and the perceived lack of a relationship between performance and pay.  At first, 
the only SBC element of executive compensation plans were ESOs which 
traditionally had zero intrinsic value at the date of grant and had no performance 
conditions attached to their vesting.  In other words, vesting was solely 
dependent on the lapsing of time.  In the US, ESOs fell out of favour in the 
1970s following a prolonged depression in the US stock market (Jensen and 
Murphy, 2004).  During the period 1992–98, Jensen and Murphy (2004) 
estimate that the annual dollar value of option awards to CEOs increased by 
more than 300 percent.   
 
In the UK, the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003) states that a 
significant proportion of executive directors’ remuneration should be structured 
so as to link rewards to corporate and individual performance.  Unlike the US, 
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the UK share options received by executives are often subject to performance 
criteria prior to vesting.  
 
Since its original introduction (in the 1960s in the US), the SBC of executives 
has undergone two significant changes, namely the addition of LTIPs and the 
inclusion of performance criteria in both ESOs and LTIPs.  
 
LTIPs were launched in the UK in 1995 (Buck, Bruce, Main and Udueni, 2003). 
 
‘Options in the United Kingdom became controversial in 1995, after 
executives in several recently privatised electric utilities exercised 
options worth millions of pounds.  The influential Greenbury Report 
(1995) encouraged companies to replace their option plans with LTIP 
share plans’ (Conyon and Murphy, 2000: 666). 
 
Since LTIPs have a zero exercise price, their advantage from the firm’s point of 
view is that firms may award less in number than under an executive share 
option plan whilst providing the same potential payout to the recipient.  This 
reduction in the number of shares, in addition to addressing the concern over 
the large number of shares options granted, also dispelled some of the unrest 
over the dilutive effect of large option grants.  Despite the introduction of LTIPs, 
large payouts continued even in firms where performance was bad which gave 
rise to the second change in SBC, that is, the attachment of performance 
criteria to many ESO plans and LTIPs (a recommendation of the 1995 
Greenbury Report). 
 
The attachment of performance criteria in the UK occurred after the Association 
of British Insurers (ABI) issued guidelines in July 1999 to cover many practical 
aspects of share schemes (Share Incentive Schemes – A Statement of 
Principles).  These principles are endorsed by the National Association of 
Pension Funds (NAPF) and are intended to provide a framework for assessing 
company share schemes.  They include a requirement that performance 
conditions should be challenging, that achievement should be demanding, be 
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measured relative to a peer group or other relevant benchmark, and be 
disclosed.  While not legally binding, these guidelines have been influential, and 
consequently the majority of UK firms have included performance criteria in 
their ESOs and LTIPs.   
 
During the period of this research evidence, share options are the dominant 
form of long-term incentives in the UK and many companies have both share 
option plans and LTIPs in place: 90.2 percent of mid-250 companies have 
ESOs and 47.1 percent have LTIPs for firms with year-ends between May 2002 
and June 2003 (Directors’ Pay Report, 2003).  This is broadly consistent with 
the findings in this study: 93.1 percent of the sample firms have ESOs and 57.6 
percent have LTIPs.  The dominance of ESOs in executive remuneration 
contracts has reduced significantly in more recent years, for example, Ozkan 
(2009) reports that, in money terms, ESOs accounted for 45 percent of CEO 
compensation in 2000; this falls to 5.4 percent in 2005.  This is believed to be 
due to the requirement to expense ESOs from 1 January 2005. 
 
 
3.3.1 The Earnings per Share Financial Reporting Standard  
 
The standard governing the disclosure of EPS in the UK is Financial Reporting 
Standard 3 (FRS 3), Reporting Financial Performance issued by the Accounting 
Standards Board (ASB) in 1992.  FRS 3 requires only one basic EPS number to 
be included in published financial statements and importantly, the precise 
definition of how this basic EPS is to be calculated is provided in FRS 3.  Basic 
EPS is calculated on earnings after both exceptional and extraordinary items.  
Where a firm chooses to disclose an alternative EPS measure, the standard 
requires the chosen alternative to be calculated consistently over time and the 
standard also requires that the alternative figure should be reconciled to the 
FRS 3 EPS figure.  In addition, any alternative EPS figure should be disclosed 
with an equal or lower level of prominence as the FRS 3 EPS figure.  FRS 3 
allows but does not require firms to disclose an alternative EPS figure (Walker 
and Louvari, 2003). 
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The selection of the alternative EPS figure, as the variable of interest, is 
pertinent to the research question given the fact that management have control 
over whether or not an alternative EPS figure is disclosed and they can decide 
how it is calculated.   
 
This study builds on a study by Choi et al. (2005) which examines the motives 
for disclosing an adjusted EPS figure.  Their findings broadly support the 
hypothesis that the disclosure decision can be explained as an effort by 
management to report adjusted EPS when this is a better measure of 
sustainable earnings than the FRS 3 EPS figure.  Their findings largely support 
the efficient contracting (value relevance) reason for disclosing alternative EPS 
as opposed to the disclosure decision being a manifestation of opportunistic 
behaviour by management.  This study considers additional variables (the 
existence of an EPS performance criterion in three elements of managers’ 
compensation contracts: bonus, options and LTIPs) which are added to the 
empirical model in Choi et al. (2005) with the intention of testing whether the 
goodness of fit of the model improves.  The objective is to test for any evidence 
of a link between the existence of an EPS criterion in executive remuneration 
contracts and the disclosure of an alternative EPS figure.  Finding evidence of a 
link would then provide grounds for expanding the research to see if this 
disclosure decision can be categorised as opportunistic behaviour or efficient 
contracting. 
 
 
3.4 Accounting Choice Literature 
 
Fields et al. 2001 who critique the accounting choice literature from the 1990s1 
provide a comprehensive definition of accounting choice: 
 
‘An accounting choice is any decision whose primary purpose is to influence 
(either in form or substance) the output of the accounting system in a 
                                            
1
 Bernard (1989) and Dopuch (1989) review the accounting choice literature in the 1980s; 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1983), and Lev and Ohlson (1982) review the literature prior to the 
early 1980s. 
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particular way, including not only financial statements published in 
accordance with GAAP, but also tax returns and regulatory findings’ (Fields 
et al. 2001:256). 
 
While earnings management is a particular form of accounting choice, not all 
accounting choice is concerned with earnings management.  In contrast, by 
definition all earnings management necessarily involves accounting choice.  
Examples of accounting choice decisions include the choice of LIFO versus 
FIFO, structuring a lease to be an operating lease as opposed to a finance 
lease, choices on the level of disclosure and choices on the timing of the 
adoption of a new standard.  Increasing production to reduce cost of goods sold 
by reducing per unit costs, and reducing research and development 
expenditures to increase earnings, are often cited examples of real decisions 
that qualify under the definition of accounting choice above.  Francis (2001) 
divides accounting choice activities between real decisions with direct cash flow 
implications and accounting decisions with no real effects.  This classification is 
important: 
 
‘the motivation for a real decision may be unrelated to the accounting while 
the motivation for a purely accounting decision must be related to the 
outcome’ (Francis, 2001:311). 
 
The accounting choice literature has its foundation in PAT.  This theory 
attempts to predict actions such as the accounting policy choice a firm is likely 
to make; it also examines the determinants of accounting choice.  PAT is 
consistent with the existence of economic consequences as it considers the 
consequences of accounting choice.   
 
The predictions made by PAT are largely organised around three hypotheses, 
formulated by Watts and Zimmerman (1986).  The three hypotheses are as 
follows: 
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1. The bonus plan hypothesis which predicts that managers with bonus 
schemes are more likely to make accounting choices that shift reported 
earnings from future periods to the current period to increase reported 
income (Scott, 2003).  Under this hypothesis, managers are assumed to 
maximise their own payout. 
 
2. The debt covenant hypothesis predicts that closeness to debt covenants 
(may be in the form of predetermined levels of debt to equity, interest 
coverage, working capital, and shareholders’ equity violations) induce 
income-increasing accounting choices.  The underlying rationale of this 
hypothesis is that an increase in reported income reduces the probability 
of default for the firm.  In cases of default, the debt agreements often 
impose penalties such as constraints on dividends or additional 
borrowing, which essentially restrict managerial actions.  Both DeFond 
and Jiambalvo (1994) and Sweeney (1994) find that managers use 
accounting choices to avoid violating debt covenants.  Under this 
hypothesis, managers are assumed to maximise the welfare of 
shareholders. 
 
3. The political cost hypothesis predicts that the agent of very large firms 
(proxy for political costs faced by a firm) will choose more conservative 
accounting policies than managers of small firms, and will be less likely 
to oppose standards that may lower reported income (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986).  Under this hypothesis, managers are assumed to 
maximise the value of the firm. 
 
Empirical research has found support mainly for the bonus plan hypothesis, and 
slight support for the political cost hypothesis, but only weak support for the 
debt covenants hypothesis (Bowen, DuCharme and Shores, 1999; Fields et al. 
2001; Holthausen, 1981). 
 
Consistent with Watts and Zimmerman (1986) and Holthausen and Leftwich 
(1983), Fields et al. (2001) classify accounting choice issues by the purpose 
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they serve and the problem they overcome.  They specify three goals or 
motivations for accounting choice: 
 
• Contracting or managerial opportunism. 
 
• Asset pricing or economic efficiency (signalling). 
 
• Influencing external parties. 
 
The following sections will now provide some insight into the research in each of 
these categories which will help place this research in context. 
 
 
3.4.1 Contracting or Managerial Opportunism 
 
PAT makes predictions as to how managers will act in response to the 
existence of bonus plans and/or debt covenants based on reported financial 
accounting numbers.  These contracts aim to mitigate two conflicts: firstly, 
internal conflicts (owner-manager) in the case of management compensation 
contracts and secondly, external conflicts (bondholder-shareholder and current 
owner–potential owner) in the case of bond contracts. 
 
PAT provides the motivation for studies on whether the existence of such 
contracts provides incentives to choose particular accounting methods to 
achieve desired financial reporting objectives.  Two of the three hypotheses of 
PAT, the bonus plan hypothesis and the debt covenant hypothesis, will be 
discussed in this section.  The third, the political cost hypothesis, is discussed in 
Section 3.4.3. 
 
The bonus plan hypothesis claims that managers with bonus plans are more 
likely to choose accounting methods that shift reported earnings from future 
periods to the current period, ceteris paribus. 
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The debt covenant hypothesis postulates that the closer a firm is to violation of 
accounting-based debt covenants, the more likely the manager is to select 
accounting procedures that shift reported earnings from future periods to the 
current period, ceteris paribus. 
 
Much research has studied the impact of executive compensation contracts on 
accounting choices (see Section 3.5.1) as the structure of managerial 
compensation contracts leads to interesting research questions.  There may be 
a bonus linked to financial reporting numbers, share options where payout 
depends on share price performance or perhaps some element of executive 
remuneration linked to total shareholder return.  One such question is why, in 
the first instance, executive compensation contracts allow managerial 
accounting discretion.  Reasons suggested include: 
 
• The potential for managers to signal. 
 
• The cost of flexibility is less than the cost of eliminating all choice. 
 
• It may be less costly to allow managers manipulate accruals than the 
alternative which is to manage real transactions, for example, reduce 
research and development expenditure. 
 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggest that although managers may increase 
their compensation when given financial reporting discretion, this discretion also 
improves the alignment of their interests with those of shareholders.  It is 
possible that higher accounting earnings means higher share values or lower 
probability of debt covenant violations. 
 
In general, researchers conclude that managers select accounting methods to 
increase their compensation and to reduce the likelihood of violating bond 
covenants.  Fields et al. (2001) outline several research design problems, which 
they claim have impeded progress towards understanding accounting choice 
decisions.  These include reliance on existing accruals models along with the 
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problem of multiple motivations for accounting choices.  They argue that as 
accounting is used for multiple purposes, it is inappropriate to analyse one 
accounting issue or even one goal in isolation.  They do admit that this would 
require the development of a comprehensive theory of accounting choice.  In 
addition, they commend some attempts to extend the methodological 
boundaries by the application of simultaneous equations and instrumental 
variables techniques to accounting problems (Beatty, Chamberlain and 
Magliolo, 1995; Hunt, Moyer and Shevlin, 1996). 
 
 
3.4.2 Asset Pricing or Economic Efficiency (Signalling) 
 
This strand of the accounting choice literature examines the association 
between accounting numbers and share prices or returns, asking whether 
accounting choice decisions impact equity valuation or the cost of capital.  This 
literature predicts that management make accounting choices to reveal their 
expectations regarding the firm’s future cash flow stream.  Subramanyam 
(1996) provides evidence consistent with the idea that managers employ their 
accounting discretion to signal future performance. 
 
Erickson and Wang (1999) analyse firms using shares as a form of payment in 
acquisitions.  Bidders, they postulate, will increase earnings through abnormal 
accruals to increase the share price and thus reduce the number of shares 
needed to complete the deal.  Even though they find that bidders manage 
earnings upwards (abnormal accruals), Fields et al. (2001) contend that the 
results are unconvincing as their research design does not allow one to test if 
the earnings management was successful. 
 
The disclosure policies of firms have been studied to see whether the firms 
whose managers choose higher levels of disclosure have lower costs of capital.  
Fields et al. (2001) consider a range of disclosure studies and note the findings 
are inconclusive as to whether increased disclosure leads to a reduction in the 
cost of capital.  In addition, they provide examples of research based on the 
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efficient markets hypothesis (Beaver and Engel, 1996; Subramanyam, 1996; 
Hand, Hughes and Sefcik, 1990) and conclude that the results from the market 
efficiency literature have changed over time.  Earlier research through to the 
1970s generally finds evidence supporting market efficiency.  In contrast they 
infer that it is impossible to conclude the markets are efficient or inefficient from 
the research during the 1980s and early 1990s.  Healy and Palepu (1993) 
assume that managers have superior information on their firms’ current and 
future performance than outside investors; there are conflicts of interest 
between managers and shareholders and imperfect accounting standards and 
auditing.  They maintain that disclosure choices provide an avenue to impart 
such information and this is true even if capital markets are efficient.   
 
 
 3.4.3 Influencing External Parties 
 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) contend that politicians have the power to affect 
a firm’s wealth redistribution through corporate taxes, regulations and subsidies.  
The magnitude of political costs is considered to be highly dependent on firm 
size.  The third PAT hypothesis states that the greater the political costs faced 
by a firm, the more likely the manager is to choose accounting procedures that 
defer reported earnings from current to future periods, ceteris paribus.  Both the 
bonus plan hypothesis and the debt covenant hypothesis predict that managers 
will choose less conservative accounting policies and will oppose any proposed 
accounting standards that may lower reported income or increase its volatility.  
In contrast, the political cost hypothesis predicts managers of very large firms 
(proxy for political costs faced by a firm) will choose more conservative 
accounting policies than managers of small firms, and will be less likely to 
oppose standards that may lower reported income. 
 
Much of the empirical research with respect to the political cost hypothesis 
employs firm size as a crude proxy for political costs.  It is argued that the use 
of this variable can be problematic due to its correlation with other firm 
characteristics such as profitability and risk.  As the bonus plan and debt 
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covenant hypotheses predict the opposite to the political cost hypothesis in their 
accounting policy predictions, it is necessary to control for their effects in any 
study analysing the political cost hypothesis. 
 
Fields et al. (2001) classify political costs research into accounting choice policy 
decisions by firms into two groups, namely firms selecting accounting methods 
to reduce or defer taxes and those motivated to avoid potential regulation.  The 
former research is structured around changes in tax rates (Dhaliwal and Wang, 
1992; Boynton, Dobbins and Plesko, 1992).  They maintain the tax-related 
empirical research reports evidence that firms make accounting choices in order 
to reduce their tax burden.  In common with other accounting choice studies, 
this research suffers from the drawback of focusing on tax issues in isolation. 
 
Due to these factors, it is considered useful to investigate situations where 
political costs are particularly salient.  Jones (1991) studies firms under 
consideration for import relief, that is, relief granted to firms that are affected by 
foreign competition.  The granting of import relief to firms is, in part, a political 
decision (Scott, 2003).  She studies 23 firms from five industries involved in 
import relief investigations and finds evidence of the predicted behaviour; for 
almost all firms in the sample, abnormal accruals are significantly negative in 
the investigation year.  The study did not find significant negative accruals in the 
years immediately preceding or following the investigations.  These results are 
evidence of firms choosing accrual policies consistent with the political cost 
hypothesis. 
 
A different strand in the tax-related research vein takes the accounting choice 
as the starting point, mostly the LIFO versus FIFO decision.  Firms adopting 
LIFO are assumed to benefit from tax savings and associated cash flows.  This 
is a result of the requirement that firms that adopt LIFO for tax purposes must 
also adopt LIFO in the calculation of accounting income.  Results of studies 
prior to the 1990s have been inconclusive and often inconsistent.  Fields et al. 
(2001) state: 
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‘Stock price reactions have not been consistently positive in reaction to 
the LIFO adoption announcement (assuming tax savings and associated 
cash inflows) nor have the announcement period returns for the first 
earnings announcement been consistently negative or zero’ (Fields et al. 
2001: 282). 
 
As with the research focused on changes in the tax rates, stock market reaction 
to the LIFO/FIFO accounting policy choice is inconclusive.  Other studies also 
show inconsistent results when they study the LIFO/FIFO decision (Tse, 1990; 
Hand, 1993; Kang, 1993). 
 
While research motivated by regulation issues finds evidence consistent with 
expectations, as mentioned it is considered to suffer from a lack of 
consideration of multiple incentives and multiple methods. 
 
Most of the research on the regulation theme focuses in the main on industry-
specific regulations.  For example, some research on the banking industry 
focuses on the setting by bank executives of the loan loss provisions amount, 
which is a provision against future loan losses, and earnings management. 
 
While many studies attempted to demonstrate that banks manage accruals or 
transactions to meet capital, tax or earnings goals, these studies assume all 
other decisions are fixed.  In contrast Beatty et al. (1995) develop a 
methodology that allows accrual and transactions decisions to be modelled 
simultaneously.  They conclude that missing capital or earnings targets is costly 
and bank executives will trade-off accrual and financing discretion to meet these 
goals.  Overall the evidence from these studies is interpreted as suggesting that 
loan loss provisions are a tool to manage capital level requirements even 
though some studies, like Collins, Shackelford and Wahlen (1995) find evidence 
to the contrary. 
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3.5 Share-based Compensation and Disclosure of an Alternative 
Earnings per Share Figure 
 
As mentioned above, in response to the criticism that executives benefit from a 
general (as opposed to firm-specific) upward trend in the market from their 
SBC, many firms introduced performance criteria, where vesting of SBC to 
executives is contingent on the achievement of a performance criterion.  The 
idea is to better align a manager’s pay with his firm’s performance, thus 
rewarding relative rather than absolute performance.   
 
The objective of this chapter is to analyse the effect of an EPS performance 
criterion and the voluntary disclosure of an alternative EPS figure, the definition 
of which is within the control of management and is used here as a proxy for 
accounting choice (earnings management).  A priori one would expect a 
positive relationship between the existence of an EPS figure as a performance 
criterion and the disclosure of an alternative EPS figure. 
 
This intuition is based on two possibilities.  The first is that basic EPS (net 
income) is a noisy measure so efficient contracting would suggest the 
application of a smoother measure; one such measure would be the alternative 
EPS figure.  The second is that management have control over the definition of 
the alternative EPS figure and it thus provides a basis for opportunistic 
behaviour on the part of management. 
 
 
3.5.1 The Impact of the Structure of Compensation Contracts on 
Accounting Choice 
 
Watts and Zimmerman’s PAT is concerned with predicting the actions of 
managers while assuming that managers are rational and will act to maximise 
their own expected utility (Watts, 1977; Watts and Zimmerman, 1978).  Under 
the bonus plan hypothesis of PAT, managers are assumed to choose 
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accounting methods to maximise their compensation, which is often based on 
accounting numbers.   
 
Healy’s (1985) study, which is based on PAT, finds evidence that managers 
opportunistically manage net income so as to maximise their bonus.  Healy 
(1985) shows that firms with caps on bonus awards are more likely to report 
accruals that defer income when that cap is reached than firms that have 
comparable performance but which have no bonus cap.  This and other studies 
into the use of accruals provide significant evidence that managers use accruals 
to manage earnings so as to maximise their bonuses (Holthausen et al. 1995b; 
Gaver, Gaver and Austin, 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997).   
 
A body of literature (see for example, Healy, 1985; Dye, 1988; Holthausen et al. 
1995b; Healy and Wahlen, 1999) examines whether the level of equity-based 
compensation is related to accounting manipulation.  In general, this research 
finds a positive relationship between the level of SBC and earnings 
management. 
 
While earlier literature employs abnormal accruals2 as the measure of earnings 
management, recent literature often considers other proxies (see Table 3.1) to 
measure earnings management.  Some of these more recent studies include 
the consideration of the structure of executive compensation and ask whether 
the various components have a different impact on earnings management.  
Current executive compensation pay contracts usually include the following 
components: 
 
• Salary. 
• Bonus. 
• Share options. 
• LTIPs (restricted stock). 
                                            
2
 There are some methodological issues with discretionary accruals measurement, see 
McNichols (2000) as an example.  The general consensus is that this methodology has 
widespread use in large-scale empirical studies of earnings management. 
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The interesting question is whether there is a different influence on managerial 
behaviour between linear and non-linear payout compensation components.  
Different payout structures might induce different behaviour; for example, 
Guay’s (1999) hypothesis is that to avoid or to mitigate the agency costs caused 
by risk-averse managers, firms add share options (convexity) to executive 
remuneration to encourage them to accept high-risk projects.  Managers will be 
more willing to accept high risk projects if there is a possibility of receiving a 
higher payout.  In contrast, an argument against the incentive alignment 
attribute of share options, is that the convexity gives managers the incentive to 
take excessive risk.  In contrast, LTIPs (including restricted stock grants) have a 
linear relationship with share price movements.  Kadan and Yang (2005) find 
that restricted stock (options with a zero exercise price and some conditions to 
vesting) induces more earnings management (discretionary accruals) than 
share option compensation. 
 
Table 3.1 below provides an indication of some recent research, the 
measurements they employ as a proxy for earnings management together with 
their findings.  This chapter attempts to investigate whether different 
components of executive compensation have varying impacts on the earnings 
management behaviour of managers. 
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Table 3.1 
 
Studies on the structure of executive compensation 
Authors 
 
Earnings Management 
Measure 
Structure Findings 
Bartov and 
Mohanram 
(2004) 
Large option exercises. Option exercise. Sales of acquired shares. High abnormal accruals prior to exercise. 
Efendi, 
Spivastava and 
Swanson 
(2005) 
Misstatements of 
financial statements. 
Options granted. 
Restricted stock. 
Restatements higher when CEOs hold in-the-money 
options. 
Cheng and 
Warfield 
(2005) 
Meet or just beat analyst 
earnings forecasts. 
Abnormal accruals. 
SBC. Positive link with MBE and abnormal accruals. Leads to less informative earnings. 
Kadan and Yang 
(2005) Abnormal accruals. 
Restricted stock. 
 
More earnings management. 
Marquardt and 
Wiedman 
(2005) 
Conversion criteria of 
convertible debt. CEO’s cash bonus. 
Linked to CEO’s cash bonuses. 
Related to reduction in diluted EPS. 
Bergstresser and 
Philippon 
(2006) 
Exercise of options. 
Selling of shares. 
Abnormal accruals. 
Stock holding. 
Option holding. 
Option exercise. 
Selling of shares. 
Abnormal accruals linked to all structures studied with 
respect to the CEO. 
Burns and Kedia 
(2006) Restatements. 
Bonus. 
Option portfolio. 
Equity. 
Restricted stock. 
CEO’s option portfolio only positively related to 
misreporting. 
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Bartov and Mohanram (2004) analyse abnormally large option exercises by top-
level executives to investigate whether these can predict future stock returns.  
They find positive earnings performance prior to exercise and disappointing 
earnings post-exercise.  This pattern is mirrored by discretionary accruals 
(proxy for earnings management), but not by non-discretionary accruals, which 
are also abnormally high pre-exercise, and this is a factor in the positive 
earnings performance.  This pattern is reversed in the post-exercise period with 
a reversal of the discretionary accruals.  Bartov and Mohanram (2004) state: 
 
‘These findings are consistent with our hypothesis that, in an effort to 
increase the cash payout from option exercises and sales of acquired shares, 
managers inflate earnings through accruals management in the period 
leading up to the abnormally large exercises’ (Bartov and Mohanram 2004, p. 
891). 
 
Efendi, Spivastava and Swanson (2005) study firms which misstated their 
financial statements during 2001 and 2002, and find that the likelihood of a 
restatement is considerably higher when the CEO holds in-the-money options 
(intrinsic value).  Option grants during the year (valued using the Black-Scholes 
(1973) valuation model), restricted stock grants or restricted stock holding are 
not significant.  In addition, they find CEOs at restatement firms realised more 
cash from exercising share options than their counterparts at the control firms.  
Interestingly, this realisation came from a small portion of their in-the-money 
options.   
 
Burns and Kedia (2006) study US firms which had to restate their financial 
statements due to overstating revenue and understating costs.  A restatement 
on either of these two grounds is taken as a proxy for more aggressive 
accounting.  They investigate the relationship between the magnitude of the 
restatement and various components of executive compensation, salary, bonus, 
option portfolio, equity, restricted stock, long-term incentive payouts.  Burns and 
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Kedia (2006) find that the sensitivity of the CEO’s option portfolio to be the only 
component of executive compensation to be significantly positively related to 
the propensity to misreport.  This, they argue is because of the convexity of 
share options.  This contradicts the findings of Kadan and Yang (2005) above. 
 
From the above studies it may be concluded that there is evidence in the extant 
literature that executive compensation contract design has some bearing on the 
incidence of earnings management.  While Kadan and Yang (2005) find that 
restricted stock  (options with zero exercise price) induces more earnings 
management (discretionary accruals) than share option (Black-Scholes) 
compensation, Burns and Kedia (2006) find share options (Black-Scholes) 
induce more earnings management than restricted stock. 
 
This thesis complements the above research by considering a different 
structure (EPS performance target) of executive remuneration contracts to see 
whether the disclosure and accounting choices of management are associated 
with this particular structure.  While the above research adopts various financial 
measures of managerial incentive, that is, intrinsic value or fair value, this study 
concentrates on the closeness of the firm to the target.  This research thus 
avoids the issue surrounding the measurement of the incentive from the SBC 
from management’s viewpoint. 
 
Managerial incentives may result from managerial ownership and/or 
management compensation.  Managers have some flexibility when reporting the 
financial performance of a firm; their behaviour may be opportunistic (Christie 
and Zimmerman, 1994; Warfield, Wild and Wild, 1995) or may be to provide 
value relevant information (Jones, 1991; Healy and Palepu, 1993).  Agency 
theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) predicts that managers with high ownership 
are likely to make choices (including the use of discretionary accruals) to 
convey value relevant information while managers with accounting-based 
compensation are likely to behave opportunistically to improve their 
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compensation.  Gul, Chen and Tsui (2003) provide evidence that accruals may 
be used for both opportunistic manipulation and information signalling 
depending on managers’ incentives.  Their results concur with those of 
Warfield, Wild and Wild (1995) who find that firms with low managerial 
ownership are more likely to manage earnings for opportunistic reasons. 
 
 
3.5.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
Management have choices, including the ones outlined above, by which they 
can influence the reported earnings and consequently the EPS figure.  Given 
the evidence from this literature and the availability of choices, a priori, it would 
be expected that disclosure of an alternative EPS figure would be positively 
related to the existence of an EPS performance target in executive 
remuneration.  The main hypothesis is thus: 
 
H1: The disclosure of an alternative EPS figure is positively related to the 
existence of an EPS target in each or any of three components of 
executive remuneration contracts, namely, bonus plans, ESOs and LTIPs. 
 
What will be interesting to observe is whether all three components have a 
similar impact on the disclosure decision. 
 
As EPS is calculated as earnings divided by the number of outstanding shares, 
any accounting decision that results in a change in either the earnings or the 
number of outstanding shares will have an impact on the reported EPS figure.  
Kahle (2002) finds that repurchase decisions and levels are associated with the 
number of options outstanding.  She finds that the stock market views 
repurchases that appear motivated to avoid dilution as less positive than 
repurchases that may be signalling undervaluation or a return of free cash flow 
to shareholders.  Bens, Nagar and Wong (2002) find that repurchase decisions 
are associated with incentives to manage diluted EPS and to maintain a desired 
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rate of EPS growth.  They also show that these repurchases crowd out real 
investment (research and development and capital expenditures).  In addition, 
they find that such behaviour is associated with declines in future performance.  
A study by Young and Yang (2009) finds a strong association between share 
repurchase activity and the presence of EPS-based compensation 
arrangements in UK firms.  Thus, evidence does exist to link share repurchases 
to option granting and exercise as claimed by Hirst, Ashbaugh-Skaife, Botosan, 
Davis-Friday, Fairfield, Hopkins, Mallett, Uhl, and Venkatachalam (2005).   
 
 
3.6 Data and Methodology 
 
This study has as its starting point a paper by Choi et al. (2005) which is based 
on data collected on adjusted EPS disclosures for three year-ends, 1993/94, 
1996 and 2001.  The sample for each year-end comprised the 500 largest 
London Stock Exchange-listed non-financial firms ranked by market 
capitalisation.  Details of adjusted EPS disclosures were hand-collected from 
firms’ published financial statements.  I/B/E/S-defined EPS was obtained 
directly from I/B/E/S.  Financial statement and market data were collected from 
Datastream. 
 
The methodology for this study is borrowed from Choi et al. (2005) who test 
their hypothesis using logit regression analysis.  They consider the probability of 
disclosure of an alternative EPS figure and find that adjusted EPS disclosure is 
an attempt by management to provide information on underlying sustainable 
earnings performance.  They question the value relevance of the EPS figures 
and find that adjusted EPS disclosures are significantly more informative 
(earnings predictability, price-earnings associations and returns-earnings 
associations) about current and future performance than FRS 3 EPS. 
 
The analysis in Choi et al. (2005) is extended by adding additional exploratory 
variables to see if these variables help explain the EPS disclosure choice of 
firms.  Specifically, it considers the structure of executive remuneration 
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contracts, in particular whether or not various components (bonus plans, ESOs 
and LTIPs) have a vesting criteria based on some form of EPS performance.  
The purpose is to see whether these components of executive compensation 
contracts are associated with an accounting choice, namely, the decision to 
disclose an alternative EPS figure.  This study contributes by considering a 
contractual motive for the decision to disclose an alternative EPS figure, in 
contrast to Choi et al. (2005) which considers a signalling motive. 
 
This study, while drawing on the above, considers data from the 2001 year-end 
alone.  The rationale for this is due to the exploratory nature of the study which 
has as an objective the identification of what information is available with 
respect to the required remuneration data.   
 
 
3.6.1 Variable Definitions 
 
The test, control and indicator variables which are as in Choi et al. (2005) are 
defined below.   
 
The test variables include NEGIBES, NEGPOS and MAGDIFF.  NEGIBES 
equals 1 if I/B/E/S defined EPS (EPSIBES) is negative and 0 otherwise.  
NEGIBES is expected to be negatively associated with the disclosure of 
alternative EPS on the assumption that management will be keen to avoid 
reporting a loss. 
 
NEGPOS takes the value of 1 if FRS 3 EPS (EPSFRS3) is negative and I/B/E/S 
defined EPS is positive and 0 otherwise.  The probability that an alternative 
EPS figure is disclosed is predicted to be positively related to NEGPOS.  Choi 
et al. (2005) suggest that under these circumstances, management face strong 
incentives to report I/B/E/S defined EPS if this is deemed more informative 
regarding sustainable earnings. 
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MAGDIFF is a measure of the relative uninformativeness of FRS 3 EPS with 
respect to sustainable earnings.  Evidence indicates that I/B/E/S EPS is 
informative about sustainable earnings.  It is the measure of the price-scaled 
difference between FRS 3 EPS and the corresponding I/B/E/S EPS figure: 
 
MAGDIFF = | EPSi,tFRS3 - EPSi,tIBES| / Pi,t     (1) 
 
Choi et al. (2005) cite evidence in Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) and Brown and 
Sivakumar (2003) to predict that the probability of management disclosing an 
alternative EPS figure will be positively related to MAGDIFF.   
 
Choi et al. (2005) include the following control variables, SIZE, MTB, NANAL 
and PAGES which they draw from prior disclosure literature.  There is an 
established link between size and disclosure policy (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; 
Tasker, 1998; Chen, DeFond and Park, 2002).  MTB, the market-to-book value 
captures the presence of intangible assets, which Chen et al. (2002) finds to be 
associated with the level of voluntary disclosure.  NANAL is the logarithm of the 
number of analysts from I/B/E/S following the firm at the year-end and controls 
for differences in the external information environment of firms (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1996; Bhushan, 1989; Chen et al. (2002)).  PAGES is the natural 
logarithm of the number of pages in the published financial statements and 
measures a firm’s general attitude towards disclosure (Walker and Louvari, 
2003). 
 
In addition to the test and control variables above, Choi et al. (2005) add two 
indicator variables.  The first is MAGDIFFINC representing the interaction 
between MAGDIFF and an indicator variable taking the value of 1 where 
EPSIBES is positive and materially greater than EPSFRS3, and 0 otherwise.  The 
second is MAGDIFFDEC representing the interaction between MAGDIFF and 
an indicator variable taking the value of 1 where EPSIBES is positive and 
materially less than EPSFRS3, and 0 otherwise.   
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The creation of the additional dependent exploratory variables, for the purpose 
of this study, is now outlined.  Information on the existence of bonus, ESO and 
LTIP components of executive remuneration was hand-collected from financial 
statements along with the existence, or otherwise, of an EPS performance 
criteria for each of these remuneration components.  For the purpose of this 
research, ESOs are defined as share option plans (schemes) which are open 
only to executives.  All-employee share option plans and revenue approved 
share option plans are not considered.  The reason for this is that the number of 
options allowed to be granted under the latter plans is restricted, and are 
therefore not expected to provide incentives to motivate executives to take 
actions to disclose an alternative EPS figure or to manage earnings.  LTIPs are 
defined as share plans where the exercise price is zero, regardless of whether 
or not a performance condition is attached to their vesting.  Information on the 
variables was hand-collected from the 2001 Annual Reports with the majority of 
the data derived from the Remuneration Report section. 
 
Three independent dichotomous variables are defined as follows and are 
included in the logit regressions to analyse whether they are associated with the 
probability that an alternative EPS figure will be disclosed: 
 
EPSTARGB = 1 if the bonus component of executive remuneration contains 
an EPS performance criterion; 0 otherwise. 
 
EPSTARGO = 1 if the ESO component of executive remuneration contains 
an EPS performance criterion; 0 otherwise. 
 
EPSTARGL = 1 if the LTIP component of executive remuneration contains 
an EPS performance criterion; 0 otherwise. 
 
In line with the hypothesis, the above three variables are expected to be 
positively associated with the disclosure of an alternative EPS figure. 
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3.6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
While Choi et al. (2005) originally used the 500 largest firms; information 
required for this study is only available for 276 firms in the sample year 2001. 
 
Of those 276 firms, 266, 257 and 159 have bonus, ESOs and LTIPs plans 
respectively.  Table 3.2 outlines the sample characteristics and explains the 
reasons for this attrition rate. 
. 
Table 3.2 
 
Sample selection                                                             
 
2001 Sample yeara 500  
I/B/E/S EPS missing (traditional EPS definition)b -61 
I/B/E/S EPS missing (EPS before goodwill definitions)c -98 
Sample with complete EPS and price data 341 
Less: Trimmed observationsd -9 
332 
Firms disclosing adjusted EPS 255 
Firms not disclosing adjusted EPS 77  
     332* 
Final sample for data analysis 
Insufficient remuneration data 56 
 276 
Firms disclosing adjusted EPS 214 
Firms not disclosing adjusted EPS 62 
Total 276 
 
Notes: 
aIn the sample year, all UK-domiciled non-financial firms in the Datastream active files with 
earnings data reported in pounds sterling are ranked by year-end market capitalisation and the 
top 500 selected. 
bTraditional I/B/E/S-defined EPS.  Earnings are defined before discontinued operations and 
exceptional items. 
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cI/B/E/S-defined EPS before goodwill amortisation.  Earnings are defined as earnings before 
discontinued operations, exceptional items and goodwill amortisation.  For UK firms from 2001 
onwards, I/B/E/S distinguishes between analysts who forecast traditional EPS and analysts who 
forecast EPS before discontinued operations, exceptional items and goodwill. 
dThe sample is trimmed according to the distributions of EPS, book value per share and share 
price prior to undertaking empirical tests.  For each variable, the median from all observations is 
deducted and then exclude the one percent of cases with the largest absolute median-adjusted 
value. 
*Source: Choi et al. 2005:33. 
 
 
With respect to the trimmed observations, Choi et al. (2005) found some firms 
with extreme accounting and price data.  To ensure these observations do not 
confound the analyses, they 
 
‘trim the sample based on the distributions of earnings per share, book 
value per share, and stock price prior to undertaking our empirical tests.  
For each variable, we deduct the medial from all observations and then 
exclude the one percent of cases with the largest absolute mean value’ 
Choi et al. 2005:12). 
 
Table 3.3 reports the frequency of a bonus, ESO and LTIP component in the 
executive compensation contracts of firms in the sample, in addition to the 
prevalence of an EPS-defined target in these components of executive 
remuneration.  While the majority of firms have a bonus plan and grant ESOs as 
part of executive compensation contracts in 2001, just over half the firms in the 
sample had LTIPs.  By far the most significant component of executive 
remuneration with an EPS target is ESOs of which 75 percent have an EPS 
target.  An EPS target is not prevalent in bonus plans and is a criterion in just 
under half the LTIP plans. 
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Table 3.3 
 
Frequency of EPS performance criteria according to executive 
remuneration contract component              
 
Frequencies (%) 
   Plan         EPS Target if Plan = Yes 
 
Yes No Yes No 
Bonus 96.38 3.62 29.70 70.30 
ESOs 93.12 6.88 74.71 25.29 
LTIPs 57.61        42.39 45.28 54.72 
 
Table 3.4 below presents the characteristics of the adjusted EPS numbers for 
the 276 firms in the 2001 sample.  These are consistent with the findings in 
Choi et al. (2005).  
 
  Table 3.4 
 
 
  Characteristics of adjusted EPS figures  
 
 
  Number of adjusted EPS disclosed: 
 
Frequencies (%) 
No adjusted EPS figure 22.46 
One adjusted EPS figure 69.57 
Multiple adjusted EPS figuresa 07.97 
  
Adjusted EPS vs. FRS3 EPS: 
 
 
Adjusted EPS > FRS3 EPS 85.05 
Adjusted EPS < FRS3 EPS 11.21 
Adjusted EPS = FRS3 EPS 03.74 
 
Notes: 
a
 For firms with multiple adjusted EPS disclosures, Choi et al. (2005) identify the ‘primary’ 
adjusted number using information reported in the accompanying notes to the financial 
statements. 
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Table 3.5 
Descriptive statistics comparing firms that disclosed adjusted EPS on the 
face of the profit and loss account with firms that did not disclose 
Panel A: Earnings per share metrics 
 Disclosers (n = 214) Non-disclosers (n = 62) p-values for differencesb 
Variablea Mean Std. dev Median Mean Std. dev Median Means Medians 
EPSFRS3 11.45 33.65 14.28 16.30 28.42 13.19 0.303 0.774 
EPSIBES 24.51 18.89 21.00 20.06 26.59 16.12 0.141 0.096 
EPSADJc 24.52 19.07 20.75 - - -   
Panel B: Firm-specific characteristics 
 Disclosers (n = 214) Non-disclosers (n = 62) p-values for differencesb 
Variablea Mean Std. dev Median Mean Std. dev Median Means Medians 
NEGIBES 
  0.03  0.19  0.00  0.17  0.38  0.00 0.000 0.000 
NEGPOS 
  0.17  0.38  0.00  0.04  0.21  0.00 0.012 0.012 
MAGDIFF 
  0.07  0.17   0.01  0.01  0.03  0.00 0.012 0.000 
SIZE 
  13.44  1.43 13.19 13.08  1.33 12.94 0.085 0.095 
MTB 
  2.59  5.49  1.92  4.27  7.02  2.10 0.048 0.372 
NANAL 
  9.64  5.48  8.50  8.78  5.42  7.50 0.143 0.209 
PAGES 
 76.67  26.82 72.00 69.53 29.81 63.50 0.006 0.004 
PRICE 378.57 255.33 318.50   359.76   296.26 316.00 0.837 0.974 
EPSTARGB 
  0.31  0.46   0.00   0.26   0.44   0.00 0.530 0.529 
EPSTARGO 
 0.80  0.40  0.00   0.59   0.50   0.00 0.001 0.001 
EPSTARGL 
 0.49  0.50  0.00   0.29   0.46   0.00 0.043 0.043 
 
Notes: 
a Variable definitions are as follows: EPSFRS3 is reported EPS computed according to FRS 3; 
EPSIBES is I/B/E/S-defined EPS; EPSADJ is adjusted EPS (only available for disclosers); 
NEGIBES is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if EPSIBES ≤ 0 and 0 otherwise; 
NEGPOS is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if EPSFRS3 < 0 EPSIBES > 0, and 0 
otherwise; MAGDIFF is the absolute price-scaled difference between EPSIBES and EPSFRS3; 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of fiscal year-end market capitalisation; MTB is the market-to-book 
ratio defined as the year-end share price per share divided by the book value of shareholders’ 
funds per share; NANAL is the number of analysts (from I/B/E/S) following the firm at the end of 
year t; PAGES is the number of pages in the firm’s published annual report and accounts. 
PRICE is the fiscal year-end stock price per share.  EPSTARGB is an indicator variable taking 
the value of 1 if the bonus component of executive remuneration contains an EPS performance 
 80  
criterion and 0 otherwise.  EPSTARGO is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the ESO 
component of executive remuneration contains an EPS performance criterion and 0 otherwise.  
EPSTARGL is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the LTIP component of executive 
remuneration contains an EPS performance criterion and 0 otherwise.  
bTests of equality of sample means (medians) are based on two-tailed t- (Wilcoxon) tests. 
c 
- denotes not relevant. 
 
 
Panel A of Table 3.5 reports descriptive statistics for the variables in the 
regression analysis, apportioned according to whether or not firms disclose 
adjusted EPS.  As in Choi et al. (2005), disclosers have lower EPSFRS3 and 
higher EPSIBES than non-disclosers. 
 
This study finds both the mean and median values of EPSFRS3 for disclosing and 
non-disclosing firms to be significantly lower (p<0.01) than the corresponding 
values for EPSIBES and EPSADJ.  This is consistent with the findings of Choi et 
al. (2005) with the exception of non-disclosing firms where the latter study finds 
the mean (median) EPSFRS3 of non-disclosing firms to be equal (higher) than 
EPSIBES.  A problem with this exploratory study and the interpretation of the t 
test is that the number of firms in the non-disclosing sample is small (n = 62). 
 
Panel B of Table 3.5 reports the descriptive statistics for the test, control, 
indicator and exploratory variables.  With respect to the exploratory variables, 
the means of the EPS variables representing the existence or otherwise of an 
EPS target in bonus plans, ESOs and LTIPs are higher for firms which disclose 
an alternative EPS figure.  While the mean difference is significant for ESOs, 
the existence on an EPS target in bonus plans is not significant and the 
existence of an EPS in the LTIPs is only marginally significant. 
 
The parallel between the existence of an EPS target and disclosure choice is 
worthy of note: the percentage of firms with an EPS target in their bonus, ESOs 
and LTIPs component of the executive remuneration contract is roughly similar.   
 
Table 3.6 below shows the percentage of earning per share targets in the 
remuneration components of firms categorised by disclosure choice. 
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Table 3.6    
The existence of EPS targets and disclosure choice  
                             Frequency (%) 
EPS target in Bonus ESOs LTIPs 
Disclosers 78.57 76.26 80.50 
Non-disclosers 21.43 23.74 19.50 
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Table 3.7 
 
Correlation matrix  (n = 276) 
 
  
 NDISCL  NEGIBES  NEGPOS  MAGDIFF SIZE MTB  NANAL  PAGES  MAGDIFFINC MAGDIFFDEC EPSTARGB EPSTARGO EPSTARGL  
NDISCL   
 1.00             
NEGIBES   -0.23***    1.00            
NEGPOS   
 0.15**   -0.11*   1.00           
MAGDIFF 
 0.15**    0.01   0.57***    1.00          
SIZE 
 0.10*   -0.10*  -0.03   -0.11*  1.00         
MTB  -0.12***    0.22***  -0.10*   -0.09  0.03  1.00        
NANAL  
 0.09   -0.13**   0.05   -0.01  0.70*** -0.04  1.00       
PAGES  
 0.17***   -0.03   0.05    0.08 0.64*** -0.07  0.48***    1.00      
MAGDIFFINC 
 0.13**   -0.18***  -0.33***   -0.13** -0.04 -0.04  0.04    0.01       1.00     
MAGDIFFDEC -0.05   -0.04  -0.07    0.14** -0.05 -0.04 -0.12*   -0.03      -0.10       1.00    
EPSTARGB 
 0.04   -0.11*   0.05    0.03  0.04 -0.01  0.00    0.06       0.04       0.11*      1.00   
EPSTARGO 
 0.20***   -0.25***   0.03   -0.02  0.12* -0.05  0.09    0.04       0.09      -0.04      0.20***      1.00  
EPSTARGL  
 0.16**   -0.01   0.00    0.09  0.05* -0.04  0.04    0.06      -0.19*       0.03      0.03      0.28***      1.00 
 
Notes: * / ** / *** indicate significance at 10% / 5% / 1%.  A full definition of the variables is provided in Appendix A. 
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Table 3.7 above reports the correlation matrix for the variables appearing in the 
logit regression models.  The results reveal a high positive correlation between 
size and the number of analysts following a firm which is not surprising as the 
number of analysts following a firm is known to vary with size (Walker and 
Louvari, 2003).  Likewise the positive correlation between size and page 
numbers would be expected.  Both the above correlations are significant at the 
1% level.  The other high correlation reported is between the variables 
NEGPOS and MAGDIFF and this would not be unexpected given that NEGPOS 
reflects the situation where FRS 3 EPS is negative and IBES EPS is positive 
and MAGDIFF is the price-scaled difference between these two variables.  
While this does potentially represent collinearity among these variables, the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) measure for the regressions in this study report 
VIF of under 4 for all other variables which is generally considered acceptable.  
This suggests multicollinearity is not a problem (Hair, Black, Babin and 
Anderson, 2010). 
 
With respect to the three exploratory variables added, EPSTARGO is positively 
and significantly correlated with both EPSTARGB and EPSTARGL at the 1% 
level.  To some extent, this might be a reflection of the fact that many firms in 
the sample have only EPS as a target in their ESOs, whereas for bonus plans 
and LTIPS, there are mostly multiple performance targets. 
 
 
3.6.3 Disclosure Choice and Executive Compensation Structure 
 
Choi et al. (2005) test their hypothesis regarding the probability of adjusted EPS 
disclosure by estimating the following logit regression: 
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Table 3.8 presents the results of the logit regression analysis as per the main 
variables of Choi et al. (2005) for the sample firms in year t , t
 
= 2001.  The 
 
(2) 
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dependent variable, NDISCL, takes the value of 1 if firm i discloses an adjusted 
EPS figure, and 0 otherwise.  For each explanatory variable, regressions results 
are presented in stages (for the number of observations for each of the 
exploratory variables, EPSTARGB, EPSTARGO and EPSTARGL) using 
Equation 3, Equation 4 and Equation 5 respectively. 
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Equations 3, 4 and 5 are run in stages, with the first column of each model 
including only the test and control variables from Choi et al. (2005).  The second 
column adds the indicator variables and to the last of these three models, the 
additional dichotomous variables are introduced, namely the existence of an 
EPS target in the compensation components, bonus, ESOs and LTIPs of 
executives in the sample firms.   
 
Table 3.8 presents the results of the regressions of the three models which are 
included for comparative purposes.  The last model includes the exploratory 
variable EPSTARGB.  The same process is applied to EPSTARGO 
(EPSTARGL) with the results presented in Table 3.9 (Table 3.10) which will be 
discussed later. 
 
 
(3)  (4) 
 
(5) 
 
(3) 
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The marginal effect of each variable is also reported.  The marginal effect of a 
continuous independent variable x is the partial derivative, with respect to x, of 
the prediction function 
xb
xb
e
e
xf
′
′
+
=
1
)( .  That is: 
xb
xb
e
e
dx
df
′
′
+
=
1
                                                  (6) 
where xβ ′  is computed at the mean values of the independent variables 
(Greene, 1993).   
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Notes: 
 az-stat in brackets; * / ** / *** indicate significance at 10% / 5% / 1%. 
The dependent variable is NDISCL which takes the value of 1 if firm i discloses an adjusted 
EPS figure and 0 otherwise; NEGIBES is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
EPSIBES ≤ 0 and 0 otherwise; NEGPOS is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
EPSFRS3 < 0 EPSIBES > 0, and 0 otherwise; MAGDIFF is the absolute price-scaled difference 
between EPSIBES and EPSFRS3; SIZE is the natural logarithm of fiscal year-end market 
capitalisation; MTB is the market-to-book ratio defined as the year-end share price per share 
divided by the book value of shareholders’ funds per share; NANAL is the number of analysts 
Table 3.8 
Logit analysis of the probability of alternative EPS disclosure as a 
function of test, control, indicator and EPS target variables in Bonus Plans 
 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
Variable Predicted               Sign 
  Coefficient 
(z-stat)a 
Coefficient 
(z-stat) 
Coefficient 
(z-stat) 
Marginal 
Effect 
 
                  
Intercept ? 0.705 (0.838) 
        0.372 
      (0.915) 
  0.415 
(0.904)  
NEGIBES -      -2.414*** 
     (0.000) 
   -2.216*** 
  (0.001) 
     -2.298*** 
(0.001) -0.400 
NEGPOS +       0.952 
     (0.347) 
 0.975 
 (0.254) 
  0.991 
 (0.233)    0.069 
MAGDIFF +       4.780* 
     (0.071) 
   6.982* 
  (0.061) 
   6.592* 
  (0.067)    0.624 
SIZE ?      -0.041 
     (0.882) 
 0.029 
 (0.920) 
      0.018 
  (0.948)    0.002 
MTB ?        0.001 
     (0.965) 
 0.001 
 (0.976) 
  0.002 
  (0.921)    0.000 
NANAL ?       0.458 
     (0.313) 
 0.320 
 (0.491) 
 0.299 
   (0.518)    0.267 
PAGES ?       0.142 
     (0.900) 
  0.001 
  (0.999) 
   0.061 
   (0.957)    0.005 
MAGDIFFINC
 
?         18.472 
  (0.380) 
     18.586 
     (0.366)    1.670 
MAGDIFFDEC ?  -8.008 
 (0.124) 
     -7.488 
     (0.158)    -0.673 
EPSTARGB +   -0.367 
 (0.412)       -0.035 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.1394 0.1618 0.1654  
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
 
-84.13 -81.94 -81.58  
CHI-SQUARE 
 
23.44 23.06 24.76  
P-VALUE 
 
 0.00   0.01   0.01  
OBSERVATIONS 
 
 228  228   228  
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(from I/B/E/S) following the firm at the end of year t; PAGES is the number of pages in the firm’s 
published annual report and accounts. MAGDIFFINC represents the interaction between 
MAGDIFF and an indicator variable taking the value of 1 where EPSIBES is positive and 
materially greater than EPSFRS3, and 0 otherwise.  The second is MAGDIFFDEC represents the 
interaction between MAGDIFF and an indicator variable taking the value of 1 where EPSIBES is 
positive and materially less than EPSFRS3, and 0 otherwise.  EPSTARGB is an indicator variable 
taking the value of 1 if the bonus component of executive remuneration contains an EPS 
performance criterion and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
The results from Table 3.8 show: 
 
• Although a positive sign is predicted, the sign of the EPSTARGB variable 
is negative, albeit insignificant, in all the regressions which include this 
variable as reported in Table 3.8 above. 
 
• Besides MAGDIFF, NEGIBES is the only variable that remains significant 
in most versions of all three models.  NEGIBES is negative and 
significant at 1% in all three models and in Model 3 which includes the 
exploratory variable EPSTARGB, it is significant at 1% (-2.298, P>|z| = 
0.001).  As NEGIBES is where I/B/E/S-defined EPS is ≤ 0, a negative 
relationship between it and the disclosure of an alternative EPS figure 
would be expected.  This is the case in all of the regressions above. 
 
• MAGDIFF is positive and significant at the 10% level in all the Models 
which could be interpreted as either opportunistic behaviour, managers 
use the ‘better’ EPS as the performance criteria.  If interpreted as 
efficient contracting, it could be that the larger the difference, the more 
important management feel it is to provide a more value relevant EPS 
(the alternative EPS).  In Model 3 which includes the exploratory 
variable, EPSTARGB, MAGDIFF is positive and significant at the 10% 
level (6.592, P>|z| = 0.067). 
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Notes: 
az-stat in brackets; * / ** / *** indicate significance at 10% / 5% / 1%. 
The dependent variable is NDISCL which takes the value of 1 if firm i discloses an adjusted 
EPS figure and 0 otherwise; NEGIBES is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
EPSIBES ≤ 0 and 0 otherwise; NEGPOS is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
EPSFRS3 < 0 EPSIBES > 0, and 0 otherwise; MAGDIFF is the absolute price-scaled difference 
between EPSIBES and EPSFRS3; SIZE is the natural logarithm of fiscal year-end market 
capitalisation; MTB is the market-to-book ratio defined as the year-end share price per share 
Table 3.9 
Logit analysis of the probability of alternative EPS disclosure as a 
function of test, control, indicator and EPS target variables in ESOs 
 
  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  
Variable Predicted Sign 
Coefficient 
(z-stat)a 
Coefficient 
(z-stat) 
Coefficient 
(z-stat) 
Marginal 
Effect 
 
 
    
Intercept ?  0.972 
 (0.761) 
0.677 
     (0.883) 
 -0.635 
(0.841)  
NEGIBES -       -2.295*** 
      (0.000) 
 -2.068*** 
       (0.002) 
     -1.835*** 
 (0.004) -0.333 
NEGPOS +       -0.082 
      (0.904) 
        0.019 
       (0.978) 
  0.094 
   (0.882)    0.010 
MAGDIFF +   5.364* 
      (0.031) 
   7.059** 
       (0.020) 
      6.049** 
   (0.037)    0.674 
SIZE ?        0.372 
      (0.892) 
        0.093 
       (0.737) 
  0.051 
  (0.853)    0.006 
MTB ?        0.004 
      (0.848) 
        0.004 
       (0.831) 
  0.001 
  (0.947)    0.000 
NANAL ?        0.537 
      (0.218) 
        0.414 
       (0.355) 
  0.340 
   (0.445)    0.038 
PAGES ?       -0.231 
      (0.834) 
       -0.346 
       (0.745) 
   -0.021 
   (0.984)    -0.002 
MAGDIFFINC
 
?         19.200 
       (0.338) 
     18.570 
     (0.344)    2.068 
MAGDIFFDEC ?         -7.489 
       (0.110) 
     -6.369 
     (0.149)    -0.709 
EPSTARGO +       0.946** 
     (0.014)         0.126 
Pseudo R2 
 
 0.1177 0.1400 0.1644  
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
 
-88.98 -86.74 -84.26  
CHI-SQUARE 
 
23.82 24.11 31.88  
P-VALUE 
 
 0.01  0.04  0.00  
OBSERVATIONS 
 
 218 218  218  
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divided by the book value of shareholders’ funds per share; NANAL is the number of analysts 
(from I/B/E/S) following the firm at the end of year t; PAGES is the number of pages in the firm’s 
published annual report and accounts. MAGDIFFINC represents the interaction between 
MAGDIFF and an indicator variable taking the value of 1 where EPSIBES is positive and 
materially greater than EPSFRS3, and 0 otherwise.  The second is MAGDIFFDEC represents the 
interaction between MAGDIFF and an indicator variable taking the value of 1 where EPSIBES is 
positive and materially less than EPSFRS3, and 0 otherwise.  EPSTARGO is an indicator variable 
taking the value of 1 if the ESO plan component of executive remuneration contains an EPS 
performance criterion and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
The results from Table 3.9 show: 
 
• Of the three exploratory variables added to the Choi et al. (2005) model, 
the only one which is significant is the EPS criterion in ESOs.  This 
variable, EPSTARGO, is significant at the 5% level and as expected a 
priori, it is positively related to the disclosure of an alternative EPS 
(0.946, P>|z| = 0.014).  The number of observations in Table 3.9 is 218. 
 
• MAGDIFF is positive and significant at the 5% level in all the Models 
which could be interpreted as either opportunistic behaviour, managers 
use the ‘better’ EPS as the performance criteria.  If interpreted as 
efficient contracting, it could be that the larger the difference, the more 
important management feel it is to provide a more value relevant EPS 
(the alternative EPS).  In Model 6 which includes the exploratory 
variable, EPSTARGO, MAGDIFF is positive and significant at the 10% 
level (3.412, P>|z| = 0.026). 
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Notes: 
az-stat in brackets; * / ** / *** indicate significance at 10% / 5% / 1%. 
The dependent variable is NDISCL which takes the value of 1 if firm i discloses an adjusted 
EPS figure and 0 otherwise; NEGIBES is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
EPSIBES ≤ 0 and 0 otherwise; NEGPOS is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
EPSFRS3 < 0 EPSIBES > 0, and 0 otherwise; MAGDIFF is the absolute price-scaled difference 
between EPSIBES and EPSFRS3; SIZE is the natural logarithm of fiscal year-end market 
capitalisation; MTB is the market-to-book ratio defined as the year-end share price per share 
divided by the book value of shareholders’ funds per share; NANAL is the number of analysts 
(from I/B/E/S) following the firm at the end of year t; PAGES is the number of pages in the firm’s 
published annual report and accounts. MAGDIFFINC represents the interaction between 
Table 3.10 
Logit analysis of the probability of alternative EPS disclosure as a 
function of test, control, indicator and EPS target variables in LTIPs 
 
  
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9  
Variable Predicted Sign 
Coefficient 
(z-stat)a 
Coefficient 
(z-stat) 
Coefficient 
(z-stat) 
Marginal 
Effect 
 
     
Intercept ?      -0.161 (0.968) 
-1.066 
      (0.797) 
 -1.397 
(0.739)  
NEGIBES -      -1.324 
     (0.161) 
       -0.958 
 (0.343) 
     -0.883 
(0.342) -0.108 
NEGPOS + 0.724 (0.535) 
 0.858 
 (0.438) 
  1.052 
  (0.344)    0.073 
MAGDIFF +   2.362** 
     (0.217) 
   3.811** 
 (0.015) 
      3.412** 
   (0.026)    0.305 
SIZE ?  0.034 
 (0.917) 
0.160 
 (0.646) 
   0.204 
   (0.582)    0.018 
MTB ?       0.001 
     (0.959) 
 0.001 
 (0.969) 
       0.004 
   (0.853)    0.000 
NANAL ?       0.239 (0.703) 
 0.030 
 (0.963) 
  -0.085 
     (0.895)    -0.008 
PAGES ? 0.210 
     (0.868) 
  0.035 
  (0.977) 
    -0.045 
     (0.972)    -0.004 
MAGDIFFINC
 
?   25.761 
   (0.379) 
  28.63   
   (0.313)    2.559 
MAGDIFFDEC ?   -4.881 
 (0.239) 
      -4.782 
   (0.026)    -0.427 
EPSTARGL +          0.603 
   (0.264)    0.054 
Pseudo R2 
 
 0.0485 0. 0865   0.0979  
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
 
-50.84 -48.82  -48.21  
CHI-SQUARE 
 
06.00 10.03  13.17  
P-VALUE 
 
 0.54 0.35   0.21  
OBSERVATIONS 
 
 138 138   138  
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MAGDIFF and an indicator variable taking the value of 1 where EPSIBES is positive and 
materially greater than EPSFRS3, and 0 otherwise.  The second is MAGDIFFDEC represents the 
interaction between MAGDIFF and an indicator variable taking the value of 1 where EPSIBES is 
positive and materially less than EPSFRS3, and 0 otherwise.  EPSTARGL is an indicator variable 
taking the value of 1 if the LTIP plan component of executive remuneration contains an EPS 
performance criterion and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
The results from Table 3.10 show: 
 
• The existence of an EPS criterion in LTIPs is predicted to be positively 
related to the disclosure of an alternative EPS figure.  This variable is not 
significant in Model 9 which includes the variable EPSTARGL, (0.603, 
P>|z| = 0.264).  This result is not surprising on two counts: the number of 
observations is low (138) and more meaningfully, when reading the 
details of the majority of LTIPs, the performance criteria was rarely 
exclusively EPS and there was more likely to be some form of 
comparator group target making management less able to influence the 
achievement of the target. 
 
• The focus will now be on the models as a whole rather than focusing on 
individual variables.  To achieve this, the marginal effect is considered, 
the chi-square and likelihood-ratio test for the models with the variables, 
namely EPSTARGB, EPSTARGO and EPSTARGL. 
 
• For Models, 3, 6 and 9, which add the exploratory variables EPSTARGB, 
EPSTARGO and EPSTARGL, respectively to the Choi et al. (2005) 
model, the marginal effect is reported.  The results are interesting in that 
the marginal effect of an EPS target in bonus plans is negative but 
insignificant.  The marginal effect of an EPS target in ESOs, suggests 
that the percentage increase of the probability of the disclosure of an 
alternative EPS figure is almost 13 percent.  The marginal effect for 
LTIPs is not equal to zero. 
 
The chi-square (χ2) can be interpreted as a test of whether or not the 
independent variables jointly impact on the dependent variable; it provides an 
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indication of whether the chi-square statistic for the number of independent 
variables is significant at different levels. 
 
• In Model 3, which includes the exploratory variable, EPSTARGB, the χ2 
statistic for the independent variables with 10 degrees of freedom is 
24.76.  This is beyond the critical value of 23.21 at the 1% level. 
 
• In Model 6, which includes the exploratory variable, EPSTARGO, the χ2 
statistic for the independent variables with 10 degrees of freedom is 
31.88.  This is beyond the critical value of 23.21 at the 1% level. 
 
It can thus be concluded that for Model 3 and Model 6, the independent 
variables jointly impact on the dependent variable (NDISCL). 
 
• The result in Model 9, which includes the exploratory variable, 
EPSTARGL, shows the χ2 statistic for the independent variables with 10 
degrees of freedom is 13.17.  This is less than the critical value of 18.31 
at the 5% level indicating that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.  
This might be a result of the sample size (138) or might reflect a weak 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables.   
 
In addition to testing the exploratory variables for significance in the logit 
regression models, it is interesting to observe if the goodness of fit of the 
models improves as a result of the addition of the exploratory variables, 
EPSTARGB, EPSTARGO and EPSTARGL.  The models with these variables 
(Models 3, 6 and 9) are tested for improvement in goodness of fit with the 
models including all other variables except these exploratory variables (Models 
2, 5 and 8 respectively).  For each of the Models 3, 6 and 9 the change in the 
log likelihood, albeit small, indicates these models have a better fit when the 
exploratory variables are included.  With respect to the overall fit of these 
models, the likelihood-ratio test shows that only in the case of EPSTARGO 
(Model 6) does the extended model indicate a better model fit than the nested 
model as a result of the addition of an exploratory variable (Prob > χ2= 0.026). 
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In summary, the findings suggest that the component of executive remuneration 
which exhibits the most potential in the study of the consequences of an EPS 
target in executive remuneration is ESOs.  This confirms the a priori expectation 
that executive remuneration can play a role in explaining the decision to 
disclose an alternative EPS figure.  The significance of the variable, 
EPSTARGO in this exploratory study provide grounds to expand the research 
based on ESOs. 
 
The potential displayed by EPSTARGO is not surprising as it is one of the three 
components which, from the remuneration reports, can be seen to be mainly 
based on an EPS target.  In addition, ESOs are the one component of the 
executive remuneration compensation contract whose payout is most likely to 
solely depend on an EPS target. 
 
 
3.7 Conclusions 
 
As outlined in Chapter 2, agency theory claims that granting executives share 
options will reduce agency costs and align managers’ objectives with those of 
the principal.  In contrast some recent studies question the efficiency of ESOs 
and ask whether they might lead to behaviour on the part of management that is 
opportunistic rather than in the best interests of the principal.  This chapter 
investigates the probability of an alternative EPS figure being disclosed, and 
asks whether disclosure is related to the use of an EPS figure in any one of 
three components of executive remuneration.  The objective of this chapter is to 
explore the relationship between an EPS target and a disclosure choice made 
by management.  
 
Healy (1985) explained discretionary accruals decisions by managers to the 
structure of bonus plans under which no bonus was paid until a minimum level 
of performance was achieved, and the bonus was capped beyond a certain 
specified level of performance.  This chapter, built on a study by Choi et al. 
(2005), finds evidence of a link between the structure of executive remuneration 
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and an accounting choice by firms (the voluntary disclosure) of an adjusted EPS 
figure. 
 
In particular, this study finds a link between the disclosure of an alternative EPS 
figure by firms and the existence of an EPS criterion in ESOs.  This link with 
share options (and not the bonus or LTIP components of executive 
remuneration) might be attributable to the convex relationship between share 
options and share price; option holders gain from any increase in share price 
but are protected from any decrease as they can avoid taking a hit by not 
exercising the options.  This study provides evidence that the structure of 
executive compensation has an impact on the accounting choices of firms.  As 
the magnitude of the incentive of the components of executive remuneration is 
not considered, an interesting extension to this research would be to include the 
sensitivity of each component of executive remuneration. 
 
An alternative explanation could be that granting ESOs does reduce agency 
costs by encouraging the disclosure of an alternative EPS figure which Choi et 
al. (2005) finds to be a more informative indication of sustainable earnings than 
FRS3 EPS, thus providing outsiders (principals) with more information. 
 
A main limitation of this study is the small sample size.  As its objective was to 
explore the possibility of a link between the three structures of executive 
compensation contracts and the disclosure choice of firms, it can be considered 
to have achieved its objective by providing symptomatic results and thus 
encouraging further research into this relationship.   
 
This chapter provided an overview of the extent of the use of an EPS target in 
executive remuneration components.  It looks at one particular disclosure 
choice, the decision to disclose an alternative EPS measure.  The rationale for 
this was twofold: firstly, to see if there was any link between an EPS target and 
the decision to disclose an alternative EPS figure, and secondly, to provide 
some insights as to what might be a fruitful avenue to further research the link 
between EPS targets and company accounting choices.   
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The remainder of this thesis will concern itself with gathering further evidence of 
the effects of compensation policy on other accounting choices of firms.  The 
following chapter will consider the link between the existence of an EPS target 
in ESOs and earnings management in the form of abnormal working capital 
accruals.  It will expand the number of observations by adding the years 2002 
and 2003 to the sample, in addition to incorporating some measure of the 
incentives for managers to manage earnings upwards or downwards. 
 
Following this, Chapter 5 will consider the association between the executive 
remuneration structure and whether firms meet or beat analysts’ forecasts.  As 
in Chapter 4, this chapter will include some measure of the incentives 
management have to make decisions regarding accruals to ensure their ESOs 
vest by incorporating some measure of the attainability of the performance 
target. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
 
Earnings Management and Earnings per Share Vesting Targets 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter considers whether a particular form of vesting conditions (EPS 
target) applying to ESOs provides incentives to manage earnings, and if so, in 
what direction.  This study is motivated by the significance of the ESOs 
component of executive remuneration and thus their potential to influence 
executives’ behaviour to maximise the payout they receive.  The objective is to 
carry out a study developing the work of Healy (1985).  The research question 
is to investigate whether ESOs with EPS performance criteria impact on the 
accounting choices of management.  Specifically, it considers whether an EPS 
performance criterion provides management with incentives to manage 
earnings downwards (if target is not going to be achieved), in addition to 
providing incentives to manage earnings upwards (to meet target).  
 
The period of study (2001, 2002 and 2003) is particularly apt to address the 
research question as it is removed from the following GAAP changes: 
 
• FRS 17, Accounting for Retirement Benefits, issued by the ASB, while 
originally due to be fully operational from 22 June 2003, an amendment 
in November 2002 changed that date to accounting periods beginning on 
or after 1 January 2005.  This standard was expected to have a 
significant impact on financial statements. 
 
• FRS 20, Share-based Payment, issued by the ASB in 2004 for 
application on or after 1 January 2005 to coincide with IFRS 2, Share-
based Payment, issued by the International Accounting Standards Board 
in 2004, applicable from 1 January 2005. 
 
During the period of this study, no expense was required to be charged to the 
Income Statement by firms as a result of granting share options.  This 
accounting anomaly meant that options were often perceived as having no cost 
to the firm issuing them.  Performance criteria which had to be met before 
options could vest were customary in UK executive share option schemes, 
allowing the study of the effect of such targets. 
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To date, no literature explores the link between the existence of an EPS target 
in ESOs and the impact these EPS targets have on the accounting choices of 
management.  Examples of such accounting choices might include: 
 
• Disclosing alternative EPS figures. 
 
• Earnings management. 
 
• Meeting or beating analysts’ forecast. 
 
As shown in Chapter 3, the existence of an EPS target in ESOs helps explain 
the decision to disclose an alternative EPS figure.  This chapter focuses on 
earnings management and provides insights for those charged with setting 
executive remuneration contracts.   
 
The current chapter investigates whether in years when targets are not 
attainable (even with earnings management) earnings are managed down with 
the intention of saving these ‘excess’ earnings for future accounting periods.  It 
also considers whether in years when options are capable of vesting with 
earnings management, whether or not earnings are managed (upwards or 
downwards) to meet the target. 
 
Agency theory postulates that the separation of ownership and control leads to 
agency costs and this results in a search for mechanisms to reduce those costs.  
One such mechanism is executive remuneration, in particular the components 
and structure of the remuneration package.  In general, it is assumed that 
agents will focus on the short term and to counterbalance this, executive 
remuneration components are designed with the intention of rewarding 
executives on the basis of the long-term performance of a firm with a view to 
aligning the principal and agent’s incentives.  One solution has been to reward 
executives with shares (in the form of options or actual shares) which are 
intended to focus their decision-making on the long term.  In a bull market, 
managers with shares (or share options) benefit even when the performance of 
their firm is poor.  Addressing this, the Greenbury Report (1995) proposed that 
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long term incentive schemes, including share option schemes, should be 
payable only where stringent performance criteria are met, thus linking rewards 
with executive effort.   
 
The ABI issued guidelines in 1999 to cover many practical aspects of share 
schemes; these principles are endorsed by NAPF and are intended to provide a 
framework for assessing company share schemes.  Like Greenbury (1995), 
they require that performance conditions in executive remuneration components 
be challenging, demonstrate achievement is demanding, be measured relative 
to a peer group or other relevant benchmark, and be disclosed.  While not 
legally binding, these guidelines are influential and consequently, the majority of 
UK firms have included performance criteria for SBC.  This practice is not 
mirrored in the US.  In agreement with Conyon and Mallin (1997), and 
Stathopoulos et al. (2004) this study finds that EPS is by far the most commonly 
employed criterion for the vesting of ESOs.  Thus the UK provides a unique 
setting for studying the effects of the structure of executive compensation on the 
behaviour of managers.   
 
Empirical research has investigated the effect of bonus plans on the managers’ 
choice of accounting procedures (see Smith and Watts, 1982).  The underlying 
assumption is that the bonuses awarded are a positive linear function of 
reported earnings.  The resulting hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
 
Bonus plan hypothesis.  Ceteris paribus, managers of firms with bonus 
plans are more likely to choose accounting procedures that shift reported 
earnings from future periods to the current period.  
 
Healy (1985) further developed the bonus plan hypothesis and found that in 
some years managers in US firms have an incentive to reduce earnings (see 
below for further details). 
 
This research contributes to the literature on the relationship between the 
structure of compensation contracts and earnings management.  Specifically, it 
contributes to corporate governance and earnings management literatures.  
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This it does by assessing whether the inclusion of an EPS performance criterion 
in ESOs is associated with significant changes in a firm’s reported abnormal 
accruals, controlling for the corporate governance of the firms.  A priori, it would 
be expected that firms with EPS vesting contracts and weak corporate 
governance are more likely to use abnormal accruals to game vesting targets. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows.  Section 2 outlines the 
theoretical framework, reviews the related literature and develops the 
hypotheses.  Section 3 defines earnings management and Section 4 presents 
the sample selection, definition of variables and the research design.  Section 5 
presents and discusses the empirical results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
4.2 Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development 
 
Earnings management has its origin in the PAT literature (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986 and Watts, 1977).  Watts and Zimmerman (1986) were 
among the first to study the motivations for earnings management.  This 
literature aims to develop an empirically testable theory of accounting policy 
choice based on the value of accounting numbers in formal contracting 
arrangements (for example, debt contracts and compensation contracts).  The 
objective is to determine whether earnings management exists, rather than 
comment on efficiency issues such as contract design or the consequences of 
any observed earnings management. 
 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) is underpinned by the income-smoothing 
hypothesis proposed by Gordon (1964).  Income-smoothing emerges as 
rational behaviour based on the assumptions that (1) managers act to maximise 
their utility, (2) fluctuations in income and the unpredictability of income are 
causal determinants of market risk measures, (3) the dividend payout ratio is a 
causal determinant of share values, and (4) managers’ utility depends on the 
firm’s share value (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).  The early literature on 
income-smoothing did not consider the incentives to smooth, it had as its 
objective to determine whether the observed time-series of earnings was 
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consistent with smoothing (Beattie, Brown, Ewers, John, Mason, Thomas and 
Turner, 1994). 
 
From this theory two major hypotheses flow.  First, the income-smoothing 
hypothesis postulates that managers take actions to reduce earnings 
fluctuations to a level considered normal for the firm, in order to: 
 
(1) better deliver management’s expectations concerning the persistence of 
future earnings to investors (Barnea, Ronen and Sadan, 1975; Hand, 
1989); 
 
(2) increase their job security with the firm (DeFond and Park, 1997); or 
 
(3) reduce the firm’s borrowing costs (Trueman and Titman, 1988). 
 
The second hypothesis, the bonus plan hypothesis, will be considered in the 
next section. 
 
 
4.2.1 Bonus Plans and Executive Compensation 
 
The second and competing hypothesis, the bonus plan hypothesis, contends 
that the existence of bonus plans with upper and lower bounds based on 
accounting numbers creates a conflict of interest between owners and 
managers.  By smoothing income, managers can affect a transfer of wealth 
from shareholders to themselves.   
 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) and Ronen and Sadan (1981) provide the 
earliest theory of how income-related compensation schemes can induce 
smoothing behaviour.  Moses (1987) supports this theory empirically by linking 
smoothing behaviour with the existence of bonus compensation plans.  
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The seminal paper by Healy (1985) looks at the actual definitions and 
parameters used in bonus arrangements when empirically testing abnormal 
(discretionary) accrual accounting choices.  By looking at the structure of bonus 
plans, Healy makes specific predictions of how, and under what circumstances, 
managers will engage in this type of earnings management.  His study was 
confined to firms with compensation plans (bonus schemes) based on current 
reported net income only.  All the bonus schemes in the sample had bogeys 
(below which the bonus is zero) but not all had caps (the bonus is a constant for 
earnings greater than the cap).  In years when earnings fall sufficiently far below 
the lower bound or above the upper bound specified by the bonus plan, 
managers are expected to select negative abnormal accruals (see figure 4.1).  
This action increases the probability of receiving a bonus the following year.  
Positive abnormal accruals are expected in all other years.  Shifting of earnings 
to future years when bonuses were at their maximum is also reported in 
Holthausen et al. (1995b) and Gaver et al. (1995). 
 
This study finds its inspiration in Healy’s (1985) paper which notes that 
management have inside information on a firm’s net income before earnings 
management.  Since outside parties, including the board itself, may be unable 
to learn what this number is, Healy predicts that managers would 
opportunistically manage earnings so as to maximise their bonuses under the 
firms’ compensation plans.   
 
Healy’s paper is an extension of the bonus plan hypothesis, which states that 
managers of firms with bonus plans will maximise current earnings.  From figure 
4.1, it can be seen that the bonus increases linearly between the bogey and the 
cap.  In general, the literature focuses on when situations might exist where 
executives are aware they will not meet the target so have incentives to 
manage earnings upwards.  Healy (1985) extends this to explore if incentives 
might exist to manage earnings downwards in some circumstances. 
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U 
-K 
Case 2 Case 3 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
(DA1) 
Earnings before 
discretionary 
accruals 
(C1 + NA1) 
K 
0 
L-K L L+K U-K U+K L’ 
‘Managerial discretionary accrual decisions as a function of earnings before discretionary 
accruals and bonus plan parameters in the first period of a two period model.  L = the 
lower bound defined in the bonus plan, U = the upper bound on earnings, L’ = a cut-off 
point which is a function of the lower bound, the manager’s risk preference, expected 
earnings in period 2 and the discount rate, K = the limit on discretionary accruals, C = 
cash flows from operations, and NA = non-discretionary accruals’. 
 
Source: Healy, 1985:90 
Figure 4.1 
 
Typical bonus scheme 
Case 1 
 
 
Figure 4.1 shows that the incentives to manage reported earnings depend on 
where earnings are in relation to the bogey (L) and the cap (U). 
 
Healy (1985) maintains that if earnings are below the bogey, managers, are 
motivated to adopt income-decreasing choices (for example, accruals and/or 
change accounting policies) as no bonus will be received if, even with maximum 
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abnormal accruals, reported earnings will not reach the lower bound.  In this 
case managers might as well manage earnings downwards which would 
increase the probability of receiving a bonus in the following year as accruals 
reverse. 
 
Equally, if earnings are above the cap, there is motivation to adopt income-
decreasing choices.  This would reduce reported earnings as any bonus on 
earnings above the cap would be permanently lost.  Healy (1985) maintains that 
only when reported earnings are between the bogey and the cap are managers 
motivated to adopt income-increasing choices. 
 
The literature preceding the widespread use of equity-based payments focuses 
on the impact of bonus schemes.  Like Healy (1985), Gruidy, Leone and Rock 
(1999) find evidence that managerial accounting decisions are related to 
incentives provided by their bonus contracts.  Holthausen et al. (1995b) find that 
managers manipulate earnings downwards when their bonuses are at their 
maximum.  In contrast, Gaver et al. (1995) explain their findings as evidence of 
the income-smoothing hypothesis.  They find that when earnings before 
abnormal accruals fall below the lower bound, managers seek income-
increasing accruals and vice versa. 
 
This study attempts to apply the approach in Healy (1985) to ESOs with EPS 
targets and identify: 
 
• Whether, and under what conditions, there might be incentives to 
manage earnings downwards. 
 
• Whether, and under what circumstances, there might be incentives to 
manage earnings upwards. 
 
Effectively, the EPS target mirrors the bogey and cap, in that if reported EPS is 
below the target, no options vest, and any reported EPS above the target are 
lost for vesting purposes. 
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4.2.2 Equity Plans and Executive Compensation 
 
The structure (as opposed to the level) of executive compensation has been the 
focus of some studies which consider whether or not the various components 
have an impact on earnings management.  Current executive compensation 
pay contracts may include the following components: 
 
• Salary. 
• Bonus. 
• Share options. 
• LTIPs (restricted stock)3. 
 
The existence of these different components has led to research dominated by 
a preoccupation with studying the influence of compensation contracts on 
managerial behaviour, in particular considering the linear and non-linear payout 
structures derived from the different components of the compensation package.  
Chapter 3 provides more details of these studies. 
 
A recent study by Zhang, Bartol, Smith, Pfarrer and Khanin (2008) isolates 
certain categories of share-based incentives which may cause management to 
act contrary to the interest alignment argument which forms the basis of agency 
theory.  They find that the effects of out-of-the money options lead to incentive 
misalignment.  This, they argue, is explained by prospect theory, that is, in the 
context of possible gains, executives tend to forgo the possibility of a gain if 
pursuing that gain involves the perceived potential for loss relative to the current 
position. 
 
In this case, executives (decision-makers) are loss avoiders rather than wealth 
maxi misers.  Zhang et al. (2008) maintain that considering agency theory and 
prospect theory together, outcome-based incentives could lead to serious 
misalignment (in the form of earnings management) between agents and the 
                                            
3
 Share options granted at zero exercise price.  Another important component, mostly ignored in 
the literature, is pension contributions. 
 106 
principal.  This conclusion would lead to the idea that incentives exist – when 
the vesting of options is contingent on reaching an earnings target – for 
executives to manage earnings.  This manipulation would represent 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of managers.  
 
A study by Young and Yang (2009) finds a strong association between share 
repurchase activity and the presence of EPS-based compensation 
arrangements.  In agreement with the findings of Zhang et al. (2008) they claim 
their findings support the following: 
 
‘One possibility is that opportunistic executives use repurchases to 
maximise their compensation at the expense of external shareholders; and 
such behavior persists either because it represents an unavoidable agency 
cost associated with a second best contracting solution, or because 
management-friendly boards successfully appease external monitors by 
adopting performance targets that at the same time provide executives 
with ancillary earnings management opportunities’ (Young and Yang 2009: 
4). 
 
From the above, it is evident that prior research had found an association 
between executive compensation contract and earnings management. 
 
 
4.2.3 Hypotheses 
 
The motivation behind this study is an attempt to adapt Healy (1985) in an 
environment where the significance of the bonus element of executive 
remuneration has been replaced by ESOs, and where there is a ‘bogey’ and 
‘cap’ element to this component of executive remuneration.  A priori, it is 
expected that firms will manage earnings depending on where actual EPS are 
relative to the target in accordance with the following hypotheses: 
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H1: An EPS target will be positively related to earnings management. 
 
H2: If actual EPS is well below target EPS: managers manage earnings 
downwards. 
 
H3: If actual EPS is just below target EPS: managers manage earnings 
upwards to meet target and ensure ESOs vest. 
 
H4: If actual EPS is just above target EPS: managers manage earnings 
downwards to meet target and store earnings for future years. 
 
H5: If actual EPS is well above target EPS: managers manage earnings 
downwards and store excess earnings for future years. 
 
The results in Chapter 3 suggest that the decision to disclose an alternative 
EPS figure is strongly associated with EPS vesting targets in ESOs.   
 
This chapter looks at the effect of a specific performance criterion, namely, an 
EPS performance target in ESOs, in the context of corporate governance and 
contracting.  The decision to focus on ESOs is supported by theoretical 
arguments (agents act in their own interest) and intuition (agents act to 
maximise their award) which would lead one a priori to expect that the existence 
of an EPS target in ESOs would motivate earnings management.  Raw (signed) 
abnormal working capital accruals (Raw AWCA) are expected to be connected 
with the existence of an EPS performance criterion in the ESOs, their sign and 
magnitude being conditional on where the firms’ unmanaged earnings are in 
relation to the target.   
 
The EPS target in ESOs is generally based on the growth of EPS over a three-
year period.  This target is generally set at a percentage plus the increase in the 
RPI and is required to be achieved before any ESOs vest.  As a result of this 
requirement for EPS to increase over a three-year period, there is potentially 
varying motivational influence in any individual year.  That is, missing a target in 
one specific year does not necessarily mean that any particular tranche of 
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ESOs will fail to vest.  In addition, there may potentially be several tranches of 
ESOs waiting to vest at any one year-end thus making exact measurement of 
the incentive difficult.  Management, it is assumed, can influence reported 
earnings and thus have control over the vesting of their options.  The non-linear 
payout from ESOs are expected to have the greatest impact on the likelihood 
that managers engage in earnings management to benefit from the vesting of 
the options (Burns and Kedia, 2006; Efendi et al. 2005). 
 
Typical examples of the conditions applicable to UK executive share option 
schemes are: 
Kewill plc, Annual Report and Accounts 2003, page 9: 
‘Under the 1995 executive share option schemes, options issued to the 
executive directors (as shown below) may only be exercised provided the 
percentage increase in the group's annualised EPS over the relevant 
three-year period is at least 2% above the average annual percentage 
increase, if any, in the UK Retail Price Index over the three years prior to 
the exercise of the option’. 
 
Luminar Group Holdings plc, Annual Report and Accounts 2003, page 21: 
‘The criteria currently operated by the Committee is that growth in pre-tax 
Earnings Per Share (EPS) must exceed RPI + 3% compounded, over the 
relevant three-year period’. 
 
The focus on share options is interesting as the sample includes 59 percent of 
sample years which have ESOs due to vest and given the convex nature of the 
payout to managers from share options.  This is in contrast to bonus schemes 
where fewer than 30 percent of the bonus schemes have an EPS target.  
Besides, in contrast to bonus schemes and LTIPs, the vesting of share options 
was more often than not dependent solely on an EPS target.  In general, bonus 
plans involve individual or divisional targets, and LTIPs tend to be exercisable 
on the basis of total shareholder return, often measured against a comparator 
group of firms.  This suggests that these latter elements of executive 
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compensation have vesting targets which are less under the control of 
management in addition to being more difficult to observe. 
 
Despite increased disclosure requirements relating to executive remuneration; it 
has proved impossible to determine the exact EPS target of the firms in the 
study.  There are several reasons for this, among them the following: 
 
1. The exact definition of EPS used in the target was generally not 
disclosed. 
 
2. The exact starting and ending dates for the measurement period was not 
disclosed. 
 
3. There was, in some instances (approximately 4 percent), an opportunity 
to reset the target and/or vesting dates. 
 
The particular structure of ESOs selected for study provides a valuable 
opportunity to determine whether the EPS target represents efficient contracting 
or whether it causes management to behave opportunistically. 
 
The main research focus is to determine whether firms manage earnings to: (1) 
meet an EPS target, if they are close to that target, or (2) take a hit if they are 
too far away from the target. 
 
 
4.3 Earnings Management 
 
Equity-based compensation was proposed as a means of ensuring managers 
act in the interests of shareholders, in particular to address the situations where 
managers focused exclusively on the short term.  In order to avoid the situation 
where managers were being rewarded even when firms performed below par, 
reports like Greenbury (1995) maintained that including targets in SBC would 
avoid managers being rewarded when their firm was benefiting from a bull 
market (Oyer, 1998 and Murphy 1998).  Earnings management provides an 
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approach to study the accounting choices of firms.  The separation of ownership 
and control which leads to one potential agency cost, in the shape of earnings 
management, motivates this study.   
 
 
4.3.1 Definition and Measurement of Earnings Management 
 
While there appears to be no universally accepted definition of earnings 
management, the following definition is popular: 
 
‘Earnings management occurs when management use judgement in 
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports 
to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that 
depend on reporting accounting numbers’ (Healy and Wahlen, 1999: 368). 
 
Thus it can be said that earnings management is when managers select 
estimates and/or reporting methods that result in information in financial reports 
that does not reflect the firm’s true position and performance.  This can lead to 
either (1) the misleading of stakeholders and/or (2) the influencing of contractual 
outcomes which rely on reported accounting figures. 
 
As previously stated, the research questions are firstly, does the existence of an 
EPS performance target in ESOs lead to earnings management and secondly, 
do these targets provide incentives to manage earnings downwards and/or 
incentives to manage earnings upwards.  Consequently, this research is 
interested in earnings management in both directions.   
 
Given that financial reporting involves management making judgements and 
estimates to comply with GAAP, the predicament is how to measure earnings 
management.  Since any definition of earnings management involves 
consideration of managerial intent, which is not observable, it is by its nature 
difficult to measure.  For example, Healy and Wahlen (1999) found that there is 
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limited evidence of actual earnings management, which they attribute in part to 
the problems with measurement. 
 
A popular measure of earnings management is abnormal accruals.  Total 
accruals are measured as the difference between net income before 
extraordinary items and operating cash flows.  Total accruals are then 
decomposed into: (1) normal accruals i.e. accruals induced by normal business 
activities and (2) abnormal (discretionary) accruals i.e. accruals that are not a 
direct consequence of normal business and are subject to managerial 
judgement. 
 
As the earnings management for the purpose of this study may be directional 
(that is, the existence of an EPS target in ESOs is hypothesised to create 
incentives to increase and decrease income) the raw value of abnormal working 
capital accruals is the main variable of interest.  Working capital accruals are 
used (rather than total accruals) as literature suggests that working capital 
accruals offer a more attractive device for earnings management due to their 
recurring nature and the large degree of judgement involved in their estimation 
(McNichols and Watson, 1988).  Long-term accruals (depreciation, amortisation, 
provisions for restructuring costs, large write-offs and losses from disposal of 
assets) are usually non-recurring and quite transparent to investors.  As a 
result, they are a more costly device to manage earnings.  
 
If managers are focused on the reported earnings figure, then the role of 
accruals as an earnings management tool becomes clear: for a given amount of 
cash from operations, reported income is increased by positive accruals and 
decreased by negative accruals (for example, increasing a provision for doubtful 
debts).  Crucially, by their nature accruals reverse thus resulting in an increase 
in future periods’ earnings (for example, the need to provide for say, the same 
provision for doubtful debt is removed). 
 
Accrual choices are chosen as the earnings management instrument because, 
as Young (1999) points out, accruals are likely to represent a favoured 
instrument for manipulating reported earnings because of their relatively low 
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cost and opaque nature.  One regularly cited disadvantage of using accruals is 
that they reverse in the future.  From the perspective of this study, this feature 
of working capital accruals – their reversal – can cause them to be a particularly 
attractive device for managers with a three-year target.  For example, if a 
manager sees that he is about to exceed the earnings target in the current year, 
then he can manage earnings down to the target and then store these managed 
earnings for future periods.   
 
Healy’s use of total accruals as a proxy for abnormal accruals is the subject of 
some criticism.  Healy (1985) acknowledges that this method introduces biases 
that support his bonus-maximisation hypothesis.  Normal accruals are 
adjustments to cash flow mandated by GAAP while abnormal accruals are 
adjustments to cash flow selected by managers.  Total accruals thus include 
accruals over which the manager does not have control and this could lead to 
measurement error. 
 
Other measures of earnings management adopted in the past include asset 
sales (Black, Sellers and Manley, 1998; Bartov, 1993), changes in research and 
development expenditure (Bushee, 1998; Bange and De Bondt, 1998), and 
accounting method choices (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
 
 
4.4 Sample and Definition of Variables 
 
The initial sample for the disclosure study in Chapter 3 was the 500 largest UK-
domiciled industrial firms in 2001.  For the purpose of the earnings management 
study, the sample size is extended by the inclusion of the years 2002 and 2003 
for the same 500 largest (in 2001) firms.  The research required information on 
the actual executive remuneration structure in these UK firms in 2001, 2002 and 
2003.  This reduced the sample firms from the original 500 down to 376.  The 
following provides the reasons for the attrition of firms from the original sample: 
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Table 4.1   
 
  
Sample selection  
  
  
  
  2001 sample 500   
  Insufficient information -4   
  Did not file with Companies House -4   
  Not in sterling -3   
  Published 2 Annual Reports in 2003 -1   
  Fiscal year covered 16 months -1   
  Merged/Acquired -32   
  Taken private -1   
  Delisted -2   
  Receivership/Liquidation -9   
  No reply -23   
  Unable to locate -44   
  Earnings Management sample 376   
  
  
 
Concern is often expressed about survivorship bias in the sense that only 
successful firms remain in a sample.  In this study the attrition of firms is not 
solely dependent on firms surviving but also on adequate disclosure of 
remuneration data.  While it is practically impossible to ensure a perfectly 
random sample, the degree of representation (by industry) is consistent over 
the three years with the sample being a reasonable approximation to a random 
sample. 
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4.4.1 Measuring Target Earnings per Share 
The ideal methodological approach would be to have full data and know the 
actual target EPS growth, and then use this to divide the firms by how far actual 
EPS are from target EPS.  From this, a firm’s incentive to manage earnings to 
meet the target and record the direction of earnings management to test the 
hypothesis could be measured.  The findings could then be used to determine 
whether earnings were managed to meet the target, that is, to assess whether 
or not targets impact on the accounting choices of management. 
As evident from the sample extracts from annual reports in the previous section, 
sufficient information (to determine the actual EPS target) is not disclosed 
prohibiting exact duplication of the Healy (1985) study.  The definition of EPS 
which comprises the performance target is not disclosed nor is the 
measurement period (for example, the use of any three-year period).  In 
addition to information being unavailable, there is an issue in measuring EPS 
growth if EPS is negative at the start of the period.  To address these deficits a 
proxy EPS target was devised, whereby a normalised EPS is used as the 
denominator for calculating EPS growth.  Normalised EPS is price per share at 
the start of the period multiplied by the cost of equity capital.  As the cost of 
equity capital is unknown, a constant cost of equity capital of 10 percent is 
assumed.  This is applied to the median three-year4 EPS growth for the industry 
to which a firm belongs, and the industry median is calculated based on all firms 
for whom data is available at the relevant year-end on Datastream, not just the 
firms in the sample.  Therefore, the more observations there are in each 
industry, the more accurate the measure of industry growth will be.  The median 
is chosen above the mean as it is less susceptible to the influence of outliers. 
 
A similar approach is applied to calculating actual EPS growth.  For actual EPS 
growth, the period of measurement ends in the year of interest whereas for the 
target EPS growth, the period of measurement ends in the year prior to the year 
of interest.  This is based on the assumption that the target is based on historic 
growth rates. 
                                            
4
 The EPS growth target for the vast majority of firms in the sample is based on a three-year 
period.  This is gleaned from the disclosures in the financial statements. 
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4.4.2 Research Design 
 
The selection of the period of study, 2001 to 2003, is central.  This period is 
before the changes in the accounting rules requiring the expensing of share 
options granted and after performance vesting ESOs were common practice in 
executive remuneration contracts in the UK. 
 
 
4.4.3 Abnormal Accrual Model 
 
The Jones (1991) model calculates total accruals for each firm in the sample 
and then predicts normal accruals for the year by estimating a regression which 
includes the change in revenues (revenues for firm i in year t less revenues for 
year t-1) to control for normal accruals of current assets and liabilities on the 
grounds that these depend on changes in business activity as measured by 
revenue.  Jones also includes gross property, plant and equipment to control for 
the normal component of depreciation expense.  The Jones model uses the 
unexplained part of a regression of total accruals on the change in revenue and 
gross property, plant and equipment as a proxy for abnormal accruals. 
 
In later abnormal accruals research (DeFond and Park (1997), Subramanyam 
(1996) and Guidry et al. (1999)), the modified Jones model is employed to 
calculate abnormal accruals.  The modified Jones model proposed by Dechow, 
Sloan and Sweeney (1995) classifies all increases in credit sales as 
discretionary and modifies the Jones model by removing change in receivables 
(REC) from the change in sales. 
 
Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) further adapt the modified Jones model by 
excluding depreciation and calculating working capital accruals.  Working 
capital accruals (WCA) is defined as: 
 
WCA = ∆current assets - ∆cash - ∆current liabilities + ∆short-term debt. 
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This modified Jones model applies a cross-sectional approach with the 
objective of overcoming the survivorship bias inherent in the time-series version 
of the Jones (1991) model.  A cost of the cross-sectional approach is that it 
ignores possible reversals of abnormal accruals of prior periods (Peasnell, Pope 
and Young, 2000).  
 
To measure earnings management the model adopted is similar to that of 
Athanasakou, Strong and Walker (2006) whose study follows Kothari et al. 
(2005).  The model estimates normal WCA by including lagged return on assets 
to control for operating performance.  Similar to Athanasakou et al. (2006), the 
modified Jones model is extended as in Ball and Shivakumar (2006) to account 
for the fact that the recognition of gains and losses is asymmetric (Basu, 1997).   
 
Basu (1997) notes the recognition of gains and losses is asymmetric, in that 
losses are recognised in a more timely fashion than gains in accrual accounting 
(accounting conservatism).  Ball and Shivakumar (2006) argue that the 
relationship between accruals and cash flows cannot be linear and show that 
including changes in cash flow corrects for the fact that non-linear accruals 
models explain substantially more variation in accruals than equivalent linear 
models.  Consequently, the Kothari model is extended to account for this timely 
loss recognition function of WCA by including negative changes in cash flows, 
as these are more likely to reflect bad current earnings news than just negative 
operating cash flows.  
 
Three variables are added to the modified Jones model based on changes in 
operating cash flows rather than the level of cash flow, as negative changes in 
cash flows are more likely to reflect bad current earnings news than just 
negative operating cash flows.  This regression is, in the first instance, run by 
industry year for all firms on the Datastream Active and Research files.  It is run 
for each Datastream Level 35 industry year at the relevant year-ends with 
available accruals data and where there were at least six firms in an industry 
                                            
5
 Most research uses Level 6 but this resulted in only medium and small firms remaining in the 
final sample due to the practice of requiring six observations for an industry to be included in 
Stage 2.  Lara, Osma and Mora (2005) also use Level 3. 
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group.  Including all firms ensures efficient parameter estimation from equation 
(1) below with the stipulation that the industry year combination has at least six 
observations.  In addition, as the objective is to isolate abnormal earnings 
management, including all firms in every industry will provide a better reflection 
of any deviation from the industry norm.  This will lead to more accurate and 
meaningful estimates of AWCA. 
   
For each sample year, the following cross-sectional model is estimated for all 
firms available in Datastream matched by year and industry code: 
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Where ∆REVi,t, ∆RECi,t and ∆CFOi,t are change in revenue, change in accounts 
receivable and change in operating cash flow respectively for firm i in period t.  
ROAi,t-1 and Ai,t-1 are return on assets and total assets for firm i in period t-1.  All 
variables (except indicator variables) are scaled by lagged total assets.  
∆CFOi,tNEG is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the change in cash 
flows from operations is negative and 0 otherwise.  CFOi,t*CFONEGi,t is an 
interaction term which is defined as ∆CFOi,t multiplied by ∆CFONEGi,t. 
 
For each individual firm in the sample the following equation is calculated 
solving for AWCA: 
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WCA, A
 t-1, ∆REV, ∆REC and ROA t-1 are all the figures for the individual firm and 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
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This model is estimated cross-sectionally within industry-years to correct for 
industry-wide economic conditions that might influence accruals independently 
of earnings management (Teoh, Welch and Wong, 1998) and to avoid 
contamination of abnormal accruals estimates by time-specific factors, such as 
interest rate fluctuations.  The cross-sectional approach has the limitation that it 
assumes homogeneity across firms in the same industry. 
 
Abnormal, or discretionary, WCA for a firm are the unexpected component 
reported by a company and are the differences between actual levels reported 
and the level expected to be reported by the firm for a period.  Normal, or non-
discretionary, accruals are the expected level of accruals for the firm based on 
factors such as revenue growth and industry classification (Jones, 1991; 
DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Kothari et al. 2005). 
 
Abnormal accruals can be manipulated through financial reporting discretion 
allowed under GAAP.  This provides management with the capacity to either 
increase (positive abnormal accruals) or decrease (negative abnormal accruals) 
reported income for a period. 
 
The objective here is to test whether managers use earnings management to 
meet an EPS growth target when that target needs to be achieved before their 
ESOs vest.   
 
 
4.4.4 Variable Definitions 
 
This study is interested in the direction of earnings management, not just to 
determine the existence of earnings management.  Thus, the dependent 
variable is Raw AWCA.  
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The objective is to test for an association between earnings management and 
the existence of an EPS performance criterion in ESOs.  The variable 
EPSTARG is an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the ESOs have 
an EPS target and 0 otherwise.  The expected sign of this relationship is 
unknown. 
 
The control variables are included as prior research finds they have some 
consequence for the earnings management behaviour of firms.  Consistent with 
PAT (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, 1979), they include leverage (LEV) as a 
proxy for agency costs.  Highly leveraged firms would be expected to manage 
earnings to smooth income and avoid any fluctuations that might trigger 
covenant violations.  A positive association between LEV and Raw AWCA is 
expected. 
 
ISSUE is included following the finding of Teoh et al. (1998) of higher income 
growth in the issue year and the preceding fiscal period.  Thus ISSUE would be 
expected to be positively related to earnings management.   
 
GROWTH is controlled for following Young’s (1999) findings that most abnormal 
accrual models do not adequately control for the growth rate of the firm.  A 
negative association is expected between accounting discretion and growth as 
growth firms have strong incentives to meet earnings benchmarks in order to 
avoid increases in the cost of capital or to maintain access to capital (Bowen, 
Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2008). 
 
Prior research has reported that political costs (proxied by size) are negatively 
associated with |AWCA| (Warfield et al. 1995, Bartov, Gul and Tsui, 2001, Klien 
2002).  In addition, the financial statements of large firms would be expected to 
face more scrutiny and so a negative association with AWCAs is anticipated.  
The mean (median) size of 13 (13) shows that the sample does not appear to 
be biased in the firms remaining in the final sample from the original 500 firms 
which had a mean size of 13 also.  SIZE is defined as the natural logarithm of 
fiscal year-end market capitalisation.  While, this study has as its dependent 
variable Raw AWCA rather that |AWCA|, size is included as it would be 
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expected to impact on the level, in addition to the amount, of earnings 
management. 
 
Minton and Schrand (1999) find that firms with greater earnings volatility have 
higher costs of equity and debt capital.  Hence, riskier firms might use abnormal 
accruals to reduce the perception of risk (Warfield et al. 1995) or to smooth 
earnings and lower their cost of capital.  Volatility is captured using two 
measures: 
 
(1) RISK is a measure of volatility.  This is included to control for the fact that 
more volatile firms are expected to report more volatile earnings figures.  
RISK is measured as the volatility of share price over 60 monthly 
observations before the year of study similar to Aggarwal and Samwick 
(1999). 
 
(2) CVSALES which is the coefficient of variation of sales. 
 
These variables are expected to be positively associated with earnings 
management as high volatility increases the demand for income-smoothing.  
VESTED is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if there is a tranche of 
ESOs due to vest in a year. 
 
Year indicator variables (YEAR2002 and YEAR2003) are included and take the 
value of 1 if the data refers to a particular year and 0 otherwise. 
 
The research requires the defining of firms by the closeness of actual EPS 
growth to the performance target EPS.  To capture this, three variables are 
devised and defined as follows.  To reflect the growth in EPS, the variable 
ACTUAL3 is included and defined as the three-year increase/decrease in actual 
EPS.  To measure the performance target EPS, the variable TARGET3 is 
defined as the three-year increase/decrease in target EPS.  To capture how 
close a firm’s actual growth in  EPS is to its performance criterion growth in  
EPS, MISS3  is defined as the actual increase/decrease in EPS over three 
years minus the industry median increase/decrease in EPS over three years 
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(target).  Further details of these variables are presented in the following 
section. 
 
Four corporate governance variables6, BLOCK, BRDOWN, NEDS and 
BRDSIZE are incorporated in the regression models, and the remaining 
corporate governance variables are used in robustness checks.  Sound 
corporate governance structures are expected to reduce earning management 
practices in firms.  These include: 
 
• The existence of high block holders (BLOCK).  This is an indicator 
variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm has an external stockholder 
owning ≥ 5 percent of the outstanding shares at the fiscal year-end and 0 
otherwise. 
 
• Greater ownership by board members (BRDOWN).  The percentage of 
outstanding shares owned by members of the board at the fiscal year-
end. 
 
• Larger number of non-executive directors on the board (NEDS).  The 
percentage of non-executive directors on the board. 
 
• Total number of board members (BRDSIZE).  The total number of board 
members. 
 
The impact of board size is somewhat uncertain; in theory a larger board will 
reduce earnings management, the larger the board the less the influence of any 
one person or group of persons.  In practice it may mean less efficient decision-
making as it may be more difficult to achieve consensus.  
 
 
 
                                            
6
 Supplied by Manifest Information Services Ltd. 
 
 122 
Corporate governance variables  
 
The following alternative corporate governance variables are used for 
robustness tests.  DUAL takes the value of 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of 
the board and 0 otherwise.  CEOREM takes the value of 1 if the CEO is a 
member of the Remuneration Committee and 0 otherwise.  INSTOWN is the 
percentage of outstanding shares at each year-end held by outside block 
holders.  TEN takes the value of 1 if the firm has an external stockholder owning 
greater than or equal to 10 percent of the outstanding shares at the fiscal year-
end and 0 otherwise.  BIG4 takes the value of 1 if the firm is auditor by one of 
the Big 4 audit firms and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
4.4.5 Vesting Performance Variables 
 
From the remuneration reports of the firms in the sample, it appears that 
generally ESOs vest if a three-year target EPS growth rate is achieved, with the 
latter often linked to the RPI. 
 
Adjusted EPS and adjusted share price are used to estimate the growth 
variables. 
 
Target growth 
 
As the actual target growth is not disclosed and sufficient information is not 
provided to enable it to be estimated, a proxy is employed as follows: 
 
The target growth is based on normalised EPS growth over the three years prior 
to the year under study, so the target for 2003 is measured on the growth from 
1999–2002 EPS figures.  
 
Assuming a constant cost of capital of 10 percent as a rate investors would 
deem acceptable, normalised EPS is defined as the greater of 10 percent of the 
share price at the start of the measurement period (so for the 2003 target, the 
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greater of 10 percent of the 1999 closing share price is taken) and the starting 
EPS (1999).  Taking the greater of these two figures was necessary to 
overcome the difficulty caused by the following two situations (1) starting EPS 
value being too low and (2) where the EPS is negative at the start of the period. 
 
Figure 4.2 explains the timing of the calculation for the three-year growth rate 
for an individual firm with a 31 December year-end: 
 
  
Figure 4.2 
 
Calculating target growth rate for 2003 
   
       
31 December   £  Growth          
       Rate 
1999 Share price 2.00    
2000 Normalised EPS 0.20    
  Reported EPS -0.15    
2003 Reported EPS  -0.01   
  Change in EPS   0.14 0.707 
     
 
 
The target is based on the median EPS growth for the industry to which a firm 
belongs.  The industry median is calculated based on all firms, for whom data is 
available at the relevant year-end on Datastream.  Therefore, the more 
observations there are in each industry, the more accurate the measure of 
industry growth will be.  Also it is anticipated that some degree of consideration 
of an industry norm would be involved in setting a target for a firm. 
 
Actual growth 
 
The same procedure to measure the actual growth in EPS for each firm is 
followed over a three-year period except that for actual growth the period ends 
                                            
7
 0.70 = .14/.20 
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in the year of interest.  This is based on the assumption that this would be used 
to measure the achievement of actual growth. 
 
From the target and actual growth, a variable MISS3 is defined as ACTUAL3 
minus TARGET3. 
 
 
4.4.6 Unmanaged Earnings per Share 
 
By definition, reported earnings are equal to unmanaged earnings plus positive 
abnormal accruals minus negative abnormal accruals.  From this the following 
can be inferred: 
 
 Unmanaged earnings = reported earnings 
     - positive abnormal accruals 
   + negative abnormal accruals. 
 
Unmanaged earnings are calculated on a per share basis, as per Lara, Osma 
and Mora (2005), as follows: 
 
X*t = (EPSt – DACCPS*t) / Pt-1 
 
 (X*t):  unmanaged earnings 
EPSt:  earnings before extraordinary items per share 
DACCPS*t: abnormal accruals per share multiplied by lagged 
total assets 
Pt-1:  share price at the beginning of the period 
 
It is appropriate to use unmanaged earnings on a per share basis (UMEPS) as 
the incentive for managers is also measured on a per share basis.  
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4.4.7 Defining Incentives for Firms 
 
Theory suggests that the earnings management behaviour of firms with EPS 
targets due to vest depends on the distance between unmanaged earnings and 
the target.  Firms with unmanaged earnings far from the target are expected to 
manage earnings downwards as they have no realistic hope of reaching the 
target.  Where firms are close but below the target, small positive accruals are 
expected to allow the firms to meet the target.  Similarly, firms above the target 
are expected to have small negative accruals and thus store accruals for future 
periods. 
 
The objective is to test the following hypothesis: that firms far below the target 
are expected to treat earnings management in a similar fashion to those with a 
bogey under Healy’s (1985) theory and firms well above the target will manage 
earnings downwards as the EPS target acts as a cap as per Healy (1985). 
 
VESTED is an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if a tranche of 
ESOs with EPS performance targets are due to vest in the current year and 0 
otherwise.  An interaction variable, TARVEST is defined as 
EPSTARG*VESTED which captures years when ESOs with an EPS target are 
due to vest. 
 
 
4.5 Group Definitions 
 
The firms are defined by the distance of their actual EPS three-year growth 
(ACTUAL3) from the target three-year EPS (TARGET3) using two methods, 
Method A and Method B.  The definition of both methods is presented in the 
following section.  
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4.5.1 Method A 
 
To define the groups into below, below and close, above and close, and above, 
quartiles of the MISS3 variable are employed; the MISS3 variable is defined as 
the actual three-year growth in EPS (ACTUAL3) minus the target three-year 
growth in EPS (TARGET3): 
 
GROUPA:  firms in the bottom quartile of MISS3; 
GROUPB: firms in the second quartile of MISS3; 
GROUPC:  firms in the third quartile of MISS3; 
GROUPD:  firms in the fourth quartile of MISS3. 
 
Interaction terms are included to test whether there is any significance for the 
different groups when they have ESOs due to vest in that year.  GROUPATV is 
defined as GROUPA*TARVEST, GROUPBTV as GROUPB*TARVEST, 
GROUPCTV as GROUPC*TARVEST and GROUPDTV as 
GROUPD*TARVEST. 
 
 
4.5.2 Method B 
 
In addressing the direction of the incentive to manage earnings, there is 
GROUP1 which is unlikely to reach the target so the firms in this group are 
expected to have incentives to manage earnings downwards, and perhaps even 
take a bath as they have no hope of reaching the target.  A major challenge in 
the research design, given the limited data provided in the remuneration 
reports, is to distinguish between firms close but below the target and firms 
close but above the target.  Having these firms defined would allow the testing 
of the theory that firms just below the target are expected to have incentives to 
manage up to meet the target while firms close but above would be expected to 
manage down to the target and thus bank accruals for future years.  Firms 
above but not close to the target are expected to manage earnings down.  To 
capture the above, four groups are defined using quartiles of the MISS3 
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variable along with the UMEPS variable to differentiate the middle two groups 
as follows: 
 
GROUP1: firms which fall into the first quartile of the MISS3 variable and 
who are well below the target.  If they have any capacity to manage 
earnings, it would likely lead them to manage downwards as they have 
no hope of hitting the target. 
 
GROUP2: firms which are in the second and third quartile of the MISS3 
variable and have negative UMEPS.  These firms are defined as being 
below but close to the target and would be expected to manage upwards 
to meet the target. 
 
GROUP3: firms which are in the second and third quartile of the MISS3 
variable but have positive UMEPS.  These firms are defined as being 
above but close to the target and would be expected to manage 
downwards to just meet the target. 
 
GROUP4: firms which fall into the fourth quartile of the MISS3 variable 
are firms which are well above the target and would be expected to 
manage downwards and keep any reserves for future years. 
 
GROUP2 and GROUP3 comprise firms that are close to the target, to further 
divide them the sign of UMEPS is employed. 
 
GROUP2 are starting not too far from the target and would be expected to have 
the capacity to manage earnings upwards by the amount required to meet the 
target despite having negative unmanaged earnings. 
 
In contrast, GROUP3 firms starting with positive unmanaged earnings can 
manage earnings down and still meet the target. 
 
Previous research validates the use of unmanaged earnings as a benchmark as 
it has been found that unmanaged earnings impact on the earnings 
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management behaviour of firms.  For example, Park and Shin (2004) find that 
positive abnormal accruals occur when unmanaged earnings are below the 
target and firms manage earnings down when unmanaged earnings are above 
the target.  Peasnell et al. (2000) argue and report that the incentive for income-
increasing earnings management is particularly strong when unmanaged 
earnings are below target earnings. 
 
As for Method A, interaction terms are included to test whether there is any 
significance for the different groups when they have ESOs due to vest in that 
year.  GROUP1TV is defined as GROUP1*TARVEST, GROUP2TV as 
GROUP2*TARVEST, GROUP3TV as GROUP3*TARVEST and GROUP4TV as 
GROUP4*TARVEST.
 
 
 
4.6 Results 
 
This section presents the results beginning with the descriptive statistics. 
 
4.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 4.2 
        
 
Executive share option plan characteristics8 
  
     
     
  
2001 2002 2003 Total 
     
N 212 212 279 703 
ESOs with EPS targets 75% 77% 80% 78% 
ESOs vesting in year 47% 60% 67% 59% 
          
                                            
 
8
 All 473 firms in the sample have an executive share option scheme, defined as a share option 
scheme open only to executives; excluded are both savings-based schemes and all-employee 
schemes.
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Table 4.2 presents the percentage of firms with ESOs during the sample period 
which increases marginally.  What is interesting to note, is that the percentage 
of firms with an EPS performance target in their ESOs which is due to vest 
increased from 47 percent in 2001 to 67 percent in 2003. 
 
Table 4.3 presents the descriptive statistics for the Raw AWCA variable along 
with the absolute AWCA (|AWCA|) variable for each year and for the sample 
period as a whole.  If the data for 2003 is considered, it would appear that 
looking at both the raw and absolute figures that this year has more earnings 
management but managing earnings upwards seems to be matched by 
downward earnings management.  Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 suggest that 2003 is 
the year with the most incentive to meet a target, given the large percentage of 
firms with an EPS target and the high percentage of firms in that year with 
ESOs (with an EPS target) due to vest. 
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Table 4.3 
 
Earnings management variables 
  
Mean Median Std. dev Min Max       1% 99% Skewness Kurtosis Obs 
Raw AWCAa 
Pooled 0.008 0.009 0.064 -0.342 0.366 -01.95 0.199 -0.338 8.121 703 
2001 0.015 0.021 0.070 -0.342 0.221 -0.207 0.210 -0.964 7.370 212 
2002 0.012 0.014 0.060 -0.173 0.366 -0.158 0.191 0.738 9.583 212 
2003 0.000 -0.004 0.062 -0.289 0.242 -0.234 0.176 -0.470 8.054 279 
|AWCA|b 
Pooled 0.044 0.031 0.047 0.000 0.366 0.000 0.234 2.540 12.175 703 
2001 0.051 0.037 0.050 0.000 0.342 0.001 0.221 2.225 10.050 212 
2002 0.042 0.029 0.045 0.000 0.366 0.001 0.191 2.958 17.167 212 
2003 0.041 0.028 0.047 0.000 0.289 0.000 0.242 2.563 11.202 279 
 
Notes: 
  
aThe means for 2002 and 2003 are statistically different. 
  
bThere is no statistical difference between the year means. 
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Table 4.4 
Raw AWCA by signa 
  
Mean Median Std. dev Min Max       1% 99% Skewness Kurtosis Obs 
 NEGRAWb 
Pooled 0.042 0.026 0.051 0.000 0.342 0.000 0.236 2.572 11.264 302 
2001 0.057 0.032 0.063 0.000 0..342 0.000 0.342 2.078 8.298 68 
2002 0.040 0.024 0.042 0.000 0.173 0.000 0.173 1.566 4.602 79 
2003 0.037 0.023 0.048 0.000 0.289 0.000 0.280 3.102 14.269 155 
POSRAWc 
Pooled 0.046 0.033 0.044 0.000 0.366 0.001 0.221 2.507 13.081 401 
2001 0.048 0.038 0.041 0.000 0.221 0.001 0.218 1.877 7.568 144 
2002 0.043 0.031 0.046 0.001 0.366 0.002 0.237 3.571 21.991 133 
2003 0.046 0.030 0.045 0.000 0.242 0.000 0.229 1.875 7.390 124 
 
    Notes: 
    
aNEGRAW is the absolute value of the observations with negative Raw AWCA. 
               
bThe means for NEGRAW and POSRAW are not statistically different for the pooled data or for any individual year. 
                
cPOSRAW is the observations with positive Raw AWCA. 
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Table 4.4 presents the statistics for NEGRAW, which is defined as the absolute 
value of negative observations of Raw AWCA, and the statistics for POSRAW, 
which is defined as the observations with positive Raw AWCA.  The 
distributions are very similar in terms of the mean, median, skewness and 
kurtosis).  Since this study is concerned with the direction of earnings 
management, and identifying circumstances under which earnings are 
managed downwards (upwards), the magnitude and not the sign is what is 
important in addressing the research question in this chapter. 
 
The objective is to identify situations where management have incentives to 
manage earnings in a particular direction so Raw AWCA is the dependent 
variable rather than |AWCA| as the direction of earnings management is what is 
of interest with respect to testing the hypotheses.  |AWCA| would be an 
appropriate dependent variable if the interest was in whether or not earnings 
management occurs. 
 
Table 4.5 gives the growth in EPS over three years, broken down into actual 
growth, and target growth and it presents the results for the MISS3 variables.  
MISS3 is the actual increase/decrease in EPS over three years minus target 
(industry median).  It is positive in two of the three years which is an indication 
that actual growth exceeded the target.  As the target requires growth over a 
three-year period, individual years are not informative.  This is because a firm 
could compensate in any year for missing the target in one or two other years of 
the (three-year) vesting period. 
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Table 4.5 
 
Increase / decrease in EPS over three years 
 
  Mean Median Std. dev Min Max       1% 99% Skewness Kurtosis Obs 
ACTUAL3 
Pooled 0.117 0.009 0.809 -1.000 12.936 -1.000 2.404 8.784 125.832 703 
2001 0.043 -0.001 0.495 -1.000 2.415 -1.000 1.590 1.256 6.981 212 
2002 0.177 0.037 0.627 -1.000 3.318 -.0.904 2.437 1.634 7.505 212 
2003 0.127 0.014 1.077 -1.000 12.936 -1.000 2.400 9.020 99.873 279 
TARGET3 
Pooled 0.106 0.094 0.178 -0.541 0.596 -0.409 0.596 -0.195 5.818 703 
2001 0.200 0.173 0.111 0.059 0.539 0.059 0.539 2.149 6.901 212 
2002 -0.006 0.022 0.176 -0.541 0.258 -0.541 0.258 -1.460 4.673 212 
2003 0.120 0.061 0.175 -0.272 0.596 -0.272 0.596 1.036 4.477 279 
MISS3 
Pooled 0.010 -0.068 0.804 -1.539 12.556 -1.150 2.030 8.435 119.366 703 
2001 -0.157 -0.188 0.483 -1.539 2.030 -1.173 1.403 0.969 6.522 212 
2002 0.182 0.087 0.627 -1.135 3.404 -1.008 2.415 1.535 7.589 212 
2003 0.007 -0.050 1.055 -1.380 12.556 -1.181 2.117 9.077 100.885 279 
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Notes: 
ACTUAL3 is defined as the actual three-year growth in EPS. 
TARGET3 is defined as the target three-year growth in EPS.  
MISS3 is defined as ACTUAL3 minus TARGET3. 
 
Figure 4.3 compares the level of Raw AWCA for firms that miss the target with 
firms that exceed the target.  The means, whose difference is not significant, 
are: 
Firms missing target (406)   Raw AWCA, mean =  0.0143 
Firms exceeding target (297)  Raw AWCA, mean = -0.0005 
 
Figure 4.3 suggests a bunching of positive and negative AWCA when the target 
is missed, that is, when MISS3 is near 0. 
 
Figure 4.3 
 
Raw AWCA versus MISS3 
             
 
Notes: 
MISS3 is defined as ACTUAL3 minus TARGET3. 
Raw AWCA is the signed measure of AWCA. 
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Table 4.6 
 
 
UMEPS versus actual growth in EPS 
 
      
  
   
  Mean Median Std. dev Min Max 1% 99% Skewness Kurtosis Obs 
UMEPS 
Pooled -0.001 0.001 0.009 -0.130 0.009 -0.026 0.008 -6.042 114.641 703 
2001 -0.000 0.000 0.009 -0.130 0.009 -0.008 0.003 -13.779 196.954 212 
2002 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.019 0.013 -0.007 0.007 -2.194 23.722 212 
2003 -0.001 0.001 0.014 -0.133 0.110 -0.063 0.017 -2.912 55.234 279 
ACTUAL3 
Pooled 0.117 0.009 0.809 -1.000 12.936 -1.000 2.404 8.784 125.832 703 
2001 0.043 -0.001 0.495 -1.000 2.415 -1.000 1.590 1.256 6.981 212 
2002 0.177 0.037 0.627 -1.000 3.318 -.0.904 2.437 1.634 7.505 212 
2003 0.127 0.014 1.077 -1.000 12.936 -1.000 2.400 9.020 99.873 279 
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Notes: 
UMEPS is unmanaged EPS, that is, reported earnings minus positive abnormal accruals plus 
negative abnormal accruals. 
ACTUAL3 is defined as the actual three-year growth in EPS. 
 
 
Table 4.6 above shows that the means of unmanaged EPS (UMEPS) per 
annum are much lower than the means of reported (actual) EPS three-year 
average growth.  This makes sense as reported earnings can be defined as 
unmanaged earnings plus positive (or minus negative) abnormal accruals. 
 
Figure 4.4 below compares the level of unmanaged earnings (UMEPS) for firms 
which have positive Raw AWCA (manage earnings upwards) with firms which 
have negative Raw AWCA (manage earnings downwards).   
 
Figure 4.4 
 
Raw AWCA versus UMEPS  
 
 
 
Notes: 
UMEPS is unmanaged EPS, that is, reported earnings minus positive abnormal accruals plus 
negative abnormal accruals. 
Raw AWCA is the signed measure of AWCA. 
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Firms with negative UMEPS (198)   Raw AWCA, mean = 0.031 
Firms with positive UMEPS (505)   Raw AWCA, mean = -0.000 
 
Tests for differences in means: 
 
Raw AWCA if UMEPS is negative versus Raw AWCA if UMEPS is 
positive, significantly different, Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.000 
 
This confirms the findings in Peasnell et al. (2000) who document that UK firms 
with negative unmanaged earnings (and changes) have positive mean AWCAs.  
Their result holds for the pre-Cadbury (1992) period and they find that the 
increased level of governance post-Cadbury restrained the use of income-
increasing AWCAs to avoid losses or earnings decline.  The results of this study 
support the findings of Peasnell et al. (2000) over this study period which is 
post-Cadbury. 
 
Table 4.7 below shows the descriptive statistics for the variables included in the 
regression models as control variables.  These are included as prior research 
finds they have some consequence for the earnings management behaviour of 
firms.  Consistent with PAT (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, 1979), they include 
leverage (LEV) as a proxy for agency costs.  Highly leveraged firms would be 
expected to manage earnings to smooth income and avoid any fluctuations that 
might trigger covenant violations.  A positive association between LEV and Raw 
AWCA is expected. 
 
From Table 4.7, just under half the firm years have ESOs with EPS targets due 
to vest (mean = 47 percent).  This is represented by the variable TARVEST, an 
interaction term which is EPSTARG*VESTED.  It captures years when ESOs 
with an EPS target are due to vest. 
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Table 4.7 
 
Control variables (n = 703) 
 
Variable Mean Median Std. dev Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
LEV 0.249 0.236 0.178 0.000 1.365 1.141 6.583 
ISSUE 0.051 0.000 0.221 0.000 1.000 4.072 17.582 
GROWTH 0.044 0.012 0.279 -0.811 2.760 2.827 22.315 
SIZE 12.902 12.702 1.522 7.450 18.623 0.444 3.581 
RISK 0.036 0.033 0.014 0.012 0.123 1.689 7.251 
CVSALES 0.283 0.220 0.231 0.014 1.894 2.545 12.879 
VESTED 0.589 1.000 0.492 0.000 1.000 -0.361 1.131 
TARVEST 0.474 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 0.105 1.011 
 
 
Notes: 
LEV is the total book value of debt over total assets; ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes 
the value of 1 if the number of shares outstanding increases by more than 10 percent in the 
next accounting period and 0 otherwise; GROWTH is the change in the book value of assets 
over lagged assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of fiscal year-end market capitalisation; RISK 
is measured as the volatility of share price over 60 monthly observations before the year of 
study similar to Aggarwal and Samwick (1999); CVSALES is the coefficient of variation of sales 
equal to standard deviation of the previous 5 years sales / mean of the previous 5 year sales; 
VESTED is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if ESOs are due to vest in the current 
year and 0 otherwise; TARVEST is an interaction term defined as EPSTARGT*VESTED. 
 
 
Table 4.8 presents the four corporate governance variables, BLOCK, 
BRDOWN, NEDS and BRDSIZE which are incorporated in the regression 
models.  The remaining corporate governance variables are used in robustness 
checks.  Sound corporate governance structures are expected to reduce 
earning management practices in firms.  These include: 
 
• The existence of high block holders (BLOCK). 
• Greater ownership by board members (BRDOWN). 
• Larger number of non-executive directors on the board (NEDS). 
• Total number of board members (BRDSIZE). 
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The impact of board size is somewhat uncertain; in theory a larger board will 
reduce earnings management, as the larger the board the less the influence of 
any one person or group of persons.  In practice it may mean less efficient 
decision-making as it may be more difficult to achieve consensus.  
 
Table 4.8 
 
       
Corporate governance variables (n = 703) 
 
Variable Mean Median Std. dev Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
BLOCK 0.849 1.000 0.358 0.000 1.000 -1.952 4.810 
BRDOWN 0.061 0.007 0.126 0.000 0.820 3.135 13.609 
NEDS 0.529 0.500 0.137 0.000 0.875 -0.193 3.211 
BRDSIZE 8.596 8.000 2.394 3.000 20.000 0.759 4.098 
INSTOWN 29.335 27.740 17.581 0.000 88.300 0.540 3.127 
DUAL 0.087 0.000 0.282 0.000 1.000 2.936 9.620 
CEOREM 0.020 0.000 0.140 0.000 1.000 6.873 48.235 
TEN 0.562 1.000 0.497 0.000 1.000 -0.249 1.062 
BIG4 0.950 1.000 0.218 0.000 1.000 -4.140 18.138 
 
Notes: 
BLOCK is an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm has an external stockholder 
owning ≥ 5 percent of the outstanding shares at the fiscal year-end and 0 otherwise; BRDOWN 
is the percentage of outstanding shares owned by members of the board at the fiscal year-end; 
NEDS is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board; BRDSIZE is the total number 
of board members; DUAL takes the value of 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of the board and 
0 otherwise; CEOREM is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is a member 
of the Remuneration and 0 otherwise; INSTOWN is the percentage of outstanding shares at 
each year-end held by outside block holders committee and 0 otherwise; TEN is an indicator 
variable takes the value of 1 if the firm has an external stockholder owning greater than or equal 
to 10 percent of the outstanding shares at the fiscal year-end and 0 otherwise; BIG4 is an 
indicator variable takes the value of 1 if the firm is auditor by one of the Big 4 audit firms and 0 
otherwise. 
 
 
Table 4.9 and Table 4.11 report the Pearson correlations between the variables 
defined using Method A (explained in Section 4.6.3 below) and Method B 
(explained in Section 4.6.4 below).  Contrary to the a priori expectation, the 
presence of an EPS target in ESOs is negatively related to both Raw AWCA 
and |AWCA|.  A possible explanation is the multi-period nature of the target, that 
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is, the growth in the target is over a three-year period rather than based on a 
single year’s results. 
 
Both Method A and Method B define the firms on the basis of MISS3.  As 
UMEPS is used in Method B to further define the firms, it is important to note 
the correlation between it and Raw AWCA.  Although significantly correlated at 
the 1% level, it is merely 13%.  While |AWCA| is expected to be positively 
correlated with CVSALES as high sales volatility increases the demand for 
income-smoothing, there is no correlation between these two variables.  In 
contrast, RISK is positively and significant correlated at the 1% level with 
|AWCA| as expected. 
 
To test for collinearity among these variables, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
measures for the regressions in this study report VIF of under 5 for all other 
variables, which is generally considered acceptable.  This suggests 
multicollinearity is not a problem (Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson, 2010). 
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Notes: * / ** / *** indicate significance at 10% / 5% / 1%.  A full definition of the variables is provided in Appendix B.  Continued… 
 
Table 4.9 
 
Correlation matrix – Groups defined using Method A (n = 703) 
 
               
 
|AWCA| Raw AWCA EPSTARG LEV ISSUE GROWTH SIZE RISK CVSALES YEAR2001 YEAR2002 YEAR2003 BLOCK BRDOWN 
|AWCA|  1.00              
Raw AWCA  0.02  1.00             
EPSTARG -0.13*** -0.08**  1.00            
LEV -0.10***  0.04  0.04  1.00           
ISSUE  0.02 -0.10*** -0.09**  0.03   1.00          
GROWTH  0.05 -0.09** -0.04 -0.04   0.37***  1.00         
SIZE -0.08**  0.06  0.11***  0.14***   0.00  0.11***  1.00        
RISK  0.13*** -0.01 -0.18*** -0.09**   0.04 -0.20*** -0.38***   1.00       
CVSALES  0.00 -0.03 -0.17*** -0.08**   0.14***  0.06 -0.07*   0.28***  1.00      
YEAR2001  0.09**  0.07* -0.05  0.02   0.16***  0.21***  0.07*  -0.20***  0.01  1.00     
YEAR2002 -0.03  0.04  0.00  0.03   0.04 -0.09** -0.07*  -0.02  0.01 -0.43***  1.00    
YEAR2003 -0.06 -0.10***  0.05 -0.05 -0.19*** -0.11***  0.00   0.21*** -0.02 -0.53*** -0.53***  1.00   
BLOCK  0.02  0.01 -0.04 -0.07* -0.01 -0.06 -0.38***   0.17***  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  
BRDOWN  0.07** -0.07*  0.08** -0.10** -0.05  0.05 -0.18***   0.03  0.05  0.02  0.00 -0.02 -0.04  1.00 
NEDS -0.11***  0.05  0.01  0.14***  0.00 -0.11***  0.13***   0.11*** -0.01 -0.09**  0.01  0.07* -0.02 -0.10*** 
BRDSIZE -0.10***  0.05  0.09  0.20*** -0.01  0.01  0.55***  -0.24***  0.03  0.02  0.01 -0.03 -0.16*** -0.08** 
GROUPA  0.04  0.08** -0.04  0.07**  0.00 -0.15*** -0.21***   0.08** -0.08**  0.15*** -0.12*** -0.03  0.11*** -0.06 
GROUPB -0.03  0.01 -0.06 -0.09** -0.02 -0.04 -0.03  0.11***  0.02  0.07* -0.10***  0.03  0.04 -0.01 
GROUPC -0.04 -0.01  0.05  0.07** -0.04  0.05  0.20*** -0.10*** -0.06 -0.11***  0.00  0.10*** -0.10*** -0.02 
GROUPD  0.02 -0.09***  0.06 -0.06  0.06  0.15***  0.05 -0.10***  0.12*** -0.12***  0.22*** -0.10** -0.05  0.10** 
VESTED -0.09** -0.03  0.08** -0.02  0.05  0.00  0.02  0.12***  0.05 -0.16***  0.01  0.14***  0.02 -0.06 
TARVEST -0.12*** -0.05  0.51***  0.01 -0.01  0.01  0.12*** -0.04 -0.07* -0.14***  0.00  0.13*** -0.03 -0.02 
GROUPATV -0.02  0.01  0.19***  0.05  0.04 -0.07* -0.10***  0.07* -0.05  0.02 -0.06*  0.04  0.09** -0.04 
GROUPBTV -0.08**  0.00  0.19***  0.04 -0.06* -0.06  0.03  0.00 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05  0.08** -0.02  0.04 
GROUPCTV -0.05 -0.01  0.20***  0.00 -0.03  0.03  0.20*** -0.06* -0.04 -0.09** -0.04  0.12*** -0.08** -0.03 
GROUPDTV -0.03 -0.09**  0.20*** -0.07*  0.03  0.10***  0.05 -0.07*  0.04 -0.11***  0.16*** -0.05 -0.03  0.00 
UMEPS  0.00 -0.13***  0.01  0.05  0.02  0.00 -0.03 -0.07 -0.01  0.01  0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.09** 
MISS3  0.07  0.03  0.03 -0.09**  0.02  0.10***  0.07** -0.02  0.20*** -0.14***  0.14***  0.00 -0.04  0.01 
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Notes: * / ** / *** indicate significance at 10% / 5% / 1%.  A full definition of the variables is provided in Appendix B. 
 
 
 
Table 4.9 Continued 
 
 
Correlation matrix – Groups defined using Method A (n = 703) 
 
 
 
 NEDS BRDSIZE GROUPA GROUPB GROUPC GROUPD VESTED TARVEST GROUPATV GROUPBTV GROUPCTV GROUPDTV UMEPS MISS3 
NEDS  1.00              
BRDSIZE -0.02   1.00             
GROUPA  0.11*** -0.14***  1.00            
GROUPB  0.04  0.00 -0.37***  1.00           
GROUPC -0.06  0.10*** -0.34*** -0.33***  1.00          
GROUPD -0.10**  0.04 -0.34*** -0.32*** -0.30***  1.00         
VESTED -0.06*  0.10*** -0.07*  0.00  0.06  0.02  1.00        
TARVEST -0.03  0.14*** -0.07* -0.03  0.06  0.05  0.79***  1.00       
GROUPATV  0.05 -0.04  0.58* -0.21*** -0.20*** -0.20***  0.30***  0.38***  1.00      
GROUPBTV -0.01  0.04 -0.22**  0.61*** -0.20*** -0.20***  0.30***  0.38*** -0.13***  1.00     
GROUPCTV -0.04  0.15*** -0.23*** -0.22***  0.68** -0.20***  0.31***  0.40*** -0.14*** -0.14***  1.00    
GROUPDTV -0.06  0.06 -0.23*** -0.22*** -0.20***  0.68***  0.31***  0.39*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.14***  1.00   
UMEPS  0.03 -0.06  0.05  0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05  0.02  0.06 -0.08** -0.08**  1.00  
MISS3 -0.08**  0.06 -0.44*** -0.12***  0.05  0.54  0.07*  0.06* -0.24*** -0.07*  0.03  0.37*** -0.05  1.00 
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4.6.2 Empirical Models and Results 
 
This section presents the results from the ordinary least squares regression 
(OLS) models.  The firms are defined by the distance of their EPS from the 
target EPS using two methods, Method A and Method B.  Both methods are 
defined and the results are presented in the following sections.  
 
 
4.6.3 Method A 
 
Model 1 represents the basic model which includes control variables, year 
dummies, corporate governance variables and the variable of interest, that is, 
EPSTARG.   
 
This model represents variables expected to influence whether or not a firm 
manages earnings.  The objective of this regression is to test the first 
hypothesis (H1) which is whether an EPS target in ESOs helps explain earnings 
management.  Also of interest are both the sign and the magnitude of the 
relationship between Raw AWCA and the EPS target in ESOs.   
 
To investigate the role of the variable of interest, that is, the existence of an 
EPS target in ESOs, the ordinary least squares regressions below are 
estimated on the pooled data.  To define the groups into below, below and 
close, above and close, and above, quartiles of the MISS3 variable are 
employed; the MISS3 variable is defined as the actual three-year growth in EPS 
minus the target three-year growth in EPS: 
 
GROUPA:  firms in the bottom quartile of MISS3; 
GROUPB: firms in the second quartile of MISS3; 
GROUPC:  firms in the third quartile of MISS3; 
GROUPD:  firms in the fourth quartile of MISS3. 
 
Model 1 in Table 4.9 presents the regression results with Raw AWCA as the 
dependent variable.  The results are presented in phases, with Model 1 showing 
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the EPS target variable and control variables from prior literature.  Model 2 
includes the groups and Model 3 adds the variable which tells whether or not 
ESOs are due to vest in that particular sample year. 
 
Years when it is anticipated that managers have greater incentives to manage 
earnings are identified by the inclusion of an interaction term, TARVEST, which 
is EPSTARG*VESTED.  The interaction terms between GROUP and TARVEST 
are to capture the scenario when there is an EPS target and some ESOs are 
due to vest in the year of observation.  
 
Model 19 
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Model 2 
 
Model 2 includes, along with the variables from Model 1, sample firms defined 
by where they fall on the MISS3 (ACTUAL3 – TARGET3) continuum.  Those 
who are in the second quartile of the MISS3 variable are considered to be 
below but close to the target.  Here the sign and magnitude of the GROUP 
variables are of interest.  This regression is designed to test the second two 
hypotheses outlined in 4.2, that is, to test the direction of earnings management 
behaviour.  The direction is predicted depending on where actual EPS are in 
relation to the target.  For example, in line with H2 (H3), firms in GROUP2 
(GROUP3) would be expected to manage earnings up (down) by a small 
amount to meet the target given that they are close to the target prior to any 
earnings management. 
 
                                            
9Model 4 in Table 4.12 is a replicate of Model 1.  While the results do not change, Model 4 is 
included in Table 4.12 as it provides a benchmark to compare the other models using Method 
B. 
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Model 3 
 
Model 3 expands Model 2 by the inclusion of  interaction terms which are the 
result of interacting the GROUP variables with TARVEST to represent firms 
which have ESO targets in their ESOs and have some ESOs due to vest in the 
year.  Table 4.10 below presents the regression results from these models.  
This regression is designed to test whether or not there are stronger incentives 
to manage earnings in years when ESOs with an EPS target are due to vest.  
This is tested by the significance and sign of the interaction terms, GROUPBTV, 
GROUPCTV and GROUPDTV.  While both GROUPBTV and GROUPDTV have 
the expected sign, none of the three interaction terms have any significance. 
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Table 4.10 
 
  
  
Coefficient estimates and model summary statistics for OLS regressions of Raw AWCA on 
the existence of an EPS performance criterion in ESOs with control and corporate 
governance variables.  Firms are categorised in Model 2 and Model 3 as per their 
hypothesised incentive to manage earnings. 
 
Variables Predicted Sign 
Model 1 
Coefficient 
(p-value)a 
Model 2 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Model 3 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
 
-0.025 
 (0.385) 
         -0.026 
 (0.361) 
-0.022 
 (0.457) 
EPSTARG ?   -0.014** (0.031) 
  -0.014** 
         (0.041) 
         -0.017 
(0.108) 
LEV + 0.009 (0.566) 
          0.006 
(0.679) 
0.005 
(0.734) 
ISSUE +          -0.032** (0.029) 
 -0.033** 
 (0.026) 
         -0.032** 
(0.032) 
GROWTH  
+ 
         -0.014 
(0.185) 
         -0.010 
 (0.339) 
         -0.010 
(0.342) 
SIZE - 0.003 (0.133) 
  0.003* 
(0.061) 
 0.003* 
(0.074) 
RISK + 0.158 (0.515) 
0.135 
(0.577) 
0.153 
(0.539) 
CVSALES +          -0.008 (0.500) 
         -0.005 
(0.707) 
         -0.005 
(0.710) 
YEAR2002 ?          -0.005 (0.448) 
         -0.001 
(0.916) 
         -0.001 
(0.918) 
YEAR2003 ?     -0.020*** (0.002) 
    -0.018*** 
(0.007) 
   -0.018*** 
(0.007) 
BLOCK - 0.005 (0.520) 
          0.005 
(0.544) 
0.005 
(0.518) 
BRDOWN -          -0.026 (0.280) 
         -0.022 
(0.366) 
         -0.023 
(0.329) 
NEDS - 0.015 (0.414) 
          0.010 
         (0.601) 
0.010 
(0.597) 
BRDSIZE ? 0.000 (0.681) 
0.000 
(0.675) 
0.005 
(0.646) 
GROUPB +           -0.008 
 (0.249) 
         -0.011 
(0.263) 
GROUPC -           -0.008 (0.275) 
         -0.011 
(0.330) 
GROUPD -    -0.016** (0.048) 
         -0.014 
(0.245) 
VESTED  ?            -0.005 (0.667) 
TARVEST ?   0.004 (0.792) 
GROUPBTV  +   0.007 (0.571) 
GROUPCTV  -   0.005 (0.697) 
GROUPDTV -            -0.004 (0.754) 
N  703 703 703 
R-squared  0.0500 0.0567 0.0583 
F-stat  3.04 3.00 2.41 
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Notes:  
ap-values in brackets; * / ** / *** indicate significance at 10% / 5% / 1%. 
The dependent variable is Raw AWCA; EPSTARG is an indicator variable that takes the value 
of 1 if there is an EPS target in ESOs and 0 otherwise; LEV is the total book value of debt over 
total assets; ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the number of shares 
outstanding increases by more than 10 percent in the next accounting period and 0 otherwise; 
GROWTH is the change in the book value of assets over lagged assets; SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of fiscal year-end market capitalisation; RISK is measured as the volatility of share 
price over 60 monthly observations before the year of study similar to Aggarwal and Samwick 
(1999); CVSALES is the coefficient of variation of sales = standard deviation of the previous 5 
years sales / mean of the previous 5 year sales; VESTED is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of 1 if ESOs are due to vest in the current year and 0 otherwise; YEAR2002 is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the year is 2002 and 0 otherwise; YEAR2003 is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the year is 2003 and 0 otherwise; BLOCK is an 
indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm has an external stockholder owning ≥ 5 
percent of the outstanding shares at the fiscal year-end and 0 otherwise; BRDOWN is the 
percentage of outstanding shares owned by members of the board at the fiscal year-end; NEDS 
is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board; BRDSIZE is the total number of 
board members; DUAL takes the value of 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of the board and 0 
otherwise; GROUPA includes firms in the second quartile of MISS3; GROUPB includes firms in 
the third quartile of MISS3; GROUPC includes firms in the fourth quartile of MISS3; VESTED is 
an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if ESOs are due to vest in the current year and 0 
otherwise; TARVEST is an interaction term defined as EPSTARGT*VESTED; GROUP2TV is an 
interaction term defined as GROUP2TV*TARVEST; GROUP3TV is an interaction term defined 
as GROUP3TV*TARVEST; GROUP4TV is an interaction term defined as 
GROUP4TV*TARVEST. 
 
 
Model 1 in Table 4.10 presents the results from the OLS regression of Raw 
AWCA on an EPS target in ESOs, variables found to be related to earnings 
management, year variables and corporate governance variables. 
 
Model 1 results show: 
 
• EPSTARG is negative and significant at the 5% level (-0.014, P>|z| = 
0.031). 
 
• ISSUE is negative and significant at the 5% level (-0.032, P>|z| = 0.029).  
As the dependent variable is Raw AWCA, this could be an indication of   
managing earnings downwards and upwards. 
 
• YEAR2003 is negative and significant at the 1% level (-0.021, P>|z| = 
0.002).  The year variable is important as the incentive to manage 
earnings could be different from one year to another depending on the 
incentives faced by management.  These incentives include the amount 
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of gain from options vesting if a target is met, whether other tranches of 
options are exercisable and/or the desire to influence the share price 
downwards if options are being rewarded. 
 
• GROWTH is not significant and for all three versions of the model it is 
negative.  Like ISSUE, perhaps this can be explained by the use of Raw 
AWCA which is not a reflection of the amount of earnings management, 
but a measure of the direction of any earnings management. 
 
Model 2 results show: 
 
• EPSTARG is negative and significant at the 5% level (-0.014, P>|z| = 
0.041). 
 
• ISSUE is negative and significant at the 5% level (-0.033, P>|z| = 0.026).   
 
• YEAR2003 is negative and significant at the 1% level (-0.018, P>|z| = 
0.007), as it was in Model 1. 
 
• This model contains the GROUP variables and both GROUPC and 
GROUPD manage earnings in the direction expected (downwards) the 
results for GROUPD are negative and significant at the 5% level (-0.016, 
P>|z| = 0.048).  GROUPB being close but below the target was expected 
to manage earnings upward to meet target but the sign of the coefficient 
is negative. 
 
Model 3 includes interaction terms which are designed to capture years in which 
there is an incentive to manage earnings due to an EPS target in ESOs which 
are due to vest in the year in question. 
 
Model 3 results show: 
 
• ISSUE is negative and significant at the 5% level (-0.032, P>|z| = 0.032). 
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• YEAR2003 is negative and significant at the 1% level (-0.018, P>|z| = 
0.007).  
 
• None of the interaction terms are significant but both GROUPBTV and 
GROUPDTV have the expected signs, positive and negative 
respectively. 
 
Summarising, some negative association is found between EPSTARG, ISSUE 
and YEAR2003 and Raw AWCA, indicating ESOs with an EPS target have 
some incentives for management to maximise the payout from the ESOs.  
While the direction of the association with the GROUP variables is as expected, 
apart from GROUPD, there is no significant association found. 
 
 
4.6.4 Method B 
 
As mentioned in Section 4.5.2 above a major challenge in the research design, 
given firms being close to the target and the limited data provided in the 
remuneration reports, is to distinguish between firms close but below the target 
and firms close but above the target.  Having these firms defined would allow 
the testing of the theory that firms just below the target are expected to have 
incentives to manage up to meet the target while firms close but above would 
be expected to manage down to the target and thus bank accruals for future 
years.  Firms above but not close to the target are expected to manage 
earnings down.  To capture the above, four groups are defined using quartiles 
of the MISS3 variable along with the UMEPS variable to differentiate the middle 
two groups as follows: 
 
GROUP1: firms which fall into the first quartile of the MISS3 variable and 
who are well below the target.  If they have any capacity to manage 
earnings, it would likely lead them to manage downwards as they have 
no hope of hitting the target. 
 
 150 
GROUP2: firms which are in the second and third quartile of the MISS3 
variable and also have negative UMEPS.  These firms are defined as 
being below but close to the target and would be expected to manage 
upwards to meet the target. 
 
GROUP3: firms which are in the second and third quartile of the MISS3 
variable but have positive UMEPS.  These firms are defined as being 
above but close to the target and would be expected to manage 
downwards to just meet the target. 
 
GROUP4: firms which fall into the fourth quartile of the MISS3 variable 
are firms which are well above the target and would be expected to 
manage downwards and keep any reserves for future years. 
 
GROUP2 and GROUP3 comprise firms that are close to the target, to further 
divide them the sign of UMEPS is employed. 
 
GROUP2 are starting not too far from the target and would be expected to have 
the capacity to manage earnings upwards by the amount required to meet the 
target despite having negative unmanaged earnings. 
 
In contrast, GROUP3 firms starting with positive unmanaged earnings can 
manage earnings down and still meet the target. 
 
As indicated in Section 4.2.3 a major challenge this research faces in the fact 
that vesting targets apply to a three-year performance target.  To address this, 
interaction terms between GROUP and TARVEST are defined to capture the 
scenario when there is an EPS target and some ESOs are due to vest in the 
year of observation.  
 
Table 4.11 presents the correlations for the variables in the study where the 
GROUPS are defined using Method B, that is, UMEPS is used along with 
quartiles of MISS3.  It is evident that no issues arise from any two variables 
being highly correlated. 
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Notes: * / ** / *** indicate significance at 10% / 5% / 1%.  A full definition of the variables is provided in Appendix B.  Continued… 
 
 
 
Table 4.11 
 
Correlation matrix – Groups defined using Method B (n = 703) 
 
               
 |AWCA| Raw AWCA EPSTARG LEV ISSUE GROWTH SIZE RISK CVSALES YEAR2001 YEAR2002 YEAR2003 BLOCK BRDOWN 
|AWCA|  1.00              
Raw AWCA  0.02  1.00             
EPSTARG -0.13*** -0.08**  1.00            
LEV -0.10***  0.04  0.04  1.00           
ISSUE  0.02 -0.10*** -0.09**  0.03  1.00          
GROWTH  0.05 -0.09** -0.04 -0.04  0.37***  1.00         
SIZE -0.08**  0.06  0.11***  0.14***  0.00  0.11***  1.00        
RISK  0.13*** -0.01 -0.18*** -0.09**  0.04 -0.20*** -0.38***  1.00       
CVSALES  0.00 -0.03 -0.17*** -0.08**  0.14***  0.06 -0.07*  0.28***  1.00      
YEAR2001  0.09**  0.07* -0.05  0.02  0.16***  0.21***  0.07* -0.20***  0.01  1.00     
YEAR2002 -0.03  0.04  0.00  0.03  0.04 -0.09** -0.07* -0.02  0.01 -0.43***  1.00    
YEAR2003 -0.06 -0.10***  0.05 -0.05 -0.19*** -0.11***  0.00  0.21*** -0.02 -0.53*** -0.53***  1.00   
BLOCK  0.02  0.01 -0.04 -0.07* -0.01 -0.06 -0.38***  0.17***  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  
BRDOWN  0.07** -0.07*  0.08** -0.10** -0.05  0.05 -0.18***  0.03  0.05  0.02  0.00 -0.02 -0.04  1.00 
NEDS -0.11***  0.05  0.01  0.14***  0.00 -0.11***  0.13***  0.11*** -0.01 -0.09**  0.01  0.07* -0.02 -0.10*** 
BRDSIZE -0.10***  0.05  0.09**  0.20*** -0.01  0.01  0.55*** -0.24***  0.03  0.02  0.01 -0.03 -0.16*** -0.08** 
GROUP1  0.04  0.08** -0.04  0.07**  0.00 -0.15*** -0.21***  0.08** -0.08**  0.15*** -0.12*** -0.03  0.11** -0.06 
GROUP2 -0.02  0.18***  0.01 -0.03  0.00  0.01  0.12*** -0.03 -0.02  0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02  0.01 
GROUP3 -0.04 -0.13*** -0.02  0.00 -0.05  0.00  0.07*  0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.08**  0.12*** -0.04 -0.03 
GROUP4  0.02 -0.09**  0.06 -0.06  0.06  0.15**  0.05 -0.10***  0.12*** -0.12***  0.22*** -0.10** -0.05  0.10** 
VESTED -0.09** -0.03  0.08**  -0.02  0.05  0.00  0.02  0.12***  0.05 -0.16***  0.01  0.14***  0.02 -0.06 
TARVEST -0.12*** -0.05  0.51***  0.01 -0.01  0.01  0.12 -0.04 -0.07* -0.14***  0.00  0.13*** -0.03 -0.02 
GROUP1TV -0.02  0.01  0.19  0.05  0.04 -0.07* -0.10***  0.07* -0.05  0.02 -0.06*  0.04  0.09** -0.04 
GROUP2TV -0.08**  0.07*  0.15*** -0.01 -0.04 -0.03  0.07* -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01  0.05 -0.01  0.05 
GROUP3TV -0.06* -0.05  0.24***  0.04 -0.05  0.00  0.16*** -0.05 -0.06 -0.08** -0.08**  0.14*** -0.08** -0.03 
GROUP4TV -0.03 -0.09**  0.20*** -0.07*  0.03  0.10***  0.05 -0.07*  0.04 -0.11***  0.16*** -0.05 -0.03  0.00 
UMEPS  0.00 -0.13***  0.01  0.05  0.02  0.00 -0.03 -0.07* -0.01  0.01  0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.09* 
MISS3  0.07*  0.03  0.03 -0.09**  0.02  0.10***  0.07** -0.02  0.20*** -0.14***  0.14***  0.00 -0.04  0.01 
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Notes: * / ** / *** indicate significance at 10% / 5% / 1%.  A full definition of the variables is provided in Appendix B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.11 Continued 
 
 
Correlation matrix – Groups defined using Method B (n = 703) 
 
 
 NEDS BRDSIZE GROUP1 GROUP2 GROUP3 GROUP4 VESTED TARVEST GROUP1TV GROUP2TV GROUP3TV GROUP4TV UMEPS MISS3 
BRDSIZE -0.02  1.00             
GROUP1 0.11*** -0.14***  1.00            
GROUP2 -0.03  0.07* -0.24***  1.00           
GROUP3  0.00  0.04 -0.46 -0.30***  1.00          
GROUP4 -0.10**  0.04 -0.34*** -0.22*** -0.41***  1.00         
VESTED -0.06*  0.10*** -0.07*  0.01  0.05  0.02  1.00        
TARVEST -0.03  0.14*** -0.07  0.03  0.00  0.05  0.79***  1.00       
GROUP1TV  0.05 -0.04  0.58*** -0.14*** -0.27*** -0.20***  0.30***  0.38***  1.00      
GROUP2TV -0.01  0.09** -0.17***  0.68*** -0.20*** -0.15***  0.23***  0.29*** -0.10***  1.00     
GROUP3TV -0.04  0.11*** -0.28*** -0.18***  0.61*** -0.25***  0.38***  0.48*** -0.16*** -0.12***  1.00    
GROUP4TV -0.06  0.06 -0.23*** -0.15*** -0.28***  0.68***  0.31***  0.39*** -0.13*** -0.10*** -0.17***  1.00   
UMEPS  0.03 -0.06  0.05 -0.22***  0.14*** -0.03 -0.04 -0.05  0.02 -0.19***  0.10*** -0.08**  1.00  
MISS3 -0.08*  0.06 -0.44*** -0.03 -0.04  0.54***  0.07*  0.06* -0.24*** -0.01 -0.02  0.37*** -0.05  1.00 
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Model 4 
 
Model 4 is a repeat of Model 1 which represents the basic model which includes 
control variables, year dummies, corporate governance variables and the 
variable of interest, that is, EPSTARG.  This model includes variables expected 
to influence whether or not a firm manages earnings.  The focus of this 
regression is the sign and magnitude of the relationship between Raw AWCA 
and the existence of an EPS target in ESOs. 
 
It is presented here in order to enable comparison with Model 5 and Model 6.  
These models define the GROUPS using UMEPS (which was not the case in 
Model 2 and Model 3 under Method A above). 
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Model 5 
 
Model 5 is based on Model 4, with additional variables relating to where firms 
fall on the MISS3 (actual EPS – target EPS) continuum.  Those who are in the 
second quartile and third quartile of the MISS3 variable are further defined by 
the sign of UMEPS.  The firms in the second and third quartile and with 
negative UMEPS are considered to be below but close to the target.  Moreover, 
the firms in the second and third quartile and with positive UMEPS are 
considered to be above but close to the target.  Here the sign and magnitude of 
the GROUP variables is of interest. 
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Model 6 
 
Model 6 expands Model 5 by the inclusion of  interaction terms which are the 
result of interacting the GROUP variables with TARVEST to represent firms 
which have ESO targets in their ESOs and have some ESOs due to vest in the 
year.  Table 4.12 below presents the regression results from these models.  The 
GROUPS are defined using Method B. 
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Table 4.12 
 
Coefficient estimates and model summary statistics for OLS regressions of Raw AWCA on 
the existence of an EPS performance criterion in ESOs with control and corporate 
governance variables.  Firms are categorised in Model 5 and Model 6 as per their 
hypothesised incentive to manage earnings. 
Variables Predicted Sign 
Model 4 
Coefficient 
(p-value)a 
Model 5 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Model 6 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
 
         -0.025 
 (0.385) 
         -0.017 
(0.537) 
         -0.012 
(0.674) 
EPSTARG ?   -0.014** (0.031) 
  -0.014** 
(0.033) 
         -0.016 
(0.121) 
LEV + 0.009 (0.566) 
0.008 
(0.573) 
0.007 
(0.635) 
ISSUE +          -0.032** (0.029) 
  -0.034** 
(0.017) 
  -0.034** 
(0.019) 
GROWTH +          -0.014 (0.185) 
         -0.010 
(0.354) 
         -0.010 
(0.343) 
SIZE - 0.003 (0.133) 
0.003 
(0.136) 
0.002 
(0.233) 
RISK + 0.158 (0.515) 
0.140 
(0.540) 
0.158 
(0.498) 
CVSALES +          -0.008 (0.500) 
         -0.005 
(0.710) 
         -0.005 
(0.686) 
YEAR2002 ?          -0.005 (0.448) 
         -0.001 
(0.842) 
         -0.001 
(0.839) 
YEAR2003 ?     -0.020*** (0.002) 
    -0.017*** 
(0.009) 
   -0.018*** 
(0.009) 
BLOCK - 0.005 (0.520) 
0.003 
(0.649) 
0.004 
(0.625) 
BRDOWN -          -0.026 (0.280) 
         -0.025 
(0.295) 
         -0.025 
(0.302) 
NEDS - 0.015 (0.414) 
0.013 
(0.495) 
0.015 
(0.411) 
BRDSIZE ? 0.000 (0.681) 
0.000 
(0.663) 
0.001 
(0.543) 
GROUP2 +       0.021*** (0.005) 
     0.030*** 
(0.005) 
GROUP3 -      -0.018*** (0.008) 
    -0.024*** 
(0.009) 
GROUP4 -  -0.015 (0.062) 
         -0.012 
(0.293) 
VESTED  ?            -0.002 (0.839) 
TARVEST ?   0.002 (0.919) 
GROUP2TV  +            -0.017 (0.199) 
GROUP3TV  -   0.014 (0.248) 
GROUP4TV -            -0.005 (0.744) 
N  703 703 703 
R-squared  0.0500 0.0923            0.0992 
F-stat  3.04 5.60 4.47 
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Notes: 
ap-values in brackets; * / ** / *** indicate significance at 10% / 5% / 1%. 
The dependent variable is Raw AWCA; EPSTARG is an indicator variable that takes the value 
of 1 if there is an EPS target in ESOs and 0 otherwise; LEV is the total book value of debt over 
total assets; ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the number of shares 
outstanding increases by more than 10 percent in the next accounting period and 0 otherwise; 
GROWTH is the change in the book value of assets over lagged assets; SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of fiscal year-end market capitalisation; RISK is measured as the volatility of share 
price over 60 monthly observations before the year of study similar to Aggarwal and Samwick 
(1999); CVSALES is the coefficient of variation of sales = standard deviation of the previous 5 
years sales / mean of the previous 5 year sales; VESTED is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of 1 if ESOs are due to vest in the current year and 0 otherwise; YEAR2002 is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the year is 2002 and 0 otherwise; YEAR2003 is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the year is 2003 and 0 otherwise; BLOCK is an 
indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm has an external stockholder owning ≥ 5 
percent of the outstanding shares at the fiscal year-end and 0 otherwise; BRDOWN is the 
percentage of outstanding shares owned by members of the board at the fiscal year-end; NEDS 
is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board; BRDSIZE is the total number of 
board members; GROUP2 includes firms which are in the second and third quartile of the 
MISS3 variable and also have negative UMEPS; GROUP3 includes firms which are in the 
second and third quartile of the MISS3 variable but have positive UMEPS; GROUP4 includes 
firms which fall into the fourth quartile of the MISS3 variable; VESTED is an indicator variable 
that takes the value of 1 if ESOs are due to vest in the current year and 0 otherwise; TARVEST 
is an interaction term defined as EPSTARGT*VESTED; GROUP2TV is an interaction term 
defined as GROUP2TV*TARVEST; GROUP3TV is an interaction term defined as 
GROUP3TV*TARVEST; GROUP4TV is an interaction term defined as GROUP4TV*TARVEST. 
 
 
Model 5 results show: 
 
• EPSTARG is negative and significant at the 5% level (-0.014, P>|z| = 
0.033). 
 
• ISSUE and YEAR2003 remain negative and significant. 
 
• GROUP2 (below but close to the target) is positive as expected and 
significant at the 1% level, (0.021, P>|z| = 0.005).  This suggests that 
firms in this GROUP manage earnings upwards to meet the target as 
hypothesised.  
 
• GROUP3 (above but close to the target) is negative and significant at the 
1% level as hypothesised (-0.024, P>|z| = 0.009). 
 
• GROUP4 is not significant.  The direction of the coefficient is as 
expected, suggesting these firms manage earnings downwards to avoid 
‘wasting’ earnings. 
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Model 6 tests the hypotheses stated in 4.2 which are as follows: 
 
H2: Actual EPS well below target EPS: Managers manage earnings 
downwards. 
 
H3: Actual EPS just below target EPS: Managers manage earnings 
upwards to meet target and ensure ESOs vest. 
 
H4: Actual EPS just above target EPS: Managers manage earnings 
downwards to meet target and store earnings for future years; and 
 
H5: Actual EPS well above target EPS: managers manage earnings 
downwards and store excess earnings for future years. 
 
H3 uses firms in GROUP2, which as predicted, manage earnings upwards to 
meet the target to which they are close. 
 
H4 uses firms in the GROUP3 definition and they, as predicted, manage 
earnings down to the target and thus avoid ‘wasting’ earnings which can be 
used in subsequent years. 
 
H5 covers firms in GROUP4 and the sign of the relationship is negative as 
expected.  However, unlike the findings for firms in GROUP2 and GROUP3, the 
results for GROUP4 are not significant. 
 
Model 6 reports much the same results as Model 5, which is disappointing as it 
was anticipated that the interaction terms would capture the strength of the 
incentive effect on the firms depending on their juxtaposition to the target EPS.   
 
Model 6 results show: 
 
• ISSUE is negative and significant at the 5% level as in Model 5.  This is 
not the expected sign as firms would be expected to manage earnings 
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upwards prior to issuing new shares to make the issue attractive to 
potential shareholders. 
 
• For the interaction terms between TARVEST and the groups which were 
defined to capture the earnings management in a year when ESOs with 
EPS targets vest, the coefficients are not significant.  Perhaps this is in 
some way due to research design which does not isolate or measure the 
incentive effect in any one year.  The lack of information on the value of 
ESOs, granted, vesting and exercised in any one year restricts the 
further development of this research question. 
 
 
4.6.5 Robustness Tests 
 
This section reports the results of some additional analysis to assess the 
sensitivity of the Table 4.12 results to alternative variable measurement of the 
quality of corporate governance of firms.  The motive behind these tests is that 
it would be anticipated that some corporate governance variables would be 
significant, as good corporate governance should reduce earnings management 
by firms.  Whether the particular selection of corporate governance variables 
was important is therefore of interest.  Substituting TEN, INSTOWN, DUAL, 
CEOREM and BIG4 as the corporate governance variables gives the following 
results reported in Table 4.13 below: 
 
• In Model 4, all the variables are unchanged apart from SIZE which 
becomes significant at the 1% level (0.005, P>|z| = 0.000). 
 
• In Model 5, SIZE is significant at 1%, YEAR2003 is significant at 5%, 
INSTOWN is significant at 5% and GROUP4 becomes significant at 5% 
as opposed to 1%.  INSTOWN is positive and significant at 5% level 
(0.000, P>|z| = 0.018) indicating institutional owners have some influence 
in reducing earnings management in firms.  GROUP4 increases in 
significance to 5%.  This indicates that the choice of corporate 
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governance variables may impact the results of an earnings 
management study. 
 
• In Model 6, SIZE is significant at 1%, INSTOWN is significant at 5% and 
the significance of GROUP3 is now 5% as opposed to 1% in Model 6 
applying the alternative corporate governance variables. 
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Table 4.13 
 
Coefficient estimates and model summary statistics for OLS regressions of Raw AWCA on 
the existence of an EPS performance criterion in ESOs with control and alternative corporate 
governance variables.  Firms are categorised in Model 5 and Model 6 as per their 
hypothesised incentive to manage earnings. 
Variables Predicted Sign 
Model 4 
Coefficient 
(p-value)a 
Model 5 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Model 6 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
 
         -0.043 
 (0.084) 
         -0.033 
(0.175) 
         -0.028 
(0.260) 
EPSTARG ?   -0.014** (0.028) 
  -0.014** 
(0.031) 
         -0.015 
(0.122) 
LEV + 0.011 (0.448) 
0.010 
(0.489) 
0.009 
(0.531) 
ISSUE +          -0.030** (0.042) 
  -0.032** 
(0.026) 
  -0.032** 
(0.028) 
GROWTH +          -0.016 (0.125) 
         -0.011 
(0.281) 
         -0.012 
(0.260) 
SIZE -      0.005*** (0.000) 
     0.005*** 
(0.001) 
     0.005*** 
(0.001) 
RISK + 0.185 (0.447) 
0.166 
(0.472) 
0.189 
(0.422) 
CVSALES +          -0.009 (0.476) 
         -0.005 
(0.664) 
         -0.006 
(0.640) 
YEAR2002 ?          -0.004 (0.567) 
          0.000 
(0.977) 
          0.000 
(0.976) 
YEAR2003 ?     -0.019*** (0.002) 
  -0.017** 
(0.011) 
   -0.017** 
(0.010) 
TEN -          -0.003 (0.671) 
         -0.005 
(0.398) 
0.006 
(0.323) 
INSTOWN -           0.000** (0.016) 
          0.000** 
(0.018) 
          0.000** 
(0.013) 
DUAL - 0.009 (0.420) 
0.005 
(0.629) 
0.006 
(0.599) 
CEOREM ? 0.011 (0.615) 
0.013 
(0.541) 
0.012 
(0.561) 
BIG4 -          -0.015 (0.165) 
-0.014 
(0.201) 
-0.015 
(0.188) 
GROUP2 +       0.020*** (0.006) 
     0.030*** 
(0.004) 
GROUP3 -      -0.018*** (0.008) 
   -0.024** 
(0.011) 
GROUP4 -      -0.017*** (0.037) 
         -0.013 
(0.248) 
VESTED  ?            -0.002 (0.857) 
TARVEST ?   0.002 (0.904) 
GROUP2TV  +            -0.018 (0.155) 
GROUP3TV  -   0.014 (0.273) 
GROUP4TV -            -0.006 (0.658) 
N  703 703 703 
R-squared  0.0577 0.0984           0.1057 
F-stat  3.74 5.84 4.72 
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Notes: 
ap-values in brackets; * / ** / *** indicate significance at 10% / 5% / 1%. 
The dependent variable is Raw AWCA; EPSTARG is an indicator variable that takes the value 
of 1 if there is an EPS target in ESOs and 0 otherwise; LEV is the total book value of debt over 
total assets; ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the number of shares 
outstanding increases by more than 10 percent in the next accounting period and 0 otherwise; 
GROWTH is the change in the book value of assets over lagged assets; SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of fiscal year-end market capitalisation; RISK is measured as the volatility of share 
price over 60 monthly observations before the year of study similar to Aggarwal and Samwick 
(1999); CVSALES is the coefficient of variation of sales = standard deviation of the previous 5 
years sales / mean of the previous 5 year sales; VESTED is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of 1 if ESOs are due to vest in the current year and 0 otherwise; YEAR2002 is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the year is 2002 and 0 otherwise; YEAR2003 is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the year is 2003 and 0 otherwise; TEN is an 
indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm has an external stockholder owning ≥ 5 
percent of the outstanding shares at the fiscal year-end and 0 otherwise; INSTOWN is the 
percentage of outstanding shares at each year-end held by outside block holders; DUAL is an 
indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the board and 0 
otherwise; CEOREM is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the CEO is a member of the 
Remuneration Committee and 0 otherwise; BIG4 is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if 
the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms and 0 otherwise; GROUP2 includes firms 
which are in the second and third quartile of the MISS3 variable and also have negative 
UMEPS; GROUP3 includes firms which are in the second and third quartile of the MISS3 
variable but have positive UMEPS; GROUP4 includes firms which fall into the fourth quartile of 
the MISS3 variable; VESTED is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if ESOs are due 
to vest in the current year and 0 otherwise; TARVEST is an interaction term defined as 
EPSTARGT*VESTED; GROUP2TV is an interaction term defined as GROUP2TV*TARVEST 
;GROUP3TV is an interaction term defined as GROUP3TV*TARVEST; GROUP4TV is an 
interaction term defined as GROUP4TV*TARVEST. 
 
 
To adjust for possible influential outliers, all variables were winsorised at 1% 
and 99% and there were no changes to the results (not reported) in the three 
models using Raw AWCA as the dependent variable. 
 
To consider whether the results were sensitive to the choice of the signed 
AWCAs, the results were re-estimated using |AWCA| as the dependent 
variable.  As these results were not significant, they support the finding that the 
direction of earnings management, as opposed to earnings management per 
se, impacts on the accounting choices of management with ESOs with an EPS 
performance criterion. 
 
 
4.7 Conclusions 
 
This research examines the impact of an EPS target in ESOs on the AWCA 
choices of management.  Using UK non-financial firms during the period 2001 
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through 2003, there is a statistically significant link between an EPS target and 
the earnings management behaviour of firms.  The direction of the earnings 
management seems to be linked to the position of the firm relative to the target. 
 
The existence of an EPS target is significant in all of the regressions, with Raw 
AWCA as the dependent variable, apart from Model 3 and Model 6.  The study 
postulates that the existence of an EPS target in ESOs will lead to earnings 
management.  The direction of the earnings management is dependent on how 
close or far the firm is from the earnings target.  This is consistent with there 
being a cap on the payout to management, but reporting earnings above that 
cap is not optimal.  In also coincides with the scenario where a target is beyond 
available accrual management, where managers use negative abnormal 
accruals to store earnings for future years. 
 
Models 5 and 6 support the following expectations: 
 
• Firms close but below the target (GROUP2) will use positive abnormal 
accruals. 
 
• Firm close but above the target (GROUP3) will use negative abnormal 
accruals. 
 
• For firms above the target (GROUP4), abnormal accruals are negative in 
agreement with the hypothesis but the association is not significant. 
 
When firms in the sample issue shares in subsequent years, this significantly 
reduces earnings management.  This is in contrast to prior research that shows 
firms increase earnings management prior to issuing shares.   
 
Corporate governance mechanisms are designed to address the problems 
associated with the separation of ownership and control.  Strong corporate 
governance mechanisms are expected to reduce agency problems by 
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monitoring managers.  INSTOWN10 is the only corporate governance variable to 
reduce earnings management in this sample of UK firms. 
 
This study is subject to a number of limitations: first, the value of the ESOs held 
by the executives is not known, and therefore cannot be included in the 
regressions.  Supposedly, the larger the potential benefit, the higher the 
incentive to manage earnings.  Second, the information provided in the 
remuneration reports was not sufficient to allow the determination of the actual 
target.  To overcome this, a proxy was developed to capture the targets.  Third, 
there may be many tranches of ESOs (options granted, options not due to vest, 
options vesting and options vested but unexercised) all with various monetary 
values.  This might be responsible for the insignificant TARVEST result. 
 
Future research would benefit greatly from having an actual target to test the 
theories explored in this research in addition to some measure of the level of 
the incentive in any particular year. 
 
The key finding of this chapter is that the incentives management receive from 
ESOs with an EPS target might not be consistent with the thinking behind the 
introduction of such targets.  The results show: 
 
• If a target is not going to be met, there are incentives to manage 
earnings downwards.  (As Healy (1985) found when there were bogeys 
and caps on bonus payments). 
 
• If unmanaged earnings are above the required target, firms have 
incentives to manage earnings downwards. 
 
Considerable research documents that firms manage reported earnings to meet 
certain reporting goals.  The next chapter will focus on the role played by an 
EPS target in ESOs with respect to the relationship between an EPS target in 
ESOs and the firm’s propensity to meet or beat annual analysts’ earnings 
                                            
10
 The percentage of outstanding shares at each year-end held by outside block holders. 
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forecasts.  It will examine circumstances where an EPS target might be 
expected to lead managers to focus on short-term objectives, in this case, 
meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts. 
 
The purpose of Chapter 5 is to study the inter-relationship between an EPS 
target in ESOs and the probability of meeting or beating analysts’ EPS 
forecasts.  In addition to considering the existence of an EPS target, as in this 
chapter, the research will be extended to include various situations, defining 
firms by how close they are to the EPS target. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Does an Earnings per Share Target in Executive Share Options 
Help Explain Whether a Firm Meets or Beats Analysts’ 
Forecasts? 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
The main objective of regulators in developing a model for reporting financial 
performance is the provision of information that is relevant for economic 
decision-making in addition to being adequately reliable.  Although 
comprehensive income is considered suitable for assessing stewardship, it is 
affected by temporary shocks in performance.  As a result, managers, analysts 
and investors increasingly rely on adjusted earnings, which exclude transitory 
income elements.  While firms may use adjusted earnings to provide an 
indicator of sustainable profitability, they may opportunistically remove items in 
an attempt to hide poor underlying performance. 
 
The disclosure of alternative EPS (a voluntary decision, whose precise 
definition is chosen by management) was found in Chapter 3 to have a positive 
relationship with the existence of an EPS target in ESOs.  In other words, an 
EPS target in ESOs increases the likelihood that management will choose to 
disclose an alternative EPS figure.   
 
There are three generally agreed purposes for accounting choices made by 
management as outlined in Chapter 3: contracting motivations, external party 
considerations and asset pricing motivations (Fields et al. 2001).   
 
Accounting choices for contractual incentives affect the firms’ cash flows either 
by managers choosing the most efficient methods to maximise firm value or by 
behaving opportunistically leading to a transfer wealth from the firm to 
themselves.  In Chapter 3, the research design did not allow the testing of 
whether the disclosure decision represented opportunistic behaviour on the part 
of management or an attempt to provide a better measure of sustainable 
earnings.  The objective was to explore whether an EPS target in any 
executive’s remuneration component (bonus, ESOs and LTIPs) could help 
explain the accounting choices made by management.  The results indicated 
that an EPS target in ESOs did increase the probability that an alternative EPS 
figure was disclosed by firms.  This encouraged the continuation of the study of 
the impact of an EPS target in ESOs on other accounting decisions executives 
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make.  The increase in the probability of the disclosure of an alternative EPS 
figure encouraged the development of a research design to test whether 
management were managing earnings to the EPS performance target in their 
ESOs. 
 
The increased importance of SBC in UK executive remuneration contracts, and 
the tendency for some of these contracts to be based, at least in part, on 
accounting measures of performance, lead to a renewed interest in the link 
between earnings management and executive compensation.  The earnings 
management study in Chapter 4 also found evidence that executives act 
opportunistically when there is an EPS target in their ESOs.  The results 
showed that firms which were below but close to the EPS target managed 
earnings upwards in a vesting year to meet the target, and the relationship was 
significant.  In agreement with Healy (1985), Chapter 4 shows that management 
have incentives to manage earnings downwards.  For example where firms beat 
a target, that is, where actual EPS growth is greater than target EPS growth, 
then downwards earnings management would result in any surplus earnings 
being carried forward to future accounting periods.   
 
A major issue in the accounting literature with respect to earnings management 
research is a debate about earnings management identification and estimation 
models (McNichols 2000; and Guay, Kothari and Watts, 1996).  This debate 
questions the suitability of accruals models like the model applied in Chapter 4.  
Some recent research avoids these issues by adopting other proxies for 
earnings management.  For example, Cheng and Warfield (2005) test whether 
or not reported earnings meet or just beat analysts’ forecasts while Bergstresser 
and Philippon (2006) use option exercise, and selling of shares in addition to 
abnormal accruals.  Studies of earnings management have indicated that the 
disproportionate likelihood of meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasts is an 
important manifestation of earnings management (Degeorge, Patel and 
Zeckhauser, 1999; Burgstahler and Eames, 2003).   
 
Considerable research documents that firms manage reported earnings to meet 
certain reporting goals (see for example, Healy, 1985; Holthausen, Larcker and 
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Sloan, 1995a; Moerhle, 2002).  In addition, evidence in Matsumoto, 2002; 
Bartov, Givoly and Hayn, 2002; Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki, 2004, shows 
that firms guide analysts’ forecasts downward in order to make earnings targets 
more achievable.  Degeorge et al. (1999) provide evidence of earnings 
management driven by three thresholds in the following hierarchal order: report 
positive profits; sustain prior year earnings level and lastly, analysts’ forecasts.  
 
A UK study by Athanasakou, Strong and Walker (2009) explores whether UK 
firms engage in earnings management or forecast guidance to meet or beat 
analysts’ forecasts.  Their results indicate that UK firms are more likely to 
engage in earnings forecast guidance, or for a subset of larger firms, in 
classification shifting, rather than in accruals management, to avoid missing 
analysts’ forecasts.  Another impact of earnings benchmarks, such as the 
consensus analyst forecast, is that they have been found to play an important 
role in capital markets.  Several studies (including Bartov et al. 2002; Kasznik 
and McNichols, 2002) find that investors assign a valuation premium to firms 
that meet or beat a benchmark level of expected earnings after controlling for 
the earnings forecast error for the period.  Consistent with investors’ focus on 
earnings benchmarks, Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) provide survey 
evidence that 80 percent of financial executives would take value-decreasing 
actions to meet or beat the consensus earnings forecast. 
 
The incentives that managers have to meet analysts’ forecasts is the evidence 
from prior research which suggests the stock market rewards firms meeting 
current earnings expectations (Bartov et al. 2002; Kaszfnik and McNichols, 
2002).  As the payout from ESOs is tied to share price performance,  and with 
the market rewarding firms that meet or beat analysts’ forecasts, managers of 
firms with ESOs face heightened incentives to meet or beat analysts’ 
expectations (Bauman and Shaw, 2006). 
 
Other research also shows that firms manage reported earnings to meet certain 
reporting goals (see for example, Healy, 1985; Holthausen et al. 1995a; 
Moerhle, 2002).  In addition, there is evidence that managers are willing to 
sacrifice economic value to meet short-term earnings targets.  As mentioned 
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above, the evidence in the Graham et al. (2005) survey reports that a majority 
of managers would forgo a project with positive net present value if the project 
would cause them to fall short of the current quarter consensus forecast.  When 
asked what actions they might take to meet an earnings target, approximately 
80 percent suggest they would decrease discretionary spending, including 
research and development and advertising expenditure.   
 
In view of the above, the objective of this chapter is to study the inter-
relationship between an EPS target in ESOs and the probability of meeting or 
beating analysts’ EPS forecasts.  The research will consider earnings surprise 
as the dependent variable in an effort to determine whether management have 
a pecking order with respect to meeting analysts’ forecasts or, where one 
exists, an EPS target in their ESOs.  In addition to considering the existence of 
an EPS target, the research is extended to examine various situations where 
firms are defined by how close they are to the EPS target.  As in the earnings 
management study, firms which are below, close or above the target EPS are 
compared and an interaction term is incorporated, the latter being based on 
whether ESOs are due to vest in a year.  This is an effort to establish whether 
meeting analysts’ expectations or the EPS target in their ESOs takes priority. 
 
Two views might be expected to play a role when the interplay between meeting 
analysts’ forecasts and ESOs with an EPS target is considered, they are as 
follows: 
 
(1) The presence of an EPS target11 makes it easier for analysts to forecast 
the EPS because a target provides useful information to the analysts.  
Because of this, this would be expected to lead to a positive relationship 
between the EPS target and the propensity to meet or beat (assuming 
some imperfect information) analysts’ forecasts. 
 
                                            
11
 As previously noted, the EPS target managers are generally required to meet is measured 
over a three-year period. 
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(2) Managers rewarded on the achievement of an EPS target, internalise 
that target and see that target (which has a direct impact on their income) 
as taking precedence over meeting analysts’ forecasts. 
 
Using a sample of UK non-financial firms, logit regressions of the probability of 
meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts (and just meeting or beating) on 
incentives are estimated.   
 
Insights will be developed into particular patterns of earnings management that 
Healy (1985) and Degeorge et al. (1999) highlight through the classification of 
the firms according to their position relative to the targets thresholds they are 
anticipated to be aiming to meet with respect to their ESOs.  The research will 
test whether there are firms with an EPS performance criterion in their ESOs 
who will manage earnings upwards to meet these targets, regardless of the 
impact on meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts.  Likewise, the research will 
test whether there are firms with motives to manage downwards, where for 
example the firms are far from the performance target or have excess earnings 
which can be saved for use in future periods, and do manage earnings 
downwards irrespective of whether or not this leads them to miss analysts’ 
forecasts. 
 
The results provide some support for the idea that an EPS target in ESOs is a 
more important benchmark for managers than meeting analysts’ forecasts.   
 
This study makes several contributions to the literature as follows: 
 
1. This study contributes to current research by including the existence of 
an EPS target in the ESOs along with earnings targets that the literature 
claims to be important to management (that is, positive earnings, an 
increase in earnings on the previous year, meeting or beating analysts’ 
forecasts) and control variables that prior studies have deemed relevant. 
 
2. It confirms the findings of prior research that management are concerned 
with reporting positive earnings and a positive growth in profit. 
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3. It suggests that the existence of an EPS target in ESOs reduces the 
probability that a firm will meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. 
 
4. The significant negative coefficients on EPS target and firms grouped by 
the distance actual EPS is from target EPS12 and whether or not ESOs 
are due to vest in that year, suggests that analysts are not aware of the 
EPS target.  If analysts are aware of the target, one would expect their 
forecasts to reflect the target and thus firms would be more likely to meet 
analysts’ forecasts. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows.  Section 2, outlines the 
theoretical framework and develops the hypotheses.  Section 3 provides the 
research design and outlines the sample selection and definition of variables.  
Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results and Section 5 
concludes. 
 
 
5.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
There are two strands of accounting research covering analysts’ forecasts.  The 
most popular stream focuses on the reporting objectives and reporting 
strategies of managers.  Another significant stream focuses on the incentives 
and forecasting strategies of analysts as there are incentives for analysts to 
correctly forecast earnings, for example, large earnings surprises hurt analysts’ 
reputations and even threaten their job security (Stickel 1992; Mikhail, Walther, 
and Willis, 1999).  See Kothari (2001) for a review of the literature covering the 
analysts’ incentives. 
 
This chapter focuses on the former strand of research and examines evidence 
to establish whether managers of firms with ESOs whose vesting is contingent 
on the achievement of an EPS target, have stronger incentives to report 
earnings that meet or beat analysts’ forecasts.  This study extends the literature 
                                            
12
 The target to be reached for ESOs to vest. 
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to include consideration of the role played by an EPS target in managers’ 
ESOs.  
 
 
5.2.1     Meeting Targets with Abnormal Accruals 
 
In the literature which considers the methods that firms use to meet or beat 
analysts’ forecasts, two methods are the focus of the majority of this research: 
positive abnormal accruals and earnings forecast guidance. 
 
There is a plethora of studies supporting the use of WCA to meet earnings 
targets which are well documented in Athanasakou et al. (2009).  These include 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) who find evidence of the use of WCA to avoid 
losses or earnings declines.  They observe high changes in working capital for 
earnings just above target, giving rise to a discontinuity in their earnings 
distribution. 
 
Payne and Robb (2000) find that when the mean of analysts’ forecasts is 
greater than unmanaged earnings in the month preceding the annual earnings 
announcement, abnormal accruals are significantly negative.  Dechow, 
Richardson and Tuna (2000) find that firms with zero annual earnings surprise 
have significantly higher abnormal accruals than other firms, while Das and 
Zhang (2003) document that managers use WCA to round up reported EPS to 
meet analysts’ forecasts.  Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) find that abnormal 
accruals are the main source of both the tail and middle asymmetry in the 
distribution of forecast errors, indicating the use of accruals to meet analyst 
expectations in the current period or to increase the likelihood of hitting the 
target in the future.  Matsumoto (2002) finds a greater frequency of positive 
abnormal accruals for firms reporting earnings that meet or beat analysts’ 
consensus quarterly earnings forecasts.  These findings are consistent with 
earnings management to meet or beat the consensus forecast.   
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5.2.2      Meeting Targets with Forecast Guidance 
 
In the period after the fiscal year-end and before the announcement date, 
management has more flexibility with respect to moving items below the line to 
meet analysts’ forecasts, which are known and constantly changing up to the 
announcement date.  This is a disclosure choice and does not flow through the 
accounting system.  In contrast, management is constrained in the ability to use 
income-increasing (or indeed income-decreasing) AWCA13 after the fiscal year-
end as they require judgement and booking through the accounting system. 
 
Regarding earnings forecast guidance, Matsumoto (2002) constructs a measure 
of expected earnings based on previous earnings change and prior returns.  
She finds a greater frequency of consensus forecasts which are less than this 
expectation, for firms that meet or exceed the consensus forecast than for firms 
that do not.  She interprets this as evidence of firms managing analysts’ 
forecasts downward to achieve positive earnings surprises.  Bartov et al. (2002) 
find fewer negative surprises for forecasts issued late in the quarter as opposed 
to early forecasts, and interpret this as evidence of downward forecast 
management to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts at the earnings announcement.  
More recently, Koh, Matsumoto and Rajgopal (2008) find that the propensity of 
US managers to rely on income-increasing, abnormal accruals to meet analyst 
expectations has decreased. 
 
Prior research finds that firms with managers more heavily compensated with 
share options, report quarterly earnings that meet or beat analysts’ forecasts 
more frequently (Bauman and Shaw, 2005; Cheng and Warfield, 2005).  
Bauman, Braswell and Shaw (2005) study two methods that option-granting 
firms might draw on to more frequently meet analysts’ forecasts; these are 
income-increasing accounting choices and analyst guidance.  They find that 
firms employ analyst guidance and not income-increasing accounting accruals.  
Likewise, evidence in Matsumoto (2002), Bartov et al. (2002), Richardson et al. 
(2004) shows that firms guide analysts’ forecasts downward in order to make 
                                            
13
 Examples would include accelerating sales, deferrals, accrued expenses and provisions. 
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earnings targets more achievable.  If meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts can 
increase share prices, managers can increase their payout through earnings 
management which increases the value of the shares.  The increased payout 
results from the increased difference between the share price and the exercise 
price of ESOs held by management. 
 
The existence of an EPS target (which has to be met in order for ESOs to vest) 
provides an opportunity to extend the literature by the inclusion of an additional 
incentive when considering managers’ reporting choices.  For example, 
Bauman and Shaw (2005) show that meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts is 
positively related to the use of options in executives’ compensation plans and 
the more options, the more the firms just meet or beat analysts’ earnings 
forecasts.  While they define management incentive as the percentage of SBC 
in total executive compensation, this study uses as its measure whether or not 
ESOs with an EPS target are due to vest.  Cheng and Warfield (2005) find that 
managers with high equity incentives are more likely to report earnings that 
meet or just beat analysts’ forecasts compared to managers with low equity 
incentives.  Their additional analyses indicate that high equity incentive 
managers are less likely to report large positive earnings surprises, consistent 
with earnings smoothing, particularly for firms with persistent equity incentives.  
This is achieved by reserving surplus income in good years thus providing the 
opportunity to more easily meet or beat analysts’ forecasts in future years.   
 
These studies, which are based on US data, give some evidence that ESOs 
provide managers with incentives to manage earnings to maximise the payout 
from their options.  The UK provides a unique environment for the purposes of 
this research as the vesting of ESOs is contingent on the passage of time and 
on a performance target.  In the US, the vesting of ESOs is contingent on the 
passage of time only. 
 
As mentioned, in the UK the share options granted to executives usually include 
a performance target, i.e. growth in EPS.  The intention was to reduce agency 
costs and reward managers only on the performance of their firm and not on a 
general rise in share prices.  This study considers a scenario where managers 
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gain disproportionally, due to the convex nature of the payout from share 
options, if these targets in their ESOs are met. 
 
Earlier research by Degeorge et al. (1999) identifies analysts’ forecasts as the 
last target management aim to meet; reporting positive earning is first and prior 
year earnings are second.  Athanasakou et al. (2009) argue that the importance 
of analysts’ forecasts as an earnings target appears to have risen over the last 
decade. 
 
Bartov et al. (2002) suggest that the market rewards firms that consistently beat 
analysts’ expectations as compared with firms that only occasionally beat 
expectations.  Other studies including Kasznik and McNichols (2002) and 
DeFond and Park (2001) also present evidence of positive market responses to 
meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts.  Skinner and Sloan (2002) and 
Kinney, Burgstahler and Martin (2002) document significant share price 
declines associated with even small negative earnings surprises.  Further, while 
the premium to meeting or beating expectations is lower in cases where 
earnings or expectations management is most likely to exist, the discount is not 
economically significant - Bartov et al. (2002).  Brown and Caylor (2005) find 
that from the mid-1990s, managers sought to avoid negative earnings surprises 
more than avoiding reporting losses or earnings decreases.  The authors 
rationalise the switch in the target hierarchy by reporting evidence of a 
significantly higher reward (penalty) for achieving (missing) analyst expectations 
than for achieving (missing) the other two earnings targets.  They attribute the 
higher premium to temporal increases in the accuracy and the precision of 
analysts’ forecasts, media attention on meeting or beating analyst expectations 
and the number of firms followed by analysts.  Beyer’s (2008) findings support 
her core premise, that analysts anticipate earnings management when issuing a 
forecast, evidence supported in Burgstahler and Eames (2003) and Liu (2004).   
 
There are three reasons which underlie the choice of meet or beat analysts’ 
forecasts as the dependent variable.  Firstly, the evidence that Habib and 
Hossain (2008) cite which contends that academic research provides strong 
evidence of positive valuation consequences associated with meeting or just 
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beating analysts’ forecasts.  Meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts would be 
perceived by managers as potentially increasing the payout received from their 
ESOs.  Secondly, the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
postulates that decision-makers derive value from gains and losses with respect 
to a reference point, rather than from absolute values of wealth.  Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1997) draw from this theory and show that managers manage 
earnings to meet or beat earnings benchmarks.  Thirdly, as prior research uses 
meet or beat as the dependent variable it is possible to compare the results in 
this study with results from prior studies. 
 
This study examines the relationship between ESOs with an EPS target and the 
probability of meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts.  It considers the potential 
priority managers give to analysts’ forecasts versus the EPS target depending 
on whether or not ESOs are due to vest in a particular year.  The following are 
the hypotheses: 
 
H1: The probability of meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts is positively 
related to the existence of an EPS target in ESOs. 
 
H2: The probability of meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts is higher in 
years when ESOs with EPS targets are due to vest. 
 
H3: The probability of meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts is 
dependent on the closeness to the target EPS growth required in 
order for ESOs to vest. 
 
In addition to the above, this research considers a dependent variable defined 
as just meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts.  Brown and Pinello (2007) 
maintain that firms reporting earnings that beat or fall short of analysts’ 
forecasts by large amounts are less likely to be engaged in the earnings 
surprise games than firms reporting earnings that are close to analysts’ 
forecasts.  In relation to this study, managers may have incentives to manage 
earnings downwards in years when earnings will be short of the target EPS 
needed in order for their ESOs to vest and in years when earnings are greater 
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than the required EPS target.  Earnings smoothing is a possibility as it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to manage earnings upward consistently.  Through 
managing earnings downwards in good years, managers can increase earnings 
in the future (Cheng and Warfield, 2005).  Since the benefits from ESOs are 
recurring, managers will be concerned about share prices in the future; if they 
miss analysts’ forecasts in the future, they bear negative consequences.  Cheng 
and Warfield (2005) postulate that one way to smooth earnings is to avoid large 
earnings surprises and they find unexercisable options reduces the odds of 
large positive earnings surprises.  Given this link between incentives faced by 
management and earnings smoothing, the following hypotheses are designed 
to test whether managers with an EPS target in their ESOs engage in 
smoothing earnings. 
 
H4: The probability of just meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts is    
positively related to the existence of an EPS target in ESOs. 
  
H5:  The probability of just meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts is 
higher in years when ESOs with EPS targets are due to vest. 
 
H6: The probability of just meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts is 
dependent on the closeness to the target EPS growth required in 
order for ESOs to vest. 
 
 
5.3 Research Design 
 
The objective is to examine the impact of an EPS target in ESOs on whether or 
not UK firms meet or beat analysts’ forecasts.  Then the study will consider 
whether any understanding can be gathered of the interplay between meeting 
analysts’ forecasts and the EPS target in ESOs.  The research design controls 
for other profit targets that have been found to influence management, and 
these are reporting positive earnings, and reporting an increase on prior year’s 
earnings.  The research design also controls for factors found in prior research 
to impact on whether a firm meets or beats analysts’ forecasts. 
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5.3.1 Sample Selection 
 
The initial sample used the 500 largest UK-domiciled non-financial firms in 
2001.  The research design required information on the actual executive 
remuneration structure for those firms in 2001, 2002 and 2003 and this was 
available for only 376 of these firms.  The following reasons explain the 
reduction in sample size: 
 
 
Table 5.1 
Sample selection 
 
2001 Sample                  500 
Insufficient information                -4 
Did not file with Companies House      -4 
Not in sterling                 -3 
Published 2 Annual Reports in 2003              -1 
Fiscal year 16 months             -1 
Merged/Acquired                          -32 
Taken private              -1 
Delisted               -2 
Receivership/Liquidation        -9 
No reply               -23 
Unable to locate           -44 
Final Sample                 376 
 
 
 
For the purpose of this research, it is a requirement that the firms are followed 
by I/B/E/S and have the required data available on Datastream.  This restricts 
the final sample from the potential 1,128 observations to 760 firm-year 
observations.  This is composed of 245, 238 and 277 for the years 2001, 2002 
and 2003 respectively. 
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5.3.2 Meet or Beat Analysts’ Forecasts 
 
To define whether or not a firm meets or beats analysts’ forecasts, the latest 
forecast prior to the earnings announcement for the year is used.  The selection 
of this is based on the evidence that most recent forecasts are more accurate 
than mean analysts’ forecasts as they are more likely to capture the most 
complete information set available just prior to earnings release (O’Brien, 1988; 
Brown, 1991).  The most recent forecast has also been shown to be less 
susceptible than the mean forecast to the overweighting of common analyst 
information (Kim, Lim and Shaw, 2001).  In line with Athanasakou et al. (2009) 
earnings surprise is defined as actual I/B/E/S EPS minus the most recent 
forecast at least three days before the announcement date.  Bartov et al. (2002) 
propose the three day criterion to avoid contamination of the forecast by actual 
earnings.  
 
Consistent with other research meeting analysts’ forecasts, the dichotomous 
dependent variable meet or beat analysts’ forecasts (MBE) equals 1 if the 
earnings surprise is 0 or positive, and 0 otherwise.   
 
 
5.3.3 Just Meet or Beat Analysts’ Forecasts 
 
Following prior studies including Athanasakou et al. (2009) and Doyle, 
McNichols and Soliman (2004), this study runs a logit regression with a 
dichotomous dependent variable, JMBE, which represents firms that meet or 
beat analysts’ forecasts by small amounts.  This is designed to test H3, H4 and 
H5 hypotheses.  JMBE is equal to 1 if the earnings surprise (SURP) is in the 
interval £0.00 ≤ SURP < £0.02 and zero if the earnings surprise is in the interval 
-£0.02 ≤ SURP < £0.00 as is common in other UK studies, for example, 
Athanasakou et al. (2009). 
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5.3.4 Methodology and Variable Definitions 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to study the inter-relationship between an EPS 
target in ESOs and the probability of meeting or beating analysts’ EPS 
forecasts.  Hence, the regression includes an indicator variable EPSTARG that 
takes the value of 1 if there is an EPS target in ESOs, and 0 otherwise.  As 
mentioned above, prior literature establishes a hierarchy of earnings targets 
which Degeorge et al. (1999) first document on US firms.  They construe a 
pecking order, with profits first, prior year earnings second and analysts’ 
forecasts third.  They conclude that meeting analysts’ forecasts matters only if 
the other targets are met.  As evidence on the priority of earnings targets is not 
agreed and Athanasakou et al. (2009) maintain that the association between 
the three earnings targets in the UK remains an empirical question, any 
empirical model would need to include profits and earnings increases as control 
variables.  Similar to their study, a profit indicator, PROFIT, an indicator variable 
that takes the value of 1 if I/B/E/S actual EPS is positive in the current 
accounting period, and 0 otherwise; and POS∆EARN, an indicator that takes 
the value of 1 if annual change in I/B/E/S actual EPS is positive, are included in 
the regressions.  Consistent with prior research, these variables are expected to 
be positively related to the dependent variables, MBE and JMBE given the 
evidence that these profit targets are given priority over analysts’ forecasts 
(Graham et al. 2005). 
 
Consistent with Matsumoto (2002) and Athanasakou et al. (2009), the value 
relevance of earnings (VREARN) is included to capture investors’ reaction to 
earnings surprises, and it is predicted that firms with low value relevance of 
earnings are less likely to be concerned about hitting analysts’ forecasts since 
investors put little emphasis on a poor indicator of performance.  Matsumoto 
(2002) argues that the underlying reason for this evidence is the low value 
relevance of loss-making firms and not merely the sign of contemporaneous 
earnings.  Matsumoto (2002) suggests: 
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‘if the value relevance of a firm’s earnings is low (i.e., earnings are a poor 
indicator of future cash flows and firm value), then shareholders likely 
react less strongly to negative earnings surprises’, (Matsumoto, 
2002:493). 
 
Additionally, firms with low value relevance of earnings are less likely to meet or 
beat analysts’ expectations as a discontinuity of earnings surprise around zero 
is not evident in loss-making firms.  Moreover, Choi et al. (2007) document that 
one of the main purposes of alternative EPS disclosures in the UK is to provide 
more value relevant earnings metrics.  Decile portfolios are formed by sorting 
R2s from industry (DataStream Level 3/6) specific regressions by year of 
excess returns (cumulated from the month following year t-1 earnings 
announcement to the month of the year t earnings announcement) on annual 
change in I/B/E/S actual EPS.  Excess returns are firm returns less market 
returns using the FTSE All Shares Index.  Returns are from Datastream. 
Consistent with Athanasakou et al. (2009) the value of 0 is assigned to firms in 
the smallest decile through 9 for firms in the largest decile.  VREARN is 
expected to be positively associated with the probability of MBE. 
 
Skinner and Sloan (2002) contend that if managers of growth firms are aware 
that their firms’ share prices suffer more than non-growth firms, with downward 
adjustments when they report negative earnings surprises, they may have 
strong incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises.  GROWTH is controlled 
for using change in the book value of assets over lagged assets consistent with 
the measure used in the disclosure study in Chapter 3.   
 
Bartov et al. (2002) argue that meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts can help 
avoid costly litigation that could potentially be triggered by unfavourable 
earnings surprises.  Matsumoto (2002) uses an industry dummy, LIT, to control 
for this effect.  She classifies biotechnology, computers, electronics and retailing 
as being high-risk industries and assigns one to firms that belong to these 
industries.  On the basis that these firms have greater incentives to meet or 
beat analysts’ forecasts, a positive coefficient on LIT is expected. 
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Similar to Matsumoto (2002) and Athanasakou et al. (2009), more firms are 
expected to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts when there is an increase in 
industrial production growth, and as a proxy for this growth in industrial 
production INDPROD is added, which is expected to have a positive coefficient.  
Larger firms, being more subject to public scrutiny, have greater incentives to 
meet or beat analysts’ forecasts.  INDPROD is the average annual growth in 
industrial production adjusted for inflation provided by Datastream.  SIZE is 
controlled for and expected to have a positive coefficient.  SIZE is measured as 
the natural logarithm of fiscal year-end market capitalisation similar to the 
measure used in Chapter 3.   
 
Kasznik and McNichols (2002) find that the market assigns a greater value to 
firms that meet expectations, and continues to do so as they meet expectations 
consistently.  This provides a greater incentive for firms to meet or beat 
analysts’ forecasts in the current year, if they had met forecasts in the previous 
year.  To control for this lagged MBE is added, that is MBEt-1 and a positive 
coefficient is predicted.  Year indicator variables (YEAR2002 and YEAR2003) 
are included and take the value of 1 if the data refers to a particular year and 0 
otherwise. 
 
The research requires the defining of firms by the closeness of actual EPS 
growth to the performance target EPS.  To capture this, three variables are 
devised and defined as follows.  To reflect the growth in EPS, the variable 
ACTUAL3 is included and defined as the three-year increase/decrease in actual 
EPS.  To measure the performance target EPS, the variable TARGET3 is 
defined as the three-year increase/decrease in target EPS.  To capture how 
close a firm’s actual growth in  EPS is to its performance criterion growth in  
EPS, MISS3  is defined as the actual increase/decrease in EPS over three 
years minus the industry median increase/decrease in EPS over three years 
(target).  Further details of these variables are presented in the following 
section. 
 
To explore whether the existence of an EPS target in ESOs can explain firms 
meeting or beating analyst expectations (H1), the following logit regression of 
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the probability that a firm meets or beats analysts’ forecasts at the earnings 
announcement date is estimated: 
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In equation (1), MBE refers to whether a firm meets or beats analysts’ 
expectations.  EPSTARG is the test variable of interest here.  It reflects the 
existence, or otherwise, of an EPS target in the firms’ ESOs.  PROFIT and 
POS∆EARN control for other reporting goals (incentives) which prior research 
finds management aim to meet.  VREARN, GROWTH, LIT are included to 
represent additional incentives faced by management in meeting or beating 
analysts’ forecasts.  SIZE
 
reflects that large firms are expected to have greater 
incentives to meet or beat.  MBEt-1 represents the desire to maintain a pattern of 
meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts.  SIZE and MBEt-1 are both included as 
control variables. 
 
To explore if the distance of actual EPS from the target EPS three-year growth 
rate (H2 and H3) can explain the probability that a firm meets or beats analysts’ 
forecasts the following equation is estimated: 
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Equation (2) adds VESTED and TARVEST to equation (1).  VESTED shows 
whether ESOs are due to vest in the year in question and TARVEST is an 
interaction term equal to EPSTARG * VESTED to represent a year in which 
ESOs with an EPS target are due to vest.  The GROUP variables are defined 
by the distance between the actual EPS growth and target EPS growth.  The 
GROUP variables are interacted with TARVEST (for example, GROUP2TV) to 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
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indicate whether firms in the groups have ESOs due to vest in the year in 
question. 
 
As in Chapter 4, when addressing the definition of the sign of the incentive to 
manage earnings, firms are defined into GROUP by the MISS3 variable 
(ACTUAL3 minus TARGET3).  Four groups are defined using quartiles of the 
MISS3 variable along with UMEPS variable to differentiate the middle two 
groups as follows: 
 
GROUP1: firms which fall into the first quartile of the MISS3 variable and 
who are well below the target.  If they have any capacity to manage 
earnings, it would likely lead them to manage downwards as they have 
no hope of hitting the target. 
 
GROUP2: firms which are in the second and third quartile of the MISS3 
variable and have negative UMEPS.  These firms are defined as being 
below but close to the target and would be expected to manage upwards 
to meet the target. 
 
GROUP3: firms which are in the second and third quartile of the MISS3 
variable but have positive UMEPS.  These firms are defined as being 
above but close to the target and would be expected to manage 
downwards to just meet the target. 
 
GROUP4: firms which fall into the fourth quartile of the MISS3 variable 
are firms which are well above the target and would be expected to 
manage downwards and keep any reserves for future years. 
 
GROUP2 and GROUP3 comprise firms that are close to the target, to further 
divide them the sign of UMEPS is employed. 
 
GROUP2 are starting not too far from the target and would be expected to have 
the capacity to manage earnings upwards by the amount required to meet the 
target despite having negative unmanaged earnings. 
 185 
 
In contrast, GROUP3 firms starting with positive unmanaged earnings can 
manage earnings down and still meet the target. 
Interaction terms are included to test whether there is any significance for the 
different groups when they have ESOs due to vest in that year.  GROUP1TV is 
defined as GROUP1*TARVEST, GROUP2TV as GROUP2*TARVEST, 
GROUP3TV as GROUP3*TARVEST and GROUP4TV as GROUP4*TARVEST.
 
 
To explore whether the existence of an EPS target in ESOs can explain firms 
just meeting or beating analyst expectations (H4), the following logit regression 
of the probability that a firm meets or beats analysts’ forecasts at the earnings 
announcement date is estimated: 
 
)20032002
()1(
,,10,9
1,8,7,6,5,4
,3,2,10
tititi
tititititi
tititi
YEARYEAR
MBESIZELITGROWTHVREARN
EARNPOSPROFITEPSTARGFJMBEProb
εββ
βββββ
ββββ
++
+++++
+∆+++==
−
 
 
As with the MBE regressions, variables are used to investigate whether the 
distance of the firm from the target EPS three-year growth rate (H2 and H3), 
can explain the probability that a firm just meets or beats analysts’ forecasts.  
The following equation is estimated: 
 
)4
3243
220032002
()1(
,,18
,17,16,15,14
,13,12,11,10,9
1,8,7,6,5,4
,3,2,10
titi
titititi
tititititi
tititititi
tititi
TVGROUP
TVGROUPTVGROUPGROUPGROUP
GROUPTARVESTVESTEDYEARYEAR
MBESIZELITGROWTHVREARN
EARNPOSPROFITEPSTARGFJMBEProb
εβ
ββββ
βββββ
βββββ
ββββ
++
++++
++++
+++++
+∆+++==
−
 
 
Equations (3) and (4) are similar to equations (1) and (2) with JMBE replacing 
MBE as the dependent variable.  The independent variables in (3) and (4) are 
the same as those in (1) and (2). 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
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5.4 Results 
 
Table 5.2 presents the annual distribution for MBE, JMBE, EPSTARG and 
VESTED.  It is interesting to note that the MBE figures for the years covered in 
both studies are similar to those reported in Athanasakou et al. (2009) for a 
much larger sample of UK firms; this study has 44 percent (43 percent) for 2001 
and 46 percent (46 percent) for 2002. 
 
The statistics for EPSTARG and VESTED suggest that in 2003, there are 
possibly greater incentives to be gained from executives meeting the EPS 
target in their ESOs given that more ESOs have an EPS target and of these a 
greater percentage are due to vest. 
 
Table 5.2  Distribution of MBE, EPSTARG, VESTED and JMBE  
  
 
        
Frequency of meeting analysts’ forecasts (MBE = 1), frequency of an EPS target in ESOs 
(EPSTARG = 1). 
Frequency of ESOs vesting in a year and frequency of just meeting analysts’ forecasts 
(JMBE = 1). 
          
N 760                            386 
  MBE = 1 EPSTARG = 1 VESTED = 1 JMBE = 1 
  Frequency (%) Frequency (%) Frequency (%) Frequency (%) 
  
        
All Years 47.89 74.86 59.74 54.40 
2001 43.67 70.20 50.20 52.94 
2002 46.22 74.37 59.66 52.25 
2003 53.07 78.70 68.23 57.55 
          
 
Notes: 
MBE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the earnings surprise (SURP) is 0 or 
positive, and 0 otherwise; EPSTARG is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if there is 
an EPS target in ESOs and 0 otherwise; VESTED is an indicator variable that takes the value of 
1 if ESOs are due to vest in the current year and 0 otherwise; JMBE is an indicator variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the earnings surprise (SURP) is in the interval £0.00 ≤ SURP < £0.02 and 
0 if the earnings surprise is in the interval -£0.02 ≤ SURP <£0.00. 
 
 
Table 5.3 presents the descriptive statistics for this sample.  The mean 
(median) MBE is 48 percent (0 percent), while the mean (median) JMBE is 54 
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percent (100 percent). MBEt-1 has the same mean as the MBE, that is, 48 
percent with a median of 100 percent.  The mean (median) EPSTARG is 75 
percent (100 percent) and the mean (median) of firms reporting a positive 
earnings figure is 84 percent (100 percent).  In this sample of firms, 52 percent 
report an increase in profits compared with the previous year and 62 percent of 
firms have ESOs due to vest in one of the years.  47 percent of the firms have 
options with an EPS target due to vest.
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Table 5.3   
                  
  
    
                  
  
Descriptive statistics (N= 760) 
                
                        
  
Variable N Mean Std.dev 1st 
Quartile 
Median 3rd 
Quartile 
Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
                        
  
MBE 760 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.08 1.01 
  
JMBE 386 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 -0.18 1.03 
  
EPSTARG 760 0.75 0.44 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 -1.13 2.28 
  
PROFIT 760 0.84 0.37 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 -1.86 4.47 
  
POS∆EARN 760 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 -0.08 1.01 
  
VREARN 760 4.31 2.86 2.00 4.00 7.00 0.00 9.00 0.04 1.79 
  
GROWTH 760 0.07 0.34       -0.06 0.02 0.14 -0.81 2.93 3.39     23.22 
  
LIT 760 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.48 3.19 
  
SIZE 760     12.80 1.49      11.80     12.67      13.75 7.45 17.09 0.26 3.30 
  
MBEt-1 760 0.48 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.06 1.00 
  
YEAR 2002 760 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.81 1.65 
  
YEAR 2003 760 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.56 1.32 
  
VESTED 760 0.60 0.49 0.00 0.60 1.00 0.00 1.00      0.17 1.03 
  
TARVEST 760 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.46 1.00 0.00 1.00 -0.40 1.16 
  
GROUP2 760 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.42 6.86 
  
GROUP3 760 0.34 0.47 0.00 0.34 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.67 1.45 
  
GROUP4 760 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.30 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.85 1.73 
  
GROUP2TV 760 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 1.00 4.07     17.54 
  
GROUP3TV 760 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.85 4.42 
  
GROUP4TV 760 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.15 5.61 
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Notes: 
MBE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the earnings surprise (SURP) is 0 or 
positive, and 0 otherwise; JMBE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the earnings 
surprise (SURP) is in the interval £0.00 ≤ SURP < £0.02 and 0 if the earnings surprise is in the 
interval -£0.02 ≤ SURP < £0.00; EPSTARG is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
there is an EPS target in ESOs and 0 otherwise; PROFIT is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of 1 if I/B/E/S actual EPS is positive in the current accounting period, and 0  otherwise; 
POS∆EARN is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if annual change in I/B/E/S actual 
EPS is positive, and 0 otherwise; VREARN is decile portfolios formed each year by sorting R2s 
from industry (Datastream Level 3/6) specific regressions of excess returns (cumulated from the 
month following year t-1 earnings announcement to the month of the year t earnings 
announcement) on annual change in I/B/E/S actual EPS.  Excess returns are firm returns less 
market returns using the FTSE All Shares Index; GROWTH is the change in the book value of 
assets over lagged assets; LIT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm 
belongs to a high-risk industry (biotechnology, computers, electronics and retail), and 0 
otherwise; SIZE is the natural logarithm of fiscal year-end market capitalisation; MBEt-1 is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm met or beat analysts’ forecasts in the prior 
year, and 0 otherwise; YEAR2002 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the year is 
2002 and 0 otherwise; YEAR2003 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the year is 
2003 and 0 otherwise;  VESTED is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if ESOs are 
due to vest in the current year and 0 otherwise; TARVEST is an interaction term defined as 
EPSTARGT*VESTED; GROUP2 includes firms which are in the second and third quartile of the 
MISS3 variable and also have negative UMEPS; GROUP3 includes firms which are in the 
second and third quartile of the MISS3 variable but have positive UMEPS; GROUP4 includes 
firms which fall into the fourth quartile of the MISS3 variable; GROUP2TV is an interaction term 
defined as GROUP2TV*TARVEST ;GROUP3TV is an interaction term defined as 
GROUP3TV*TARVEST; GROUP4TV is an interaction term defined as GROUP4TV*TARVEST. 
 
 
Table 5.3 above reports descriptive statistics for the variables in the sample 
and Table 5.4 shows the results of univariate analyses which compare firms 
which meet or beat analysts’ forecasts with firms that miss analysts’ 
forecasts.  The firms in the sample which meet or beat analysts’ forecasts 
are statistically more likely to report a profit, as well as an increase in 
reported profit on the previous year.  They are also larger and more likely to 
have an earnings surprise in the previous year.  The differences are 
statistically different for both the means and medians of PROFIT, 
POS∆EARN, SIZE and MBEt-1. 
 
Table 5.5 reports correlations between the key variables.  While the 
frequency of meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts is positively correlated, 
as expected, with reporting profit and increasing profit compared to the 
previous year, it is negatively related to the existence of an EPS target in 
ESOs.  Reporting continuous good news seems to be important given the 
positive and significant relationship between MBE and MBEt-1. 
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Since all the control variables (with the exception of LIT and INDPROD) are 
correlated with MBE, it is important to control for these factors.  The 
correlations among the incentive and control variables are not large 
indicating no multicollinearity with the exception of the INDPROD variable 
and YEAR2003.  The latter causes INDPROD to be dropped from a 
regression which includes both variables.  The coefficient of INDPROD in 
the regressions when not controlling for year effects is significant but given 
the high correlation (.99***) between YEAR2003 and INDPROD, the 
decision is made to include the year dummies over the INDPROD variable. 
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Table 5.4                 
                  
Descriptive statistics comparing firms that meet or beat analysts’ forecasts  with firms that missed analysts’ 
forecasts 
           
N 364 396   p-values   p-values 
    
 MBE = 1      MBE =0 
  
      for 
 differences 
     for 
differences 
Variable Mean Std. dev Median Mean Std. dev Median Means Medians 
EPSTARG 0.74 0.44 1.00 0.76 0.43 1.00 0.553 0.553 
PROFIT 0.90 0.31 1.00 0.79 0.41 1.00 0.000 0.000 
POS∆EARN 0.64 0.48 1.00 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.000 0.000 
VREARN 4.49 2.87 5.00 4.15 2.84 4.00 0.107 0.105 
GROWTH 0.10 0.36 0.04 0.05 0.32 0.01 0.060 0.065 
LIT 0.21 0.41 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.686 0.686 
SIZE 
      12.95        1.39       12.80       12.67 1.56       12.46 0.008 0.008 
MBEt-1 0.55 0.50 1.00 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.001 0.001 
YEAR2002 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.533 0.533 
YEAR2003 0.40 0.49 0.00 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.031 0.031 
VESTED 0.62 0.49 1.00 0.58 0.49 1.00 0.332 0.332 
TARVEST 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.45 0.50 0.00 0.580 0.579 
GROUP2 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.149 0.149 
GROUP3 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.440 0.440 
GROUP4 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.27 0.44 0.00 0.015 0.015 
GROUP2TV 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.446 0.445 
GROUP3TV 0.17 0.37 0.00 0.15 0.36 0.00 0.612 0.612 
GROUP4TV 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.975 0.975 
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Notes: 
MBE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the earnings surprise (SURP) is 0 or 
positive, and 0 otherwise; PROFIT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if I/B/E/S actual 
EPS is positive in the current accounting period, and 0  otherwise; POS∆EARN is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 if annual change in I/B/E/S actual EPS is positive, and 0 
otherwise; VREARN is decile portfolios formed each year by sorting R2s from industry (Datastream 
Level 3/6) specific regressions of excess returns (cumulated from the month following year t-1 
earnings announcement to the month of the year t earnings announcement) on annual change in 
I/B/E/S actual EPS.  Excess returns are firm returns less market returns using the FTSE All Shares 
Index; GROWTH is the change in the book value of assets over lagged assets; LIT is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm belongs to a high-risk industry (biotechnology, 
computers, electronics and retail), and 0 otherwise; SIZE is the natural logarithm of fiscal year-end 
market capitalisation; MBEt-1 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm met or beat 
analysts’ forecasts in the prior year, and 0 otherwise; YEAR2002 is an indicator variable that takes 
the value of 1 if the year is 2002 and 0 otherwise; YEAR2003 is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the year is 2003 and 0 otherwise;  VESTED is an indicator variable that takes the value 
of 1 if ESOs are due to vest in the current year and 0 otherwise; TARVEST is an interaction term 
defined as EPSTARGT*VESTED; GROUP2 includes firms which are in the second and third 
quartile of the MISS3 variable and also have negative UMEPS; GROUP3 includes firms which are 
in the second and third quartile of the MISS3 variable but have positive UMEPS; GROUP4 includes 
firms which fall into the fourth quartile of the MISS3 variable; GROUP2TV is an interaction term 
defined as GROUP2TV*TARVEST ;GROUP3TV is an interaction term defined as 
GROUP3TV*TARVEST; GROUP4TV is an interaction term defined as GROUP4TV*TARVEST. 
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Table 5.5   
 
Correlation matrix between key  sample variables 
            
 MBE EPSTARG PROFIT POS∆ 
EARN 
VREARN GROWTH LIT INDPRD SIZE MBELAG YEAR 
2002 
YEAR 
2003 
VESTED TARVEsT GROUP 
2 
GROUP 
3 
GROUP 
4 
GROUP 
2TV 
GROUP 
3TV 
GROUP 
4TV 
MBE   1.00                                           
EPSTARG  -0.02  1.00                   
PROFIT  0.14***  0.30***  1.00                  
POS∆ 
EARN 
 0.23***  0.07*  0.24***   1.00                 
VREARN  0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03  1.00                
GROWTH  0.07* -0.12***  0.12*** 0.15*** -0.01  1.00               
LIT  0.01 -0.11*** -0.22***  0.01 -0.17*** -0.00  1.00              
INDPROD  0.08**  0.07* -0.01 0.09** -0.01 -0.11*** -0.01  1.00             
SIZE  0.10*** 0.16*** 0.28*** 0.14*** 0.09***  0.07* -0.15***  0.04  1.00            
MBELAG  0.12*** -0.06*  0.08** -0.05 0.08**  0.12***  0.05 -0.02  0.03    1.00           
YEAR 2002 -0.02 -0.00  -0.03 -0.03  0.03 -0.10*** -0.00  -0.61*** -0.10***    0.05  1.00          
YEAR 2003  0.08**  0.07** -0.01 0.09** -0.00  -0.13*** -0.01  0.99***  0.03   -0.03 -0.51***  1.00         
VESTED  0.04  0.05 -0.04  0.02 -0.04  0.04  0.10***  0.12***  0.04    0.03 -0.00   0.13***  1.00        
TARVEST  0.02  0.53***  0.15***  0.05 -0.07* -0.03 -0.03  0.13*** 0.15***    0.01 -0.02  0.13***  0.75***   1.00       
GROUP2  0.05 -0.01  0.02  0.01  0.05 -0.02  0.03 -0.01 0.11***  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.02 -0.01   1.00      
GROUP3 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.01 0.14***  0.09**   0.02 -0.10***  0.14***  0.05  0.02 -0.26***   1.00     
GROUP4 0.09** -0.00   0.11*** 0.18*** -0.04 0.10*** -0.04 -0.11*** -0.02  0.07* 0.18*** -0.09** -0.01 -0.02 -0.24*** -0.48***   1.00    
GROUP2TV  0.03  0.14***  0.00  0.01 -0.00  -0.04  0.05  0.02  0.07**   0.01  0.01   0.02  0.19***  0.25***  0.65*** -0.17*** -0.15***  1.00   
GROUP3TV  0.02 0.26*** 0.11*** 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 0.16*** 0.19***  -0.00  -0.09***  0.16***  0.36***  0.48*** -0.16***  0.61*** -0.29*** -0.10***   1.00  
GROUP4TV  0.00 0.23*** 0.12*** 0.16*** -0.02  0.05 -0.06* -0.03 0.05   0.06  0.13*** -0.01  0.32***  0.43*** -0.14*** -0.28***  0.60*** -0.09**  -0.17*** 1.00 
* / ** / *** indicate significance at 10% / 5% / 1%.  A full definition of the variables is provided in Appendix C. 
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Following Athanasakou et al. (2009) earnings surprises are aggregated into 
equally sized intervals (bins) and figure 5.1 reports the findings.  The size of 
each is set to 0.05p. 
 
As the main research interest is on meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts, this 
study concentrates on those firms close to meeting or beating the analysts’ 
forecast.  This allows the aggregation of all surprises below -10p and all 
earnings surprises above 10p.  Consistent with prior research this study finds a 
discontinuity around 0 caused by the higher frequency of small positive 
compared with small negative earnings surprises14. 
 
Figure 5.1 
Frequency distribution of earnings surprise 
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The sample consists of 760 observations during the period 2001-2003 for UK firms 
meeting the sample selection criteria.  The earnings surprise is the difference between 
I/B/E/S actual EPS and the latest analyst forecast made prior to the earnings 
announcement date. 
Earnings surprise observations are aggregated into equally sized intervals (bins).  The 
size of each bin is 0.5p.  All earnings surprises below -10p are aggregated to the 20th 
bin below zero and all earnings surprises above 10p are aggregated to the 20th bin 
above zero. 
                                            
14
 Athanasakou et al. (2009), Gore, Pope and Singh (2007), Durtschi and 
Easton (2005) and Bhojraj, Hribar, Piconi and McInnis (2009). 
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5.4.1 Meet or Beat Analysts’ Forecasts 
 
 
Table 5.6     
Logit analysis of the probability of meeting or beating analysts’ 
forecasts as a function of the test variable and a series of other 
targets and controls. 
  Model 1  
 
Model 2 
 
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
MBE 
Coefficient 
(z-stat)a 
Marginal 
Effect 
MBE 
Coefficient 
(z-stat) 
Marginal 
effect 
Intercept ?     -3.697*** (0.003) 
       -4.017*** 
(0.002) 
 
EPSTARG ?        -0.177 
       (0.381) 
-0.044       -0.269 
(0.329) 
-0.067 
PROFIT +      0.852*** (0.002) 
 0.202        0.840*** 
  (0.003) 
   0.200 
POS∆EARN +      0.909*** (0.000) 
 0.223        0.938*** 
  (0.000) 
   0.229 
VREARN +    0.046 
   0.109) 
 0.011     0.050* 
   (0.089) 
   0.012 
GROWTH +         0.098 
       (0.707) 
 0.025   -0.040 
   (0.886) 
   0.010 
LIT +         0.167 
 ( 0.463) 
 0.042    0.121 
    (0.610) 
   0.030 
SIZE +  0.059 
      (0.319) 
  0.015     0.053 
    (0.400) 
   0.013 
MBEt-1 +     0.502*** 
      (0.002) 
  0.124        0.515*** 
   (0.001) 
   0.128 
YEAR2002 ?        0.221 
      (0.260) 
0.055    0.188 
   (0.356) 
   0.047 
YEAR2003 ?    0.461** (0.016) 
0.115       0.453** 
   (0.023) 
   0.113 
VESTED +      0.017 
   (0.960) 
   0.004 
TARVEST +      0.779 
   (0.105) 
  0.192 
GROUP2 ?      0.574 
   (0.127) 
  0.142 
GROUP3 ?      0.083 
 (0.782) 
  0.021 
GROUP4 ?          0.768** 
  (0.011) 
 0.190 
GROUP2TV ?      -0.688 
   (0.222) 
       -0.164 
GROUP3TV ?     -0.418 
   (0.320) 
       -0.103 
GROUP4TV ?        -1.339*** 
   (0.002) 
       -0.299 
 
INDUSTRY DUMMIES 
 
YES  YES  
Pseudo R2 
 
0.0813  0.0945  
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
 
    -483.36     -476.41  
CHI-SQUARE 
 
       77.18        86.86  
P-VALUE 
 
0.000  0.000  
OBSERVATIONS 
 
760  760  
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Notes: 
az-stat in brackets; * / ** / *** indicate significance at 10% / 5% / 1%. 
The dependent variable is MBE which is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
earnings surprise (SURP) is 0 or positive, and 0 otherwise; EPSTARG is an indicator variable 
that takes the value of 1 if there is an EPS target in ESOs and 0 otherwise; PROFIT is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if I/B/E/S actual EPS is positive in the current 
accounting period, and 0  otherwise; POS∆EARN is an indicator variable that takes the value of 
1 if annual change in I/B/E/S actual EPS is positive, and 0 otherwise; VREARN is decile 
portfolios formed each year by sorting R2s from industry (Datastream Level 3/6) specific 
regressions of excess returns (cumulated from the month following year t-1 earnings 
announcement to the month of the year t earnings announcement) on annual change in I/B/E/S 
actual EPS.  Excess returns are firm returns less market returns using the FTSE All Shares 
Index; GROWTH is the change in the book value of assets over lagged assets; LIT is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm belongs to a high-risk industry 
(biotechnology, computers, electronics and retail), and 0 otherwise; SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of fiscal year-end market capitalisation; MBEt-1 is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the firm met or beat analysts’ forecasts in the prior year, and 0 otherwise; 
YEAR2002 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the year is 2002 and 0 otherwise; 
YEAR2003 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the year is 2003 and 0 otherwise;  
VESTED is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if ESOs are due to vest in the current 
year and 0 otherwise; TARVEST is an interaction term defined as EPSTARGT*VESTED; 
GROUP2 includes firms which are in the second and third quartile of the MISS3 variable and 
also have negative UMEPS; GROUP3 includes firms which are in the second and third quartile 
of the MISS3 variable but have positive UMEPS; GROUP4 includes firms which fall into the 
fourth quartile of the MISS3 variable; GROUP2TV is an interaction term defined as 
GROUP2TV*TARVEST ;GROUP3TV is an interaction term defined as GROUP3TV*TARVEST; 
GROUP4TV is an interaction term defined as GROUP4TV*TARVEST. 
 
 
Model 1 in Table 5.6 presents results from the logit of MBE on the test variable, 
EPSTARG and incentive and control variables.  The table also reports the 
marginal effect of the independent variables. 
 
Model 1 results show: 
 
• EPSTARG is negative but not significant.  The marginal effect suggests 
that the existence of an EPS target in ESOs reduces the probability of 
meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts by 4%. 
 
• As predicted, the coefficients on PROFIT, POS∆EARN, VREARN, 
GROWTH, LIT, SIZE and MBEt-1 are positive.  In line with previous 
research, PROFIT, POS∆EARN, and MBEt-1 are all significant. In 
contrast with previous research, VREARN is not significant.  The 
marginal effects on earnings targets (PROFIT, POS∆EARN and MBEt-1) 
verify the prior findings in this study that these benchmarks are important 
to management.  The percentage increase of the probability of meeting 
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or beating analysts’ forecasts are 20%, 22% and 12% respectively for 
each of these variables. 
 
Model 2 extends Model 1 to include the incentives that management face with 
respect to their ESOs compensation component with an EPS target.  All 
variables are in accordance with predicted signs with the exception of 
GROWTH which is negative..  
 
Model 2 results show: 
 
• PROFIT, POS∆EARN and MBEt-1 are all positive and significant as in 
Model 1. 
 
• VREARN (0.050, P>|z| = 0.089) is positive and significant at the 10% 
level.  
 
• LIT is not significant as in Matsumoto (2002) and Athanasakou et al. 
(2009), and consistent with the latter, these results substantiate that the 
UK is not a litigious business environment.  
 
• Firms in GROUP4 are positively and significantly related to whether or 
not a firm meets or beats analysts’ forecasts (0.768, P>|z| = 0.011) at the 
5% level; belonging to this group increases the probability of meeting or 
beating analysts’ forecasts by 19%.  GROUP4 includes firms whose EPS 
growth is above the EPS target in their ESOs so it is no great revelation 
that they would beat the analysts’ forecasts.  These represent firms 
which do not have ESOs due to vest. 
 
• TARVEST, which represents firms in any GROUP with EPS targets in 
their ESOs which are due to vest in the year, has a marginal effect of 
19%.  This gives some credence to the premise which suggests analysts 
are aware of the targets and forecast to these targets. 
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• The interaction term, GROUP4TV, represents firms which report profits 
greater than EPS target in their ESOs, and have ESOs due to vest in 
that year.  This variable is negative and significant, (-1.339, P>|z| = 
0.002) at the 1% level.  Belonging to this group decreases the probability 
of meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts by 30%.  This infers that the 
EPS target in the ESOs is given priority by managers over meeting or 
beating analysts’ forecasts. 
 
Summarising the MBE regression results provide evidence that managers 
place priority on maximising their own income, when there are ESOs with EPS 
targets, over meeting or beating analysts’ expectations.  In line with the findings 
in the earnings management study, this chapter provides further evidence that 
EPS targets in ESOs lead to opportunistic behaviour by managers and do not 
represent optimal contracting.  The findings would suggest that analysts do not 
have noticeably better information as a result of an EPS target in ESOs. 
 
 
5.4.2 Just Meet or Beat Analysts’ Forecasts 
 
JMBE equals 1 if the earnings surprise is in the interval £0.00 ≤ SURP < £0.02 
and 0 if the earnings surprise is in the interval -£0.02 ≤ SURP < £0.00.  The 
results for the JMBE regressions are presented in Table 5.7.  The table also 
reports the marginal effect of the independent variables. 
 
The weak results are attributed to two factors.  Firstly, the evidence from the 
MBE regressions that suggest the dominance of the EPS target in ESOs over 
meeting or beating analysts’ expectations.  This implies that just meeting or 
beating analysts’ forecasts in not the priority of the management when the 
payout from their ESOs needs a different EPS figure to be achieved before their 
ESOs vest.  Secondly, the small number of observations in this sample along 
with the small percentage of the total sample (51 percent) for the JMBE 
regressions in this study.  As mentioned, this is lower than Bauman and Shaw 
(2005) where 73 percent of the firms in their sample fall into the JMBE category 
and Athanasakou et al. (2009) with 71 percent in the JMBE category. 
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Notes: 
 az-stat in brackets; * / ** / *** indicate significance at 10% / 5% / 1%. 
bPseudo R2 is not reported by Stata due to the fact that it is negative. 
The dependent variable JMBE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the earnings 
surprise (SURP) is in the interval £0.00 ≤ SURP < £0.02 and 0 if the earnings surprise is in the 
interval -£0.02 ≤ SURP < £0.00; EPSTARG is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
there is an EPS target in ESOs and 0 otherwise; PROFIT is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of 1 if I/B/E/S actual EPS is positive in the current accounting period, and 0  otherwise; 
Table 5.7 
Logit analysis of the probability of just meeting analysts’ 
forecasts as a function of the test variable and a series of other 
targets and controls. 
  Model 3  Model 4  
 
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
JMBE 
Coefficient 
(z-stat)a 
Marginal 
effect 
JMBE 
Coefficient 
(z-stat) 
Marginal  
effect 
EPSTARG +         -0.098 (0.736) 
-0.024 -0.289 
 (0.476) 
-0.071 
PROFIT + 0.363 (0.443) 
0.090 0.344 
(0.496) 
 0.086 
POS∆EARN +   0.571** (0.016) 
0.141   0.571** 
(0.033) 
 0.141 
VREARN + 0.048 (0.222) 
0.012 0.046 
(0.259) 
 0.011 
GROWTH + -0.044 (0.759) 
-0.011 -0.111 
(0.775) 
- 0.028 
LIT + 0.026 (0.931) 
0.006 0.039 
(0.898) 
 0.010 
SIZE + -0.078 (0.269) 
-0.019 -0.088 
(0.244) 
- 0.022 
MBEt-1 +  0.387* (0.079) 
0.095  0.378* 
(0.090) 
 0.093 
YEAR2002 ? -0.064 (0.818) 
-0.016 -0.071 
(0.803) 
 -0.018 
YEAR2003 ? 0.222 (0.387) 
0.055 0.245 
(0.351) 
 0.060 
VESTED +   -0.316 (0.495) 
-0.078 
TARVEST +   1.068 (0.118) 
 0.257 
GROUP2 ?   0.765 (0.162) 
 0.178 
GROUP3 ?   0.494 (0.243) 
 0.120 
GROUP4 ?     0.568 
       (0.163) 
 0.138 
GROUP2TV ?    -1.487* 
       (0.065) 
-0.339 
GROUP3TV ?          -0.845 (0.155) 
-0.208 
GROUP4TV ?          -0.760 (0.195) 
-0.187 
INDUSTRY DUMMIES  YES  YES  
Pseudo R2 
 N/Ab  N/Ab  
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
 -253.54      -251.02  
CHI-SQUARE  24.17  28.55  
P-VALUE  0.150  0.332  
OBSERVATIONS  386  386  
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POS∆EARN is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if annual change in I/B/E/S actual 
EPS is positive, and 0 otherwise; VREARN is decile portfolios formed each year by sorting R2s 
from industry (Datastream Level 3/6) specific regressions of excess returns (cumulated from the 
month following year t-1 earnings announcement to the month of the year t earnings 
announcement) on annual change in I/B/E/S actual EPS.  Excess returns are firm returns less 
market returns using the FTSE All Shares Index; GROWTH is the change in the book value of 
assets over lagged assets; LIT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm 
belongs to a high-risk industry (biotechnology, computers, electronics and retail), and 0 
otherwise; SIZE is the natural logarithm of fiscal year-end market capitalisation; MBEt-1 is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm met or beat analysts’ forecasts in the prior 
year, and 0 otherwise; YEAR2002 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the year is 
2002 and 0 otherwise; YEAR2003 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the year is 
2003 and 0 otherwise;  VESTED is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if ESOs are 
due to vest in the current year and 0 otherwise; TARVEST is an interaction term defined as 
EPSTARGT*VESTED; GROUP2 includes firms which are in the second and third quartile of the 
MISS3 variable and also have negative UMEPS; GROUP3 includes firms which are in the 
second and third quartile of the MISS3 variable but have positive UMEPS; GROUP4 includes 
firms which fall into the fourth quartile of the MISS3 variable; GROUP2TV is an interaction term 
defined as GROUP2TV*TARVEST ;GROUP3TV is an interaction term defined as 
GROUP3TV*TARVEST; GROUP4TV is an interaction term defined as GROUP4TV*TARVEST. 
 
 
While the number of observations in this sample that fall into the JMBE 
classification is small the results, although weak, appear to confirm that firms 
are more concerned with the target to be met in order for their ESOs to vest 
rather than in just meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts.  
 
In Table 5.7 above, both Model 3 and Model 4 are run without a constant due to 
the lack of observations and the number of categorical variables in the models. 
The results in the JMBE regressions, allowing for the comparatively small 
number and the relatively low percentage of firms falling into the JMBE 
classification would appear to provide some evidence that managers, rewarded 
on the achievement of an EPS target, internalise that target and see it as more 
important.  This motivates the earnings management activities more than 
meeting or beating analysts’ forecast.  
 
The signs on the coefficients are as predicted and, as was the case in the MBE 
regressions, include the negative coefficient on the EPSTARG variable.   
 
Model 3 results show: 
 
• The only variable which is significant is the POS∆EARN variable (0.571, 
P>|Z| = 0.016) which is positive and significant at the 5% level.  
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• The marginal effect figures substantiate the findings in the MBE 
regressions that the presence of an EPS target in ESOs reduces the 
probability that a firm will just meet or beat analysts’ forecasts by 2 
percent, which compares with 4 percent for meeting or beating analysts’ 
forecasts. 
 
• MBEt-1 increases the probability by 10% and YEAR2003 increases it by 
6%.  Even with the small number of observations, the results appear to 
support the results found in the MBE regressions. 
 
Model 4 in Table 5.7 reports a negative coefficient for the GROWTH variable as 
did the extended MBE model ( Model 2).  Model 4 with JMBE as the dependent 
variable, reports a negative coefficient on the SIZE variable; otherwise the sign 
of the coefficients are as predicted.  
 
 
5.4.3 Robustness Tests 
 
An array of robustness tests are performed, none of which alter the main 
inferences.  The results are robust when the measure of growth is replaced with 
that used in Skinner and Sloan (2002) and Athanasakou et al. (2009), that is, 
MTB in both Model 1 and Model 2.  Following Bauman and Shaw (2005) and 
substituting LNASSET for SIZE, both Model 1 and Model 2 return the same 
results.  Table 5.8 presents the results of the models with LNASSET and MBE 
as the dependent variable.  The table also reports the marginal effect of the 
independent variables. 
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Notes: 
az-stat in brackets; * / ** / *** indicate significance at 10% / 5% / 1%. 
The dependent variable is MBE which is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
earnings surprise (SURP) is 0 or positive, and 0 otherwise; EPSTARG is an indicator variable 
Table 5.8 
Logit analysis of the probability of meeting analysts’ forecasts as 
a function of the test variable and a series of other targets and 
controls.  Substituting LNASSET for SIZE. 
  Model 1  Model 2  
 
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
MBE 
Coefficient 
(z-stat)a 
Marginal 
effect 
MBE 
Coefficient 
(z-stat) 
Marginal  
effect 
Intercept ?  -3.253*** 
        (0.009)  
-3.624** 
(0.007)  
EPSTARG +         -0.165 
        (0.415) 
-0.041       -0.273 
(0.323) 
     -0.068 
PROFIT + 0.893*** (0.001) 
0.211         0.875*** 
(0.002) 
0.207 
POS∆EARN + 0.921*** (0.000) 
0.225 0.946*** 
      (0.000) 
0.231 
VREARN + 0.047 (0.103) 
0.012        0.050 
     ( 0.085) 
0.013 
GROWTH + 0.106 (0.687) 
0.026        0.044 
      (0.875) 
0.011 
LIT +          0.166 
        (0.464) 
0.042        0.121 
      (0.608) 
0.030 
LNASSET +          0.021 
        (0.727) 
0.005 0.018 
      (0.774) 
0.004 
MBEt-1 + 0.502*** (0.002) 
0.125        0.514*** 
      (0.001) 
0.128 
YEAR2002 ? 0.205 (0.295) 
0.051        0.171 
      (0.399) 
0.043 
YEAR2003 ? 0.457** 
        (0.017) 
0.114 0.446** 
      (0.025) 
0.111 
VESTED +          0.005 
      (0.988) 
0.001 
TARVEST +          0.802* 
      (0.096) 
0.198 
GROUP2 ?          0.607 
     (0.106) 
0.150 
GROUP3 ?         0.103 
     (0.730) 
0.026 
GROUP4 ?         0.783**      
     (0.010)       
0.193 
GROUP2TV ?        -0.685 
     (0.224) 
     -0.163 
GROUP3TV ?        -0.409 
     (0.333) 
   -0.100 
GROUP4TV ?        -1.338*** 
     (0.002) 
   -0.298 
INDUSTRY DUMMIES  YES  YES  
Pseudo R2 
 0.0804  0.0939  
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
 -483.79          -476.73  
CHI-SQUARE  76.49            86.46  
P-VALUE  0.000  0.000  
OBSERVATIONS  760  760  
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that takes the value of 1 if there is an EPS target in ESOs and 0 otherwise; PROFIT is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if I/B/E/S actual EPS is positive in the current 
accounting period, and 0  otherwise; POS∆EARN is an indicator variable that takes the value of 
1 if annual change in I/B/E/S actual EPS is positive, and 0 otherwise; VREARN is decile 
portfolios formed each year by sorting R2s from industry (Datastream Level 3/6) specific 
regressions of excess returns (cumulated from the month following year t-1 earnings 
announcement to the month of the year t earnings announcement) on annual change in I/B/E/S 
actual EPS.  Excess returns are firm returns less market returns using the FTSE All Shares 
Index; GROWTH is the change in the book value of assets over lagged assets; LIT is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm belongs to a high-risk industry 
(biotechnology, computers, electronics and retail), and 0 otherwise; LNASSET is the natural 
logarithm  of the end of year total assets; MBEt-1 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 
if the firm met or beat analysts’ forecasts in the prior year, and 0 otherwise; YEAR2002 is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the year is 2002 and 0 otherwise; YEAR2003 is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the year is 2003 and 0 otherwise;  VESTED is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if ESOs are due to vest in the current year and 0 
otherwise; TARVEST is an interaction term defined as EPSTARGT*VESTED; GROUP2 
includes firms which are in the second and third quartile of the MISS3 variable and also have 
negative UMEPS; GROUP3 includes firms which are in the second and third quartile of the 
MISS3 variable but have positive UMEPS; GROUP4 includes firms which fall into the fourth 
quartile of the MISS3 variable; GROUP2TV is an interaction term defined as 
GROUP2TV*TARVEST ;GROUP3TV is an interaction term defined as GROUP3TV*TARVEST; 
GROUP4TV is an interaction term defined as GROUP4TV*TARVEST. 
 
 
Table 5.9 below presents the results of the models with LNASSET.  In both 
Model 3 and Model 4, the models are run without a constant due to the lack of 
observations and the number of categorical variables in the models.  The table 
also reports the marginal effect of the independent variables.  In Model 3, 
substituting MTB for GROWTH results in no changes to the results.  Likewise, 
replacing SIZE with LNASSET causes no changes in the results.  In Model 4, 
substituting MTB for GROWTH returns in GROUP2TV becoming significant at 
5% rather than significant at 10% (-1.679, P>|Z| = 0.041).  The results are 
robust to the replacement of SIZE with LNASSET. 
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Notes: 
 az-stat in brackets; * / ** / *** indicate significance at 10% / 5% / 1%. 
bPseudo R2 is not reported by Stata due to the fact that it is negative. 
The dependent variable JMBE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the earnings 
surprise (SURP) is in the interval £0.00 ≤ SURP < £0.02 and 0 if the earnings surprise is in the 
interval -£0.02 ≤ SURP < £0.00; EPSTARG is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
Table 5.9 
Logit analysis of the probability of just meeting analysts’ 
forecasts as a function of the test variable and a series of other 
targets and controls.   Substituting LNASSET for SIZE. 
  Model 3  Model 4  
 
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
JMBE 
Coefficient 
(z-stat)a 
Marginal 
effect 
JMBE 
Coefficient 
(z-stat) 
Marginal  
effect 
EPSTARG +         -0.087 (0.764) 
-0.021 -0.287 
 (0.479) 
-0.070 
PROFIT + 0.380 (0.422) 
0.095 0.364 
(0.473) 
 0.091 
POS∆EARN +   0.550** (0.019) 
0.136    0.558** 
(0.025) 
 0.138 
VREARN + 0.048 (0.223) 
0.012 0.045 
(0.266) 
 0.011 
GROWTH + -0.060 (0.870) 
-0.015 -0.124 
(0.751) 
- 0.031 
LIT + 0.028 (0.925) 
0.007 0.040 
(0.896) 
 0.010 
LNASSET + -0.086 (0.198) 
-0.021 -0.092 
(0.196) 
 0.023 
MBEt-1 +  0.383* (0.082) 
0.094  0.377* 
(0.091) 
 0.093 
YEAR2002 ? -0.044 (0.873) 
-0.011 -0.043 
(0.880) 
 -0.011 
YEAR2003 ? 0.238 (0.356) 
0.059 0.263 
(0.320) 
 0.065 
VESTED +   -0.321 (0.488) 
-0.079 
TARVEST +   1.086 (0.113) 
 0.261 
GROUP2 ?   0.724 (0.182) 
 0.169 
GROUP3 ?   0.449 (0.286) 
 0.110 
GROUP4 ?     0.530 
       (0.187) 
 0.129 
GROUP2TV ?    -1.503* 
       (0.063) 
-0.342 
GROUP3TV ?          -0.844 (0.156) 
-0.208 
GROUP4TV ?          -0.780 (0.184) 
-0.192 
INDUSTRY DUMMIES  YES  YES  
Pseudo R2 
 N/Ab  N/Ab  
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
 -253.34  -250.86  
CHI-SQUARE  24.33  28.50  
P-VALUE  0.145  0.334  
OBSERVATIONS  386  386  
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there is an EPS target in ESOs and 0 otherwise; PROFIT is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of 1 if I/B/E/S actual EPS is positive in the current accounting period, and 0  otherwise; 
POS∆EARN is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if annual change in I/B/E/S actual 
EPS is positive, and 0 otherwise; VREARN is decile portfolios formed each year by sorting R2s 
from industry (Datastream Level 3/6) specific regressions of excess returns (cumulated from the 
month following year t-1 earnings announcement to the month of the year t earnings 
announcement) on annual change in I/B/E/S actual EPS.  Excess returns are firm returns less 
market returns using the FTSE All Shares Index; LNASSET is the natural logarithm  of the end 
of year total assets; MTB is the market-to-book ratio defined as the year-end share price per 
share divided by the book value of shareholders’ funds per share; LIT is an indicator variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the firm belongs to a high-risk industry (biotechnology, computers, 
electronics and retail), and 0 otherwise; LNASSET is the natural logarithm  of the end of year 
total assets; MBEt-1 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm met or beat 
analysts’ forecasts in the prior year, and 0 otherwise; YEAR2002 is an indicator variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the year is 2002 and 0 otherwise; YEAR2003 is an indicator variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the year is 2003 and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
Matsumoto (2002) includes institutional ownership as a control variable 
following Lang and McNichols (1997) who present evidence consistent with 
institutional investors trading based on earnings surprise.  When INSTOWN is 
included in Model 2, this variable is negative and not significant and the number 
of observations falls to 747 due to the unavailability of this variable for some 
firms in the sample.  The only change is that TARVEST becomes significant at 
the 10% level (0.889, P>|Z| = 0.066).  This is particularly interesting as 
institutional investors backed the introduction of a performance target in ESOs 
to reduce agency costs in an attempt to focus management on the long term.  
This result would seem to suggest that managers are more motivated to meet 
the EPS performance target in a year when there are ESOs with an EPS 
performance target due to vest. 
 
Including INSTOWN has no impact on Model 1.  Including INSTOWN in Model 
2 results in YEAR2003 being significant at the 10% level as opposed to being 
significant at 5% when INSTOWN is not included in the model.  When 
INSTOWN is included in Model 3, MBEt-1 is no longer significant and INSTOWN 
is significant at the 5% level (-0.16, P>|Z| = 0.019) and the number of 
observations is reduced by one to 385.  Likewise, in the extended JMBE model, 
the number of observations is reduced to 385 and MBEt-1 is no longer 
significant and INSTOWN is significant at the 5% level (-0.16, P>|Z| = 0.019). 
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The following corporate governance variables are included; BLOCK, BRDOWN, 
NEDS and BRDSIZE, although these are not usually included in MBE studies15 
to see whether they have any impact on the regression results.  These 
corporate governance variables have no impact on the significance levels of 
variables in Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3.  In Model 4 MBEt-1 is no longer 
significant and GROUP2TV becomes significant at 5% rather than 10% when 
these corporate governance variables are not included. 
 
When GROWTH and SIZE are winsorised at the 99% level, there are no 
changes in the significance of the variables in Model 1.  In Model 2, TARVEST 
becomes significant at the 10% level (-0.825, P>|Z| = 0.089) and GROUP4 
becomes significant at the 1% level (-0.841, P>|Z| = 0.007).  Both Model 1 and 
Model 2 have MBE as the dependent variable. 
 
In Model 3, where JMBE is the dependent variable, winsoring GROWTH and 
SIZE at the 99% level has no impact on the results of the model.  The only 
change in Model 4 which has JMBE as the dependent variable, TARVEST 
becomes significant at the 10% level (1.152, P>|Z| = 0.096). 
 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
 
The objective of this chapter was to study the inter-relationship between an 
EPS target in ESOs and the probability of meeting or beating analysts’ EPS 
forecasts.  Given the presence of an EPS target in ESOs, there are two 
possible consequences.  Firstly, the presence of an EPS target might make it 
easier for analysts to make accurate forecasts on the premise that the targets 
provide analysts with useful information.  Under this scenario, a positive 
association would be expected between an EPS target and MBE.  Secondly, 
managers awarded on the achievement of an EPS target, internalise that target 
and see it as more important than meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts. 
 
                                            
15
 Apart from studies specifically interested in the association between governance and forecast 
accuracy like Bhat, Hope and Kang (2006). 
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It is impossible to predict ex ante which of the above will be the consequence of 
an EPS target in ESOs. 
 
The evidence in this chapter, in particular the significant negative relationship 
between firms in GROUP4TV and MBE suggests that opportunistic behaviour 
by management dominates the meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts game.  
Firms with EPS larger than the growth required to allow the vesting of their 
ESOs, would appear to give precedence to managing earnings downwards 
rather than managing to meet or beat analysts’ expectations. 
 
While the JMBE results appear to confirm the findings, the interpretation of the 
results is very limited due to the small number of firms falling into this category.  
Again, the fact that the growth in EPS is a cumulative three-year growth figure 
renders both MBE and JMBE less important, given the research design which 
compares one year of MBE and JMBE with a three-year growth rate target.  
Intuitively, MBE would be a more appropriate measure to decide between the 
incentives faced by managers regarding meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts 
and meeting an EPS target in their ESOs.  The reasoning behind this claim is 
that because the EPS target in ESOs is cumulative, there are firms which will 
need to not just meet but beat analysts’ forecasts by large amounts if they have 
poor EPS growth in either, or both of, the two previous years which are included 
to determine whether the conditions for vesting have been met. 
 
The separation of ownership and control in firms, has led policy makers and 
interested parties, for example institutional investors, to try to structure 
executive compensation in such a way that the interests of owners and their 
agents will be aligned.  One such effort involves attaching performance 
conditions to ESOs, so that they are vesting not just on the passage of time but 
on the achievement of a performance target also.  In the UK, the most popular 
target in ESOs is the achievement of a specified rate of growth in EPS, usually 
above the RPI over a three-year period.  The objective is an attempt to focus 
managers’ efforts on long-term achievements as opposed to short-term goals, 
which was the situation prior to Greenbury (1995).  The Greenbury Report was 
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the first to propose the idea of performance targets being attached to executive 
remuneration components. 
 
A limitation to this study, is the practice whereby  EPS targets in ESOs are 
cumulative in the majority of firms over a three-year period, meaning that 
whether or not the target is met in a particular vesting year is dependent on the 
growth in EPS in that year along with being dependent on the growth over the 
previous two years.  A second limitation in that the number of observations is 
relatively small. 
 
The results seem to support the growing evidence that managers are willing to 
sacrifice economic value to meet short-term earnings objectives.  In particular, it 
appears from the results in this chapter, and those of Chapters 3 and 4, that 
managers with an EPS target in their ESOs behave opportunistically in an effort 
to maximise the payouts from their ESOs.  In other words, the inclusion of an 
EPS target in ESOs does not result in an efficient contract. 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
The central aim of this thesis is to classify the behaviour of executives as 
opportunistic or efficient through a study of the impact of an EPS target in 
components of executive remuneration on company accounting choices.  This 
required in the first instance, a study to test for any association between an EPS 
target and various components of executive remuneration.  The sample firms 
are UK-based, where practice has evolved to include an EPS growth target that 
is required to be met before any payout from ESOs is earned. 
 
The research design contributes to the literature on corporate governance and 
executive remuneration by identifying a specific contractual setting where 
management is particularly sensitive to reported earnings numbers.  This 
particular setting is novel.  Additionally, the research design facilitated the 
testing of whether or not executive share options with an EPS share growth 
target results in opportunistic behaviour on the part of managers or represents 
efficient contracting.  Additionally, it provided an opportunity to determine the 
preference of management among various earning measures.  From the 
results, it can be concluded that overall the design of executive remuneration 
affects managerial accounting choices in ways that may serve to reduce the 
informativeness of accounting earnings. 
 
The remainder of this chapter highlights the main theoretical, methodological 
and empirical conclusions regarding executive compensation which can be 
drawn from the research undertaken for this thesis. 
 
 
6.2 Summary of the Main Findings 
 
The research starts from the premise presented in Chapter 2, which is agency 
theory.  According to this theory, the shareholders are the principal (owners) 
and the executives are employed as agents to manage the company on behalf 
of the owners.  This separation of ownership and control results in the need to 
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monitor the actions of the agents and to encourage the agents to act in the best 
interest of the principal.  As outlined in Chapter 2, a basic assumption of agency 
theory is that individuals are rational, will seek to maximise their own expected 
utilities, and are resourceful and innovative in so doing. 
 
Financial accounting information has a role in valuation (determining stock 
prices) and in governance (control).  This thesis focuses on the latter and 
addresses one control mechanism, that is, executive remuneration 
compensation contracts.  Agency theory plays an important role in providing a 
framework for modelling this conflict of interests, the design of compensation 
contracts and in analysing contract effectiveness. 
 
The disclosure study in Chapter 3 establishes that an EPS target in ESOs is 
positively and significantly associated with the probability of the decision to 
disclose an alternative EPS figure.  The addition of the exploratory variable, 
EPSTARGO, increases the probability that an alternative EPS will be disclosed 
by 13 percent.  Also, both the chi-square test and the likelihood-ratio test 
indicated that the extended model with the EPSTARGO is a better fit than the 
nested model which excludes this variable.  The results show a negative 
association between bonus plans and the disclosure decision and find no 
association with LTIPs and the disclosure of an alternative EPS figure.  The 
findings in Chapter 3 suggest that contractual considerations do influence the 
disclosure choice.  This adds to prior research findings which find the disclosure 
decision as an effort by management to report adjusted EPS when this is a 
better measure of sustainable earnings.  
 
Given that Chapter 3 finds ESOs to be the only component of executive 
remuneration to be significantly associated with the decision to disclose an 
alternative EPS figure, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 both focus on this component 
of executive remuneration.  For the empirical studies in Chapters 4 and 5, the 
sample size is increased by the addition of two further sample years.  This is to 
allow sufficient observations in the various groups to permit meaningful 
statistical analysis.  These chapters are concerned with classifying executive 
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behaviour in conjunction with a measure of how close or otherwise they are 
from the EPS growth target which needs to be reached in order for the ESOs to 
vest.  This required defining a proxy for the EPS growth target as information to 
calculate the actual EPS growth target is not provided in the Annual Reports 
and Accounts.  
 
Chapter 4 has as the dependent variable raw AWCA which are used to reflect 
the earnings management choices of firms.  The raw AWCA is used as 
opposed to absolute AWCA as the direction of earnings management is what is 
of interest with respect to testing the hypotheses.  Absolute AWCA would be an 
appropriate dependent variable if the interest was in whether or not earnings 
management occurs and if the study was not concerned with the direction of 
any such earnings management.  Earnings management is when managers 
select estimates and/or reporting methods that result in information in financial 
reports that does not reflect the firm’s true position and performance.  This can 
lead to either (1) the misleading of stakeholders and/or (2) the influencing of 
contractual outcomes which rely on reported accounting figures. 
 
By classifying firms as to how close they are to the EPS growth target, this 
thesis finds evidence similar to Healy (1985) which is that there are situations 
when managers, as a result of their remuneration contract, have incentives to 
manage earnings downwards in addition to there being situations where 
managers have incentives to manage upwards.  The analysis here would be 
strengthened, in all probability, if the sample size was larger.  Again, not having 
the actual EPS growth target meant a proxy had to be defined for this.  Having 
the true EPS growth target would further enhance the research.  Despite this, 
the results from this earnings management study together with the meet or beat 
study, the proxy appears to reflect what it is designed to measure, that is, the 
actual EPS growth target.  As a policy implication, all firms should be required to 
publish the targets and the specific EPS measure used to define the targets. 
 
The findings in Chapter 4 show that 78 percent of the sample firms have ESOs 
with an EPS target.  The existence of an EPS target is significant in all of the 
 213 
regressions, with raw AWCA as the dependent variable.  Broadly the findings 
are in agreement with managers behaving opportunistically.  Firms are 
classified as to the distance between the actual EPS growth and the target EPS 
growth. 
 
When a further criteria is used, that is, the sign of unmanaged EPS to determine 
whether firms are close to the target EPS growth the results find that firms close 
to but below the target will use positive abnormal accruals, firms close to but 
above the target will use negative abnormal accruals and for firms above the 
target, abnormal accruals are negative as expected but the association is not 
significant.  If a target is not going to be met, there are incentives to manage 
earnings downwards and the findings show that if unmanaged earnings are 
above the required target, firms have incentives to manage earnings 
downwards. 
 
Prior research establishes that management have a hierarchy when reporting 
earnings numbers (Degeorge et al. 1999).  Chapter 5 considers one such 
potential member of this hierarchy, namely, analysts’ forecasts of EPS from 
I/B/E/S which ties in nicely with the variable of interest, alternative EPS, as the 
I/B/E/S EPS is regarded as being close to the alternative EPS figure that firms 
report.   
 
Chapter 5 studies the inter-relationship between an EPS target in ESOs and the 
probability of meeting or beating analysts’ EPS forecasts.  Bauman and Shaw 
(2005) show that meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts is positively related to 
the use of options in executives’ compensation plans and the more options, the 
more the firms just meet or beat analysts’ earnings surprises.  They define 
management incentive as the percentage of SBC in total executive 
compensation.  Chapter 5 has as the measure of incentive whether or not 
ESOs with an EPS target can meet the target and thus vest.  The evidence in 
this chapter, in particular the significant negative relationship between firms 
which are above the required EPS growth target and meeting or beating 
analysts’ forecasts suggests that opportunistic behaviour by management to 
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maximise payout from their ESOs takes precedence over meeting or beating 
analysts’ forecast.  As in Chapter 4, there is a need to add a caveat regarding 
the number of observations.   
 
The results of the logit regression confirm prior findings that reporting a positive 
profit figure, an increase on the prior year’s profit and lagged MBE are all 
significant and positively related to whether or not the firm meets or beats 
analysts’ forecasts.  The existence of an EPS target in ESOs is significant and 
negative at the 10% level when the GROUP variables are not included in the 
logit model.  The existence of an EPS target in ESOs, while negative is not 
significant in the model which includes the GROUP variables.  However, the 
marginal effect suggests that the existence of an EPS target in ESOs reduces 
the probability of meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts by 8 percent. 
 
For firms in any GROUP with EPS targets in their ESOs which are due to vest 
in a particular year, there is a marginal effect of 19 percent which gives some 
credence to the premise that analysts are aware of the targets and forecast to 
these targets. 
 
The interaction term representing firms which report profits greater than EPS 
target in their ESOs, and have ESOs due to vest in that year is negative and 
significant at the 1% level.  This leads to the inference that the EPS target in the 
ESOs is given priority by managers over meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts. 
 
In summary, the evidence from the earnings management and MBE studies 
together, while weak, suggests that some managers with ESOs with an EPS 
target appear to be seeking to achieve their target and game the reporting 
system.  These managers are likely less interested in shareholders’ interests 
than their own. 
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6.3 Policy Implications 
 
SBC as a component of executive remuneration is an attempt to align the 
interests of agents and principals.  Awarding ESOs is one such form of SBC.  
During bull markets, executives benefited from these share options even when 
their firm performed poorly.  This gave rise to the introduction of performance 
criteria into ESOs as an attempt to address this.  A performance criterion in 
ESOs was introduced in an attempt to better align the principal and agents 
incentives, in particular, to reward executives for the performance of their firm 
and not for market performance.  A second motivation was to change the 
decision-making focus of an executive’s decision horizon away from the short 
term towards the long term. 
 
This research suggests that as a policy decision to address the perceived 
shortcomings of awarding share options which do not have performance 
criteria, the introduction of an EPS performance criteria in ESOs may not have 
had the desired effect.  The performance criterion of an EPS target in ESOs, 
suggests that managers may be able to circumvent the performance demands 
of their EPS targets by gaming the reporting system rather than actually 
achieving the target.  This suggests that more needs to be done to tighten up 
the contracts so far as EPS targets are concerned.  The targets should be made 
public, and the ability to make accounting choices to achieve EPS targets 
should be controlled.  Boards and directors, audit committees and remuneration 
committees should be required to take the measures necessary to prevent 
corporate executives from influencing accounting choices in their favour at the 
expense of shareholders. 
 
 
6.4 Limitations 
 
The substantial data requirements skew the sample toward larger firms, so the 
results may not generalise.  In addition, evidence on the opportunistic behaviour 
of management depends on the effectiveness of abnormal accruals as a proxy 
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for earnings management.  Earnings management (accounting discretion) is 
estimated, not observed, which leaves our inferences subject to the standard 
caveats regarding inherent measurement error in the earnings management 
measure (raw AWCA). 
 
Similarly, although this study is among the first to investigate the impact of an 
EPS target in ESOs in the UK, the persuasiveness of the evidence in this thesis 
depends critically on the proxy for the EPS growth target which ESOs have to 
attain in order to vest. 
 
Additionally, the EPS growth targets in ESOs are cumulative for the majority of 
ESOs over a three-year period.  Whether or not the target is met in a particular 
vesting year is dependent on the growth in EPS in that year along with being 
dependent on the growth over the previous two years. 
 
This study focuses on the short-term discretion by management (disclosure of 
an alternative EPS figure, raw AWCA and meeting or beating analysts’ 
forecasts) which is one stream of research in financial accounting, and does not 
address a second stream which consists of valuation-oriented papers that show 
that accruals predict future cash flow and earnings. 
 
The measurement of the incentives for management from their ESOs applied in 
this study, does not incorporate a consideration of the monetary value.  Rather 
it considers incentives which arise from ESOs per se and incentives from 
whether or not some ESOs are due to vest in a particular year. 
 
 
6.5 Opportunities for Future Research 
 
The studies in this thesis do not provide evidence that managers (or their firms) 
are better off as a result of taking actions as a consequence of the existence of 
an EPS target in their ESOs.  A natural extension of research to address this 
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question would examine the extent to which the stock market can undo the 
effect of any opportunism in the accounting choices of management. 
 
To find out more about the behaviour of management, an obvious avenue to 
pursue would be to increase the sample size and carry out a longitudinal study 
consisting of a greater number of firm-year observations. 
 
Along with considering the particular accounting choices in this thesis – 
disclosure of an alternative EPS figure, earnings management, and meeting or 
beating analysts’ forecasts – other discretionary choices by management could 
be considered, of which a prime example would be the repurchase of shares. 
 
 
6.6 Conclusions 
 
This thesis has contributed to the literature on corporate governance and 
executive remuneration, by considering a contractual motivation for the decision 
to disclose an alternative EPS figure by UK firms.  This adds to the literature 
whose findings support the disclosure decision as an effort by management to 
report adjusted EPS when this is a better measure of sustainable earnings 
(Choi et al. 2005).  
 
The development of a proxy for the EPS growth target along with the 
development of a methodology to classify firms as to whether or not they are 
close to the EPS growth target which must be met before their ESOs vest, 
contributes to the literature on the impact of a particular executive remuneration 
practice in the design of executive remuneration compensation contracts. 
 
This thesis identifies a specific contractual setting where management is 
particularly sensitive to reported earnings numbers, that is, there is an EPS 
target which has to be achieved in order for ESOs to vest.   This particular 
setting is novel and results in an interesting study of the tensions that 
management face with respect to multiple earnings measures, which include 
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reporting positive profit, reporting an increase in profit, meeting or beating 
analysts’ forecasts, and any EPS target in their compensation structure.  It adds 
to the considerable literature which documents that firms manage reported 
earnings to meet certain reporting goals.  Examples of three such oft-cited 
thresholds from Degeorge et al. (1999) are to report positive profits; sustain 
prior year earnings level; and analysts’ forecasts.  This study adds an additional 
threshold, which is an EPS target in ESOs. 
 
As much of agency research into executive remuneration is set in the US 
environment where EPS targets in ESOs are not common, the UK provides a 
unique opportunity to examine the impact of such targets.  This thesis 
contributes to the debate between those who argue whether the design of 
executive remuneration represents efficient contracting or is a result of 
managerial power. 
 
The findings of this thesis suggest that when designing executive remuneration 
contracts it is necessary to be cognisant of the fact that such contracts have the 
ability to induce opportunistic accounting choices.  Consequently, the quality of 
the information set available to investors may be undermined. 
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Variable Definition 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
NDISCL Takes the value of 1 if the firm discloses an adjusted 
EPS figures, 0 otherwise.    
  
 
Test Variables 
 
NEGIBES Takes the value of 1 if EPSIBES ≤ 0, 0 otherwise. 
 
NEGPOS Takes the value of 1 if EPSFRS3 < 0 EPSIBES > 0, 0 
otherwise.  
 
MAGDIFF MAGDIFF16 is the absolute price-scaled difference 
between EPSIBES and EPSFRS3. 
 
 
Control Variables 
 
SIZE The natural logarithm of fiscal year-end market 
capitalisation. 
 
MTB The market-to-book ratio. 
 
NANAL The natural logarithm of the number of analysts from 
I/B/E/S following a firm at the end of year t. 
 
PAGES The natural logarithm of the number of pages in the 
published financial statements for the year t. 
 
                                            
16
 MAGDIFF = │EPSFRS3 - EPSIBES │/Pi,t 
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Indicator Variables 
 
MAGDIFFINC Interaction between MAGDIFF and an indicator 
variable taking the value of 1 where EPSIBES is 
positive and materially greater than EPSFRS3, 0 
otherwise. 
 
MAGDIFFDEC Interaction between MAGDIFF and an indicator 
variable taking the value of 1 where EPSIBES is 
positive but materially less than EPSFRS3, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
Exploratory Variables 
  
EPSTARGB Takes the value of 1 if the bonus plan has an EPS 
performance target, 0 otherwise. 
 
EPSTARGO Takes the value of 1 if the ESO plan has an EPS 
performance target, 0 otherwise. 
 
EPSTARGL Takes the value of 1 if the LTIP plan has an EPS 
performance target, 0 otherwise. 
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Variable  Definition 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Raw AWCA   Signed abnormal working capital accruals.  
 
 
Exploratory Variable 
 
EPSTARG Takes the value of 1 if the ESOs have an EPS target, 0 
otherwise. 
 
 
Control Variables 
 
LEV   Total book value of debt over total assets. 
 
ISSUE Takes the value of 1 if the number of shares outstanding 
increases by more than 10 percent in the next accounting 
period, 0 otherwise. 
 
GROWTH Change in the book value of assets over lagged assets. 
 
SIZE Natural logarithm of fiscal year-end market capitalisation. 
 
RISK Measured as the volatility of share price over 60 monthly 
observations before the year of study similar to Aggarwal 
and Samwick (1999). 
 
CVSALES Coefficient of variation of sales =  
 
    Standard deviation of the previous 5 years sales 
                      Mean of the previous 5 year sales 
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YEAR2001  Takes the value of 1 if year is 2001, 0 otherwise. 
 
YEAR2002  Takes the value of 1 if year is 2002, 0 otherwise. 
 
YEAR2003  Takes the value of 1 if year is 2003, 0 otherwise. 
 
UMEPS Following Lara, Osma and Mora (2005) UMEPS is equal to 
earnings before extraordinary items per share minus 
abnormal accruals per share, deflated by share price at the 
beginning of the period. 
 
VESTED Takes the value of 1 if ESOs are due to vest in the current 
year, 0 otherwise. 
 
TARVEST  EPSTARG*VESTED. 
 
ACTUAL3   Three-year increase/decrease in actual EPS. 
 
TARGET3   Three-year increase/decrease in target EPS. 
 
MISS3  Actual increase/decrease in EPS over three years minus 
the industry median increase/decrease in EPS over three 
years (target). 
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Corporate Governance Variables  
 
(Supplied by Manifest Information Services Ltd.) 
 
BLOCK Takes the value of 1 if the firm has an external stockholder 
owning ≥ 5% of the outstanding shares at the fiscal year-
end, 0 otherwise.  
 
BRDOWN Percentage of outstanding shares owned by members of 
the board at the fiscal year-end. 
 
NEDS Percentage of non-executive directors on the board. 
 
BRDSIZE Total number of board members. 
 
 
 
Alternative corporate governance variables used for robustness tests 
 
TEN Takes the value of 1 if the firm has an external stockholder 
owning ≥ 10% of the outstanding shares at the fiscal year-
end, 0 otherwise.  
 
INSTOWN The percentage of outstanding shares at each year-end 
held by outside block holders. 
 
DUAL  Takes the value of 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of the 
board, 0 otherwise. 
 
CEOREM Takes the value of 1 if the CEO is a member of the 
Remuneration Committee, 0 otherwise. 
 
BIG4 Takes the value of 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big 
4 audit firms, 0 otherwise. 
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Group Definitions 
 
Method A 
 
GROUPA Takes the value of 1 if MISS3 is in the bottom quartile, 0 
otherwise. 
 
GROUPB Takes the value of 1 if MISS3 is in the second quartile, 0 
otherwise. 
 
GROUPC Takes the value of 1 if MISS3 is in the third quartile, 0 
otherwise. 
 
GROUPD Takes the value of 1 if MISS3 is in the top quartile, 0 
otherwise. 
 
GROUPATV Equals GROUPA*TARVEST. 
 
GROUPBTV Equals GROUPB*TARVEST. 
 
GROUPCTV  Equals GROUPC*TARVEST. 
 
GROUPDTV Equals GROUPD*TARVEST. 
 
 
Method B 
 
GROUP1 Takes the value of 1 if MISS3 is in the bottom quartile, 0 
otherwise. 
 
GROUP2 Takes the value of 1 if MISS3 is in the second quartile and 
UMEPS <0, 0 otherwise. 
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GROUP3 Takes the value of 1 if MISS3 is in the third quartile and 
UMEPS >0, 0 otherwise. 
 
GROUP4 Takes the value of 1 if MISS3 is in the top quartile, 0 
otherwise. 
 
GROUP1TV Equals GROUP1*TARVEST. 
 
GROUP2TV Equals GROUP2*TARVEST. 
 
GROUP3TV  Equals GROUP3*TARVEST. 
 
GROUP4TV Equals GROUP4*TARVEST. 
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Variable Definition 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
MBE Takes the value of 1 if the earnings surprise (SURP) is 0 or 
positive, 0 otherwise.  SURP is the difference between 
I/B/E/S actual EPS and the latest forecast for the year 
made prior to the earnings announcement date (AFO).  In 
line with Bartov, Givoly and Hayn (2002) and Athanasakou 
et al. (2009), the latest forecast to precede the earnings 
release date by at least three days is chosen to ensure 
knowledge of the actual earnings figure does not 
contaminate the forecast, 0 otherwise. 
 
JMBE Takes the value of 1 if the earnings surprise (SURP) is in 
the interval £0.00 ≤ SURP < £0.02 and 0 if the earnings 
surprise is in the interval -£0.02 ≤ SURP < £0.00. 
 
 
Exploratory Variable 
 
EPSTARG Takes the value of 1 if the ESOs have an EPS target, 0 
otherwise. 
 
 
Incentive Variables 
 
PROFIT Takes the value of 1 if I/B/E/S actual EPS is positive in the 
current accounting period, 0 otherwise. 
 
POS∆EARN Takes the value of 1 if annual change in I/B/E/S actual EPS 
is positive, 0 otherwise. 
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VREARN Decile portfolios formed each year by sorting R2s from 
industry (Datastream Level 3/6) specific regressions of 
excess returns (cumulated from the month following year t-
1 earnings announcement to the month of the year t 
earnings announcement) on annual change in I/B/E/S 
actual EPS.  Excess returns are firm returns less market 
returns using the FTSE All Shares Index.  Returns are from 
Datastream.  Consistent with Athanasakou et al. (2009) the 
value of 0 is assigned to firms in the smallest decile 
through 9 for firms in the largest decile. 
 
GROWTH Change in the book value of assets over lagged assets. 
 
LIT Takes the value of 1 if the firm belongs to a high-risk 
industry (biotechnology, computers, electronics and retail), 
0 otherwise. 
 
 
Control Variables 
 
SIZE Natural logarithm of fiscal year-end market capitalisation. 
 
MBEt-1  Lagged MBE. 
 
INDPROD Average annual growth in industrial production adjusted for 
inflation. 
 
 
Other Variables 
 
YEAR2001  Takes the value of 1 if year is 2001, 0 otherwise. 
 
YEAR2002  Takes the value of 1 if year is 2002, 0 otherwise. 
 
YEAR2003  Takes the value of 1 if year is 2003, 0 otherwise. 
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VESTED Takes the value of 1 if ESOs are due to vest in the current 
year, 0 otherwise. 
 
TARVEST  EPSTARGT*VESTED. 
 
MTB  The market-to-book ratio defined as the year-end share 
price per share divided by the book value of shareholders’ 
funds per share. 
 
LNASSET The natural logarithm of the end of year total assets. 
 
INSTOWN The percentage of outstanding shares at each year-end 
held by outside block holders. 
 
MISS3  Actual increase/decrease in EPS over three years minus 
the industry median increase/decrease in EPS over three 
years (target). 
 
UMEPS Following Lara, Osma and Mora (2005) UMEPS is equal to 
earnings before extraordinary items per share minus 
abnormal accruals per share, deflated by share price at the 
beginning of the period. 
 
 
Group Definitions 
 
GROUP1 Takes the value of 1 if MISS317 is in the bottom 
quartile, 0 otherwise. 
 
GROUP2 Takes the value of 1 if MISS3 is in the second quartile and 
UMEPS <0, 0 otherwise. 
 
                                            
17
 MISS3 is defined in chapter 4 as the difference between the actual three-year EPS growth 
(ACTUAL3) minus the performance target three-year EPS growth (TARGET3). 
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GROUP3 Takes the value of 1 if MISS3 is in the third quartile and 
UMEPS >0, 0 otherwise. 
 
GROUP4 Takes the value of 1 if MISS3 is in the top quartile, 
0 otherwise. 
 
GROUP1TV Equals GROUP1*TARVEST. 
 
GROUP2TV Equals GROUP2*TARVEST. 
 
GROUP3TV  Equals GROUP3*TARVEST. 
 
GROUP4TV Equals GROUP4*TARVEST. 
 
